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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
On December 18, 2003, an award ceremony took place in 
Government House in Central. The website of ESDLife (Electronic 
Service Delivery Life) won the award for ‘Best e-Government Services in 
Asia’ in 2003 -- a prize awarded by the Geneva-based, United 
Nations-endorsed World Summit on the Information Society.  
 
Promoting information technology has been one of the most 
prominent government agendas of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region since its establishment on July 1, 1997. The 
‘digital 21IT Strategy’ (which is basically a list of self-declared 
government goals which include buzzwords like government 
leadership, sustainable e-government programme, infrastructure and 
business environment, institutional review, technological development, 
vibrant IT industry, human resources in a knowledge economy, bridging 
the digital divide) was initiated as a government initiative to face the 
(so-called) challenges brought about by information technology i . 
ESDLife as a portal website through which people can gain access to a 
whole range of government and business services as well as 
information such as booking leisure venues, public examination 
applications, appointment bookings for giving marriage notice, etc., is 
a better-known part of this strategy.  
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In fact, news about the ranking exercises of various IT-related aspects 
are common in this age in which information technology seems to play 
an important role in our lives. We see the ranking of the ‘100 largest IT 
corporations’ ii , a ‘World Knowledge Competitiveness Index’ iii , 
‘popularity of online learning’iv, ‘500 growing Hi-Tech companies in the 
Asia-Pacific’v, an ‘index of popularity of digital technology’vi, the ‘most 
technologically advanced country and region’vii, to name but a few. 
Although the competitions in the IT sector are simply countless, and 
critics are often questioning the standards and criteria by which the 
rankings are done, the prize won by ESDLife should still be recognized 
as significant enough to attract even the Chief Executive Tung 
Chee-wah to come to Government House to celebrate.  
 
However, the very same day also witnessed the arrest of a number of 
senior executives of ESDLife for allegedly inflating the number of hits on 
the website.viii The case in fact involved more than 30 people, staff or 
ex-staff and their friends and relatives, who, according to official claims, 
altogether made about 100,000 bookings (mostly of sports facilities), 
which cost over HK$7,000,000, within 9 months. Those sports facilities 
were in fact booked, paid, but not used. 
 
To explain briefly, the website is run by a joint venture between 
Hutchison Whampoa Limited and Hewlett-Packard HKSAR Limited. The 
Hong Kong SAR Government granted the tender to the joint venture, 
and one of the requirements was the number of bookings on the 
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website. The number is crucial because once online bookings exceed 
a certain number (2,300,000), the government will have to pay a 
monthly fee to the website. But the fact is that, not only has the 
government simply not begun to pay, the number of hits was also far 
from satisfactory – the website accumulated only 200,000 hits in its first 
year of operation.ix   
 
As commentator Hau Luen-kwai reminds us, there is no further 
coverage of the case,x  we do not know what the result of the 
investigation and the judgment of the court are, whether all of them 
have been found guilty, and what the punishment is. But even if all 
allegations turn out to be false, this case can still function as a 
miniature in which the basic nexuses at the time when information 
technology is so prominent are adequately and abundantly present. 
What we see here are officials and business elites celebrating 
something which indeed requires far more than simple celebration; the 
profiteering tendency of business meeting a government which likes to 
contract out services; the government setting up empty numbers as a 
criterion for measuring success; finally, the high profile and saviour-like 
image of information technologies which, in fact, lack users, at a time 
when optimism in regard to advanced technology has long been a 
norm. As a result, what figures in this case under the guise of 
information technology, or technology more generally, has to be 
queried and critiqued in a series of questions from highly varying 
directions, or, to put it in another way: probably no element in this case 
can assume a central position, defining exclusively what this case is all 
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about. 
 
From this perspective, this thesis seeks to  capture and make visible the 
manifold intentions, implications, and operations of both the business 
sector and the government in the discourse of information technology; 
it seeks to ask what kinds of subjects are constructed in this discourse, 
to what extent they accept or even celebrate the discourse of IT, and 
what this kind of acceptance and celebration is about. Finally, the 
thesis will discuss how we can make sense of this discourse of IT in 
relation to the conventional discourse of Hong Kong’s economic 
development. 
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In terms of nothing technological as such 
 
 
 
 
This essay seeks to discuss the discourses of science and technology in 
terms of nothing technological as such. Science and technology are 
discussed in various aspects that are different from what might appear 
inside the science and computer magazines freshly issued at the 
newsstands every week (although, in fact, the contents of these 
magazines also vary widely, ranging from personal interviews that do 
not have much to do with any technology, to the introduction of 
fashionable and related accessories, to guidelines for using computers 
safely and healthily, etc.). They are discussed in relation to the whole 
process of the development of human ‘civilization’, in the work of a 
wide range of thinkers and critics (such as those from the Frankfurt 
School and Heidegger, see below for elaborate discussion), these 
processes are considered to constitute either the impetus of the 
(declining) human civilization all the way to its self-destruction or the 
possibility of its salvation. Feminists have joined this discussion by 
uncovering the gender dimension, regardless of whether science and 
technology is heading towards salvation or self-destruction, feminists 
argue that the contributions from women or, more generally, the 
oppressed are intentionally obliterated: the cultural politics of a clean 
narrative of history of European man and the determinism of science 
and technology. Science and technology is also discussed by 
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historians of colonialism in order explain what the process of encounter 
between the colonizers and colonized indeed was all about, what 
changes these scientific and technological encounters brought to a 
society, and their effects on the culture of the colony even after the 
end of colonization.  
 
The effect of science and technology in our daily life is also diversely 
studied. Nowadays, our senses and feelings, and the structure of 
perception itself are largely mediated by technology. For instance, the 
automobile can change our very perception of the city, work and 
home; the invasion of domestic technology is related to the cultural 
project of cleanliness. The final section of this chapter takes issue with 
the political economy of science and technology, especially in the 
global and u rban context.  
 
All these perspectives have their different aspects of science and 
technology as their content, they emerge from thinkers of varying time 
and place, with a view to solving different problems. Therefore putting 
them together is not intended to align or measure them according to 
any single particular standard or to make a comparison between them. 
Similarly, putting them together does not mean to exhaust the field of 
the science and technology discussion. Indeed, drawing on 
Heidegger’s famous notion that ‘the essence of technology is by no 
means anything technological’xi or Adorno and Horkheimer’s that 
‘science is technical practice… far removed from reflective 
consideration of its own goal’xii, I argue that in order to make sense of 
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science and technology in a particular context, no matter whether it is 
in a philosophical, cultural, political, economical etc. sense, it does not 
quite help to stare at the technical details of science and technology. 
Instead it has to be acknowledged that all these perspectives 
articulate the notion of science and technology into a wider context.  
 
Truth and essence in technology 
Noticing the disadvantage of the Greek word techne of being related 
closely to the specific word ‘technology’, Michel Foucault nevertheless 
found it interesting that we now consider ‘architecture, like the 
practices of government and the practice of other forms of social 
organization …  using elements of sciences like physics, for example, or 
statistics, and so on’xiii. In other words, what interests Foucault is the fact 
that people considered these heterogeneous kinds of knowledge and 
practice as techne of different kinds. 
 
The meaning of the word techne is described by Foucault as ‘a 
practical rationality governed by a conscious goal’xiv. By unearthing 
the age-old elements in the word technology, the meaning and our 
understanding of ‘technology’ immediately expand, allowing people 
to understand technology not exclusively in terms of cogs or chips; and, 
at the same time, open up the possibilities for people to discover the 
technological moments and operations in areas that we do not usually 
associate with ‘science’ as we use the term today, such as social 
sciences or humanities. A parallel effort to unearth the etymological 
elements of the word ‘techno logy’ can be found in Raymond 
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Williams’s work. According to his explanation, the root word of 
technology is tekhne, a Greek word meaning an art or craft. 
Technology as ‘a systematic study of the arts’ can be dated back to 
the 17th century, specialized to the meaning of ‘practical arts’ in the 
19th century, and within the terms ‘practical arts’, the element of 
‘mechanical arts’ had already been emphasized since the 18th 
century.xv 
 
What might be surprising to many readers is the proximity of 
technology in the course of the development of its meaning from 
techne , to ‘arts’, instead of science, especially when we all now are 
too familiar with the (apparent) connection between science and 
technology. As we can see spatially, for instance, in Hong Kong, the 
two major science parks, the Hong Kong Science and Technology Park 
and Cyberport, are located next to the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong and The University of Hong Kong respectively, where research of 
‘pure’ sciences are supposed to carry out. The basic concept is 
ultimately that these facilities, which blend research and application, 
would be more appropriately situated next to academies that 
produce ivory tower scientific knowledge. However, Williams tells us 
that until late 17th century, ‘art’ ‘was widely applied, without 
predominant specialization …  in matters as various as mathematics, 
medicine and angling’xvi, whereas, when introduced into English in the 
14th century, the meaning of science is simply knowledge as such. Our 
contemporary sense of science, as the theoretical and methodical 
study of nature with the quality of ‘objectiveness’, became significant 
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only after the early 19 th centuryxvii. The specialization of the meaning of 
art to skills of painting, sculpture, drawing, and the distinction of 
science and arts as ‘contrasted areas of human skill and effort, with 
fundamentally different methods and purposes’, was not fully 
established until the mid- or even late 19 century.xviii As a result, the 
sense of science as we know it today indeed has a rather short history, 
and overlooking this point might lead to strange and far-fetched 
appropriations. (The discussion of the symbolism of the Innovation and 
Technology Commission in chapter 3 will demonstrate this.) 
 
Williams’s explanation regarding the separation of these two 
long-intermingled realms of art and science as knowledge and 
practice is the historical change of the practical division of labour and 
the ‘practical definitions of the purposes of the exercise of skill’. xix That 
is to say, this separation is the result of a ‘defensive specialization’ on 
the side of the arts and humanities whose forms of use and purposes 
are not to be determined by capitalist commodity production and 
immediate exchanges.xx This is also the point of separation of ‘fine arts’ 
and ‘useful arts’, which latter acquired the new word of ‘technology’. 
 
Alongside Williams’ etymological investigation, Martin Heidegger’s 
philosophical reflection on the essence of technology may also shed 
light on the possible scope of studying technology. Heidegger’s inquiry 
of technology is inseparable from his analysis of modern industrial 
society. According to Heidegger, the essence of modern technology is 
what he called ‘Enframing’ (Ge-stell), meaning ‘that unconcealment 
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comes to pass in conformity with which the work of modern 
technology reveals the real as standing-reserve’. More specifically, 
Enframing ‘is the gathering together that belongs to that setting-upon 
which set upon man and puts him in a position to reveal the real, in the 
mode of ordering, as standing-reserve.’xxi Hence Heidegger asserts 
that ‘the essence of technology is nothing technological’. xxii   
 
Modern technology, he argues, increasingly summons and ‘sets upon’  
(in another word, ‘reveals’ in a particular way) nature and human alike 
to become standing-reserve, mainly as stored-up energy and 
exploitable productions. Nature and the human even ‘lose their 
character as objects when they are caught up in the 
standing-reserve’xxiii, which is then pathetically nothing more than what 
the modern technology needs them for. 
 
While Heidegger recognizes in this situation of modern industrial society 
the decline of the west, he considers this decline to originate twenty 
five hundred years ago, ‘with the dawn of metaphysics at the hands of 
Plato.’xxiv According to Michael E. Zimmerman’s study of Heidegger’s 
thought, in the Greek tradition ‘to produce’ had 2 meanings, one of it is 
‘“actualizing” or “effecting” a thing, in the sense of causing it to be 
present’; the other is being ‘as a “letting be” or a “freeing” which 
enabled an entity to come into presence, to show itself, to emerge.’xxv 
The former is closer to the philosophical tradition since Plato and 
Aristotle, and is called a ‘productionist metaphysic’ by Zimmerman, 
while the latter belongs more to the pre-platonic tradition.  
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According to Heidegger, this productionist metaphysics, underlined by 
concepts such as the form-matter distinction, four causes xxvi , etc. 
paved the way for the rise of the enlightenment as well as modernity, 
which, above all and almost exclusively emphasize a particular kind of 
rationality, science and technology, summoning and revealing nature 
and human being alike into a system of modern society as 
standing-reserve. 
 
Combining this long philosophical tradition with the social and political 
situation of Germany in the 1920s and 30s, when Heidegger was hugely 
frustrated by the idle everydayness and inauthenticity, Heidegger 
believed German people at that time were uprooted and homeless. 
Mass culture freed ‘the “anyone self” from having to understand 
anything in a genuine, original way’xxvii. Indeed, he determines that 
both the theoretical stances of liberalism and socialism could shed no 
light or provide no answer to the problem, precisely because both of 
them are fundamentally the products of the problem, namely 
modernity.xxviii   
 
This is the philosophical and social context in which Heidegger seeks art, 
the highest form of techne, as the remedy for the crisis of the West. This 
is also how the quotation of the line of German poet Hölderlin ‘But 
where danger is, grows The saving power also’xxix  is intelligible. As 
mentioned above, art, among the 2 meanings, is ‘“letting be” or a 
“freeing” which enabled an entity to come into presence, to show 
 12 
itself, to emerge’. He believes it is precisely being in the reign of 
Enframing which tries to, but ultimately cannot, block all illuminations of 
every revealing, all appearances of truth, that the human being needs 
to recover the elements of art -- letting-be, freeing – in technology. In 
order to allow human beings to see the real opening, a break with this 
particular version of modern industrial society is necessary.xxx  And this 
break may at the first instance seem to be against the will of the 
people enjoying themselves as the anyone self, however, to Heidegger, 
‘the essence of freedom is originally not connected to the will or even 
the causality with human willing.’xxxi Unfortunately, he did not quite 
explain under which conditions and how human beings might be able 
to realize the importance of the manifesting, revealing effect of art, 
especially when human beings have already been summoned into the 
Enframing since the Greek antiquity.  
 
The whole body of Heidegger’s philosophy is of course notoriously 
difficult to grasp. If his philosophy of technology is too abstract and 
far-fetched, juxtaposing his philosophy with Slavoj Žižek’s inspirational 
appropriation of Heidegger’s thought on the topic of biogenetics and 
bioethics may provide a more focused and ‘applicable’ 
understanding. Engaging with the debate between bioethics and 
science, Žižek thinks that the problem lies in an observation by Francis 
Fukuyama that ‘the notion of humanity relies on the belief that we 
possess an essentially inherited “human nature”, that we are born with 
an unfathomable dimension of ourselves.’xxxii Habermas’s position on 
the problem, which extends from Fukuyama’s thesis, namely 
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biogenetic intervention, is straightforward. In a talk given in 2001, he 
states 2 reasons to oppose biogenetic intervention. Firstly, it will blur the 
borderline between what is made and what is spontaneous. Secondly, 
if human characters can be manipulated, probably some individuals 
will be more privileged, like those who can manipulate and those who 
are favourably manipulatedxxxiii. 
 
Žižek considers this position as an obstacle to the potential 
conversation between bioethics and science, as it unreasonably splits 
bioethics and science into two separate and discrete regions, ‘a split 
which already prevents us from seeing the way these new conditions 
compel us to transform and reinvent the notions of freedom, autonomy 
and ethical responsibility.’ And the consequence is that, if human 
integrity and dignity are to be maintained, scientific inquiry into the 
human being should better be curtailed. Žižek suggests that ‘every 
advance in knowledge has to be earned in a painful struggle against 
our spontaneous propensity from ignorance’, and the implication of 
Habermas’s position embraces ignorance but leaves the problem of 
knowledge advancement untouched. This insight can also be referred 
back to Heidegger’s observation about the ‘homeless and uprooted’ 
Germans after the Great War: avoiding understanding anything in a 
genuine, original way. Habermas’s position, as a result, would not be 
able to answer the questions revealed by the advancement of 
science and technology even regarding our essentially inherited 
‘human nature’, before we make our decision of whether to support it 
or be against it. 
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Consider an example raised by Žižek. In a quiz in which I take part, I am 
driven by self-esteem to win. The stake of winning is to memorize as 
much as possible the relevant data. Žižek asks: does it matter morally if I 
take drugs to strengthen my memory? Or stepping back a bit, if I take 
drugs which strengthen my self-esteem, so I would want more 
desperately to win the quiz, especially when scientists found that the 
level of self-esteem is controlled by a chemical in the brain called 
‘serotonin’? xxxiv Which questions would be revealed once we know 
that what we have always regarded as ‘natural’ talents, 
incomprehensible and given, as it were, are indeed manipulable by 
adjusting a certain chemical in the brain? Does it still make sense to 
hold on to the assumption of an integrated and given ‘self’, on which 
the whole debate of science and bioethics is built? Or should the 
advance of knowledge in biogenetics still be understood as infringing 
on the dignity and freedom of the self? Or does it rather tell us that ‘we 
never had them in the first place’?  
  
These considerations bring us back to Heidegger’s unanswered 
question regarding the saving power against the destructive reign of 
Enframing. If Žižek’s position to the debate of bioethics vs. science is to 
ask: what questions does scientific advancement pose, and how do 
these questions fundamentally confront our basic categories in 
considering the debates? Then we can also rethink Heidegger’s secret 
saving power along the same path. Žižek’s position though might lead 
to the charge of conformism, accepting everything technology brings 
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us as a layer of the truth confronting us. However, this seems to suggest 
precisely that we are required not to conc lude the discussion too soon.   
 
Enlightenment reason, science, self-destruction? 
Another classic text that discusses the relation between western 
civilization and science and technology, in quite a different tone, 
however, is certainly the Dialectic of Enlightenment. Written by Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School after witnessing 
the atrocities and catastrophes caused by the Nazis, the text seeks to 
discuss the failure of Enlightenment to turn mankind into ‘a truly human 
condition’, creating a new kind of barbarism’ instead.xxxv    
 
Enlightenment is commonly understood as a radical break from the 
previous superstitious and religious worldview, and is the emergence of 
rational man from his ‘self-incurred immaturity’, which means the 
‘inability to use one’s understanding without the guidance of another 
person’, according to the founding figure of the Enlightenment, 
Immanuel Kantxxxvi . Drawing widely on Nietzsche, Sade, and even 
Homer, the analysis of Dialectic  reveals the striking similarities between 
Enlightenment and myth to such an extent that myth becomes 
enlightenment, and vice versa. Since myth is what Enlightenment seeks 
to overcome, this dialectic of Enlightenment simply leads to 
self-destruction.   
 
(a) Myth as Enlightenment 
Through the interpretation of Homer’s Odyssey, which Adorno and 
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Horkheimer consider the ‘basic text of European civilization’, the 
authors argue that one can identify traces of the ‘prototype of the 
bourgeois individual’xxxvii. The authors cite the same poem by Hölderlin 
that was cited by Heidegger: ‘But where there is danger, there 
salvation grows too’, to elaborate the moment of the birth of the 
bourgeois individual: informed beforehand by Circe about the Sirens 
who are going to harm Odysseus and his men by singing sweet songs 
when Odysseus has to sail back to Ithaca in the well-known scene, one 
can see a clear hierarchical division of labour between Odysseus and 
his rowing men. While his men’s ears have to be waxed in order to 
prevent them from listening to the songs of Sirens and keep them 
rowing, Odysseus himself is tied tightly to the mast of the ship, so he can 
enjoy the song of the Sirens without risking reacting in any dangerous 
and harmful way. To Adorno and Horkheimer, this is precisely an 
indication that ‘throughout the many mortal perils he has had to 
endure, the unity of his own life, the identity of the individual, has been 
confirmed for him’ xxxviii. And through the way the bourgeois individual 
finds his prototype in Homer’s Odysseus is exactly through ‘cunning, 
rational calculation, deceit, and above all, self-restraint and 
renunciation’, ‘he confirms his own identity and integrity through 
confronting and enduring challenges and danger’.xxxix   
 
(b) Enlightenment as myth 
Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer argue, is the attempt of reason 
to extend from the principle of perception to the objects of perception 
in a harmonious and unitary system. When facing the previously 
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untamable nature, if reason fails to structure our perception in 
accordance with the understanding of the system, and at the same 
time, if particular and factual knowledge cannot be derived from 
principles of the unitary system, the system fails to constitute the ‘a 
priori assumption of judgment’. As a result, reason either fails to 
self-preserve or it successfully reaches a state in which ‘the conceptual 
apparatus determines the senses, even before perception occurs; a 
priori, the citizen sees the world as the matter from which he himself 
manufactures it.’xl 
 
Science, consisting of mathematical abstraction, is the system in 
question for the Enlightenment. On the one hand, having been 
equated with truth by the Enlightenment, and being ‘unable to 
question or determine the ends it serves, reason loses its critical 
dimension and becomes a tool for affirming and reproducing existing 
reality.’xli On the other hand, in terms of the contents of this system, 
‘moral forces are no less neutral impulses and modes of behaviors than 
the immoral forces.’xlii This equation of science with truth and hence 
the instrumentalisation of reason render reason purposively purposeless, 
as well as Enlightenment as myth. Values fail to effect any negative 
power to query or change this unitary and harmonious system, all 
negative powers are readily tamed as they are compartmentalized in 
an orderly way.  
 
As mentioned before, Kant considers man to be immature if he is 
unable to use his understanding without the guidance of another 
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person, and the Enlightenment is the advent of the opposite situation. 
Indeed, this phenomenon is relevant to the authors of Dialectic 
because they think this phenomenon has already been elevated from 
the level of the person to the level of an organizing principle of society, 
no matter whether this occurs in Nazi Germany or in the culture industry 
they experienced in America. Just like science has to structure our 
perception and adjust the world so as to fit it into perception, the 
individual in the culture industry, the authors argue, is also deceived so 
that the ‘individual is an illusion not merely because of the 
standardization of the means of production. He is tolerated only so 
long as his complete identification with the generality is 
unquestioned.’xliii Mediated by the culture industry, the authors point 
out, individuals can live well in a very orderly manner, even if they are 
living under total control, such as those of the Nazi era or the 
American-style capitalist society. The culture industry is such a concept 
that ‘emptied subject and totality immobilize each. The world appears 
frozen in the nightmare.’xliv  
 
A text such as the Dialectic of Enlightenment certainly attracts 
enormous discussion regarding different aspects. In the light of 
Heidegger’s ‘The question concerning technology’, I would like to 
compare and contrast it with the Dialectic in order to highlight some 
points for discussion. Firstly, Heidegger’s essay, as we have seen above, 
is ambiguously optimistic, while the Dialectic can be easily taken as a 
closed statement of the authors’ pessimism for the future even after the 
fall of Nazi Germany. One can try to justify this claim by contrasting 
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their different appropriations of Hölderlin’s poem. In the hand of 
Heidegger, Hölderlin’s lines refer to the potential overcoming of the 
danger of being overwhelmed by Enframing of technology, which is by 
the revealing of the being conditioned by technology in the form of art. 
However, in the Dialectic , these lines refer to beginnings of the 
bourgeois individual of the Enlightenment, which subsequently paves 
the way for the domination of Enlightenment reason and finally leads 
to its self-destruction. Rather than seeing salvation in the midst of the 
all-powerful domination of technology, overcoming the threat around 
us for self-preservation and construction of a unitary self is the opening 
of the tragedy of the self-destruction of reason.  
 
Regarding Heidegger, it is always one option to read his philosophy of 
technology closely with his political orientation: to seek the essence 
and hence the liberating potential of technology against the 
technological society of American capitalism and communism. It is not 
my intention here to judge whether the somewhat noticeable 
consistence between the political orientation of the pre-war 
Heidegger and the Heidegger of ‘the Question Concerning 
Technology’, which was written in 1953, is the result of his failure to learn 
from all the atrocities of the Nazi experience. In this context, it is, 
however, tempting to interpret the Dialectic (written at the beginning 
of the 1940s) as closed, total, elitist, as the result of their lesson learned 
from the Nazis, which is in this sense a direct contrast with the case of 
Heidegger.  
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Yet, juxtaposing these thinkers in respect to their political stance 
towards the Nazis alone may not be the most meaningful way to grasp 
their philosophies of technology. Indeed, instead of consolidating their 
respective antagonistic stances, a more fruitful analysis should be 
directed towards the problematization of their stances. Huyssen rightly 
argues that both the attempts to bury and resurrect the authors ‘tend 
to sap the energy from a body of texts that maintain their provocation 
for us.’xlv So the point is not to affirm the authors of the Dialectic as a 
pair of hopeless elitists who criticize the deceived and helpless mass 
from a panorama viewpoint, or otherwise to interpret them as hidden 
believers in the power and potential of the mass and the proletariat.  
 
In what follows, I would like to focus on the notion of ‘self’ in Dialectic 
and Heidegger, to investigate what indeed goes wrong with science 
and technology. As far as Heidegger is concerned, he observes that 
understanding things in a genuine and original way by people in 
Germany in the period around the Great War is avoided. In his own 
words, ‘we take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as the anyone self take 
pleasure, we read, see, and judge about literature and art as the 
anyone self see and judge…  the anyone self, which is nothing definite, 
and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribe the kind of being of 
everydayness.’xlvi This view of the self is highly comparable to the 
deceived mass in Adorno and Horkheimer’s totally administered 
society, where ‘in spite of all the progress in reproduction techniques; in 
controls and the specialties, and in spite of all the restless industry, the 
bread the culture industry offers man is the stone of stereotype’.xlvii 
 21 
Huyssen offers the idea of ‘ego-weakness’ or ‘ego decay’ to 
supplement the observation given in the Dialectic. He argues that the 
decline of the traditional paternal authority in the bourgeois family, 
‘complemented by the ontogenetically subsequently invasion of the 
psyche by the laws of capitalist production’, led to a change of 
personality, which was originally based upon conformity to an external 
standard. Therefore, ‘in Germany, Hitler could become the substitute 
father, and fascist culture and propaganda provided the external 
guidance for the weak, gullible ego.’xlviii      
 
To these thinkers, modern technological society and hence its cultural 
apparatus are all manoeuvred to effect ignorance, insensitivity and 
conformity of the people. And yet, the very starting point of this 
historical process is ironically human fear, the fear of the 
incomprehensible nature, the fear of the unknown and uncontrollable. 
It is precisely this human fear that started men to demythologize, 
objectivize, scientize, and finally gain mastery over nature, ‘nothing at 
all may remain outside (of the comprehensible), because the mere 
idea of outsideness is the very source of fear.’xlix  However, what 
remained unspecified are the specific historical moments w hen human 
fear changed to domination, if the word ‘gradual’ (instead of 
contingent, chaotic, uneven) is appropriate for a complex historical 
journey. The same question can also be raised for the philosophy of 
Heidegger: what exactly is the situation in which the Platonic and 
Aristotelian tradition would adopt the ‘productionist metaphysics’ out 
of the two quite different meanings of ‘to produce’? What is the milieu 
 22 
in which this choice was consolidated? And finally, how, in the 
historical process, do all these moments inform and constitute the self, 
from having a burning fear of being ignorance, and hence a will to 
know, to a will or an enjoyment of the unknown?  
 
Regarding the grand historico-philosophical projects of these thinkers, 
these plural and particular moments might look trivial; they might 
indeed not aim to work in this direction. Yet, without historical 
specifications, we can only judge their theories by result, which is the 
existing situation. In other words, we do not know, apart from abstract 
rationality, what the notion ‘society’ really refers to, in what way and 
when it is jeopardized. We also do not know what indeed the relations 
and effects upon each other between different social and cultural 
institutions, such as government officials of high and low ranks, 
businesses of different sizes, etc., are. Yet, we have to convince 
ourselves that we are being severely oppressed, controlled and 
organized into repetitive reserves in order to be able to make sense of 
their theories.  
 
Furthermore, without the depiction and analysis of the concrete and 
crucial historical, political and cultural nexus, the shift from the will to 
know to ignorance of the self would remain quite incomprehensible. 
Huyssen points out insightfully that ‘one does not need to resort to a 
critique of the whole trajectory of Western metaphysics in order to see 
that the notion of a stable “self” is historically datable and dated with 
the bourgeois age’l. In fact, if the formation of a stable and unitary self 
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is crucial to the transformation of the organizing principles of society 
into total administration and the transformation in turn of the 
constitution and orientation of the self, then what is at least equally 
worthy of being depicted is the actual process ‘littered’ along this 
history of Western civilization – if we are to learn from history to escape 
from this cage of instrumental reason or Enframing, or if escaping is 
ever possible. 
 
Science, technology, colonialism 
After the historico-philosophical projects dealing with western 
civilization, science and technology, power and politics, the numerous 
studies of the colonial experience of India can be a rich example. 
 
There are different frameworks that try to explain the trajectory of the 
development of science and technology in India, or more generally 
‘backward’ colonies, some of them explicitly, some implicitly political. 
A famous model is the three-phase linear diffusionist and Eurocentric 
model by George Basalla. In phase I of this model, non-European areas 
are conceived of as non-scientific society, and function only as 
providers of exploitable data and resources. In phase II, the colony 
establishes its own community of locally born scientists, who are 
dependent upon an external scientific culture, yet not ‘fully 
participating member(s) of that culture’. li Phase III marks the beginning 
of an independent colonial scientific culture.      
 
Though admitting Basalla had made ‘the most important statement of 
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the diffusionist model of Western Science’lii, David Arnold rightly points 
out what is intentionally or unintentionally left out in Basalla’s simplified 
and abstract model. Firstly, echoing the documentary findings of 
Kumar, Arnold reminds us that rather than the colonizer’s intention to 
bring scientific culture to the colony, it was a commercial drive that 
provided some impetus for the original scientific practices of the 
colonizers. That is why the first ‘research interests’ of the colonizers from 
the East Indian Company are botany, geology and geography. Arnold 
also points out that Basalla’s ignorance of the enormous difference of 
the background and experience of the different colonies is what 
made his model probable. Moreover, Basalla’s model fails to address 
the problem of the neutrality of science. If the assumptions of science 
are ‘value neutral, objective, empirically demonstrated, somehow 
transcending time and thus universally valid’, liii  then the spread of 
Western science to the rest of the globe is both beneficial and 
inevitable. And if this version of science and this spread are both 
inevitable and beneficial, then what is the possibility of an 
independent colonial scientific culture in phase III of Basalla’s model? 
What does that independence mean then, when science ‘culture’ is 
paradoxically culturally irrelevant?liv  
 
Apart from viewing the history of science in India in terms of colonial 
science, a related perspective, science as modernity, is also often 
employed. From this perspective, Indians were superstitious, inferior 
and backward. Europeans were subsequently superior and responsible 
for civilizing and enlightening the Indians. The authority derived from 
 25 
this superiority and responsibility of Western advancement was not only 
exercised by the European colonizers, but also by young Indians who 
had received Western education. However, by defining the inferiority 
and backwardness of Indians against the modernity and 
advancement of the West, Arnold argued, catching up with the West 
will only be a myth, as the Indians will always find themselves 
inadequate and way behind the ideal West. And this is exactly where 
Partha Chartterjee’s warning comes in: how could Indians accept and 
assimilate the modernity of the colonising West while at the same time 
seeking to contest colonial authority and its assertion of the Indians’ 
inferiority?lv  
 
Facing this premise of modernity discourse, which was built upon a 
binary with one side advanced and superior and the other backward 
and inferior, it is tempting for critics to fall also into a binary, equating 
Europeans to oppressors and Indians to the oppressed. To Gyan 
Prakash, this kind of response just ‘does not unravel the narrative’lvi, 
and sacrifices the detailed operation and position of science, the 
dominated subjects and knowledge for revealing the ‘colonizing 
impulse’ of modernity. Along this line of thought, what Prakesh wants to 
seek is the process of negotiation between the ‘colonizing’ science 
and the subordinated subjects and knowledge.  
 
This kind of ambivalence is common and yet important for us to 
actually understand how the working of science and technology 
involves both colonizer and colonized. Deepak Kumar is certainly right 
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to point out that the history and material of the discursive conflicts 
between conquerors and natives is too dense to permit ‘a genuinely 
confused spectacle’, in which natives do share or possess colonial 
power.lvii However, pointing out that Indian historians do not easily 
permit the claim that ‘natives do share or possess colonial power’ is 
different from implying that there is no role for natives to play, or that 
the role of the natives is only something to be passively acted upon. 
Another implication may also be that the position of relying solely on 
the antagonism between colonizer and colonized as such is openly 
called into question. 
 
Let us consider two cases, one provided by Prakesh and one by Kumar. 
Being coherent with his thesis that Indians were the oppressed, Kumar 
recognizes that in the history of colonial India, racial discrimination was 
a very serious problem. Although in the late 19th century there were 
already laws in India to secure posts in medical and engineering 
services for the Indians, the terms regarding paid leave, pensions etc. 
were simply different and far worse than those offered to Europeans. 
Many distinguished Indian scientists, Kumar recorded, even graduated 
from prestigious British universities, and yet, when they came back to 
India, the positions and terms offered to them were just unreasonably 
bad and unacceptable compared to their European counterparts.lviii  
 
Apart from the discrimination of Indians by Europeans as such, Kumar 
also offers cases with greater complexity within India. He documents 
cases in which Western-educated Indians criticized the Hindu ethos 
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severely. One such person was the founder of the Indian Association 
for the Cultivation of Science in 1869, Mahebdra Lal Sarkar. He 
criticized the Hindu ethos as ‘a chaotic mass of crude and undigested 
and unfounded opinions on all subjects, enunciated and enforced in 
the most dogmatic way imaginable.’ lix Another case happened in 
1896, when young Indian western-educated elites were upset by some 
of their young fellow Indians who imitated the European ideas and 
habits ‘blindly’. Those elites wrote an article to defend their traditional 
costume and dietary habits from a scientific point of view. They argued 
that under the traditional and superstitious appearance, these habits 
and ideas are indeed rational and can be accounted for 
scientifically.lx 
 
In considering the power relation in the cases mentioned above, if we 
follow the line of the European/Indian distinction, complexities and 
ambiguity certainly arise when we take into account that hierarchy, 
structured according to the possession of scientific knowledge, exists 
even within Indian society. So if claiming that ‘Indians do share or 
possess colonial power’ is too naïve, the degree of naiveté might be 
no less in saying ancient values and faith had been resurrected (only) 
through scientific validation.  
 
Recognition of the differentiated roles of different Indians in the 
working of science and technology allows for the formation of a 
tension, a tension between the assertion of colonizer/colonized 
distinction and the sharing and possession of colonial power by Indians. 
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This complicated tension is helpful for understanding the term ‘colonial 
science’, argued Arnold paradoxically, which is ‘worth retaining and 
using …  to describe the various technologies in power operating within 
and through a science in a colonial setting’, although the term itself 
‘may be flawed’. lxi Arnold seems to suggest that the cultural politics 
here may not be to search for a stance in which any one side could 
possess absolute moral innocence. We have to situate ourselves in an 
ambivalent and sometimes contradictory condition to keep the 
dynamics of resistance alive, instead of feeling comfortable behind 
any fundamental demarcation settling the boundary between who 
are the oppressors and who are the oppressed. The resistance against 
oppression by science and technology cannot rely solely on the most 
oppressed and then morally innocent, at the same time essentializing 
the ‘have’ and ‘have not’ regarding colonial power and scientific and 
technological knowledge.   
 
Yet, no matter how sophisticated those postcolonial critics are, there is 
always a common-sense position against the above criticisms that 
blend together science, technology, violence, and politics: pure 
science is itself neutral, and the effect of pure science is subject to 
application, which is technology. Moreover, the benevolent and 
appropriate way to use technology is the way to solve chaotic, dirty 
social and political problems. Obviously, this kind of position is 
particularly popular not for justifying the colonial history of science and 
technology, but for advocating the on-going development of science 
and technology. 
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Drawing on the post-war experience in India, the time when India had 
become independent of British colonial rule after 1947, Ashis Nandy 
refuses to accept the discourse that masked the inherent relation 
between science, technology and power. He argues the discourse 
that attributes the qualities of ‘purity’ and ‘neutrality’ to science and 
‘applied’ to technology shifts the responsibility away from pure science. 
On the other hand, the same discourse further defers responsibility by 
purifying technology and claiming all the violence caused by 
technology is just accidental, and is just the result of misuses by wicked 
politicians, militarists and multinationals, again shifts all the responsibility 
away from the nature and the operational logic of technology .lxii  
 
This view of a stain-free science had become a constitutive part of the 
Indian governance, or what Nandy calls ‘the reason of state’. Nandy 
explicates the situation in which a legitimate, stain-free and indeed 
violent scientific discourse is produced. Firstly, as did their early 
European predecessors, science is posed as a cure for both 
superstitious, backward, traditional Indians and the chaotic, nasty 
political and social problems. The second is a somewhat circular one, 
feeding back positively around the legitimacy of science and the 
legitimacy of the experts giving scientific judgments about Indian 
society and tradition. The third explains a miserable, or painful, as 
expressed by Nandy, situation in which ‘highly visible short-term 
technological performance in small areas yields nation-wide political 
dividends’, lxiii as India did not have adequate resources to reach the 
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consumption levels of the developed west.  
 
Piyush Mathur’s convincing analysis of the nuclear test in India in May 
1998 illustrates Nandy’s point. Citing the remark of Nandy on this test, 
Mathur points out that nuclearism is one of the ‘universals’ of our time 
which disallows cultural adaptation and edition.lxiv In other words, its 
meaning and the way it is articulated with other forces are ‘the same in 
Paris and Pokharan, Lahore and Los Alamos’lxv To Mathur, the nuclear 
test is a nexus where the interests of Hindu nationalism, fundamentalism, 
and masculinism coincide. The test seeks to stage a show to threaten 
neighboring Pakistan. This sudden and dramatic unification of the 
nation within the state around the nuclear test, Mathur argues, can be 
attributed to the supposedly autonomous and democratic Indian press 
who ‘found too little time and too narrow a range of choices in 
covering an event that hit it with unprecedented speed and without 
prior notice’. lxvi As a result, the press is not able to control their own 
agenda, totally subscribes to the state project and becomes its 
amplifier in trumpeting violence against both Pakistan and the 
ecology.  
 
The case of the plantation of eucalyptus in India, provided by 
Vandana Shiva, may also help to illuminate the violent nature of 
modern science. In response to desertification and its consequences 
such as famine from the 1960s onward, institutions like the World Bank 
started to prescribe Eucalyptus for various afforestation schemes, with 
the official reason of its fast-growth quality. However, on drought land 
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eucalyptus is notorious for its high level of water consumption, which 
destroys the natural process through which soil moisture is replenished. 
On fertile land, its fast growing property heavily diminishes the soil 
nutrients and affects also its replenishment. lxvii  The species of 
eucalyptus is actually chosen, Shiva reveals, only for its demand by the 
pulp industry, which can thus maintain a cheap supply of pulp through 
the massive plantation of this otherwise useless and even destructive 
species.  
 
Modern industry, intriguingly combined with modern science, 
maximizes its own gain, Shiva argues, and at the same time maximizes 
and disregards the social and ecological costs in the production 
process. lxviii Before we consider this example moralistically: if we think of 
the ‘inevitability’ of the reasons for choosing eucalyptus, we may 
better understand why Nandy and Shiva assert that violence is inherent 
in science. Moreover, since there is no evidence that methods, 
assumptions, principles, etc. changed fundamentally with the coming 
of Independence in India, all these examples effectively and distantly 
echo Arnold and Prakesh in regard to the complicated and 
ambiguous relationship between science and Indians.  
 
Feminists’ dissidence 
Discussing more generally the approaches to account for the history of 
the progress and advancement of science and technology, Sandra 
Harding provides and analyses a classification including categories of 
diffusionist, internalist, externialist, world system theory and postcolonial 
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approaches.lxix 
 
According to Harding, the internalist approach to the history of science 
and technology refers to a kind of thought in which historical time can 
be represented as a ‘tunnel of time’, where everything important, or 
whatever at least happened, is accumulated and confined along the 
tunnel. For the Europeans, this tunnel stretches ‘from the present back 
to the Garden of Eden.’lxx Indeed every other people has their own 
tunnel, but according to the most dominant version of the 
understanding of the progress of human civilization, or what Harding 
calls the Eurocentric account of human civilization, these other tunnels 
are almost negligible. The metaphor of the tunnel also indicates that 
progresses of civilizations were generated exclusively out of the 
essential quality of the people inside the tunnel. And the diffusionist 
approach assumes that prior to the beginning of the period of 
colonialism, European science and technology had already attained 
a level which is sufficient to spread over their acquired colonies and 
lead their development.    
 
The externalist approach rejects the internal, essential qualities of the 
European minds and culture as the reason for development of modern 
science and technology. On the contrary, this approach positively 
emphasizes the effects of the social, political and economic factors at 
those times. Say for instance, in the account of Boris Hessen, a Soviet 
Historian, at the time around Newton’s development of his theory, 
there were some unresolved problems ‘in the air’ attracting scientific 
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minds to pursue, and Newton’s significance was just ‘precisely the 
subsequent importance of the issue he addressed’. lxxi The externalist 
approach seeks to understand the history of science and technology 
in terms of the absence of human beings, scientific and technological 
progresses just so happened to be realized through human beings, 
who are nothing more than a nexus through which particular 
trajectories intersect. 
  
The third approach analyzed by Harding is called the world system 
account; this account overcomes the shortcomings of the previous 
approaches by introducing the element of European colonial 
expansion in explaining the European industrial development. 
Industrialization and the advancement of science and technology 
were neither the result of the intrinsic qualities of the European minds 
and culture, nor was it the sole result of the social, economic and 
political demands of European societies. This approach is not satisfied 
with barely identifying the different impetuses other than European 
scientific qualities, it seeks to discover the dimension of power 
connecting all these impetuses, and how these relationships are 
situated in the space and time of European colonialism. The colonial 
expansion and the contributions from other cultures indeed have a 
due role to be acknowledged. And the successful side of this process is 
of course the progress in European science and technology, while the 
original influence and contribution from places and cultures other than 
Europe and the de-development of the colonial process remain the 
unmentioned side.lxxii 
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The final approach is the postcolonial approach, w hich for Harding is 
at the same time an anti-eurocentric approach. This approach shares 
with the externalist and world system approaches that it rejects the 
‘purely internal epistemological feature of modern scientific processes’ 
as the impetus for the progress of European science and technology. It 
even goes further to argue that other cultures not only influence the 
development of European modern science and technology, their roles 
are indeed obscured, regardless of the intention, by the conventional 
account. The possibilities opened up by this approach not only include 
the problematization of the origin of modern European science and 
technology, but also the problematization of the geographical 
‘Europe’, as we knew it. According to Harding, the standard 
eurocentric tunnel of time stretches from the present all the way back 
to ancient Greece. However, the political and cultural boundaries of 
‘Europe’ have never been the same from Aristotle’s Greece to the Holy 
Roman Empire to the Present Europe. This dimension, Harding reminds 
us, is particularly at stake as Aristotle’s Greece actually was ‘part of a 
Mediterranean world that included the Near East and Northern Africa, 
and excluded all peoples lying to the north of Greece’lxxiii 
 
These different approaches of accounting for the progress of modern 
European science and technology did not come out of a vacuum, the 
same social and philosophical background. Say for instance, in a 
condition in which science is conceived as ‘singular— there is one and 
only one science— and its components are harmoniously integrated by 
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such an internal feature’lxxiv , recognition of the presence of other 
cultures and the differences between the cultures are unimportant. 
And in fact, to understand different approaches to account for this 
history of progress, different kinds of epistemologies may also be even 
more important in allowing different accounts to emerge. 
 
This epistemology problem, in a way, interests feminists. If non-feminists’ 
concern is the problem of what counts as knowledge, and scientific 
knowledge in particular, the objectivity of knowledge, and so on and 
so forth, feminists ask further questions of whether there is a gender 
dimension in the issues above. It is impossible to describe, however 
briefly, different schools of feminist epistemology in this context. 
However, I will highlight some important questions regarding the zigzag 
path by which the theoretical development of different feminist 
epistemologies proceeds. The birth of modern science is considered as 
roughly coinciding with the period of the Enlightenment, from which 
the distinctions of nature vs. culture, public vs. private, rationality vs. 
emotion, etc., emerge. Feminists argue that the modern science 
enterprise was built upon association with the former qualities of these 
binaries, therefore are masculine and hostile to its imaginative 
opposites. Responding to such a conception of science, some feminists 
reject those binaries by arguing that women can equally possess the 
qualities possessed by men. And with the contribution of women, 
‘more accurate and less androcentric’ forms of science can be 
obtained. Feminists subscribed to this theoretical orientation are 
generally called feminist empiricists. 
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According to Harding, these feminists most closely resemble the 
conventional unitary view of science, in which ‘one true story about 
nature’s order’ can be told. She argues, however, that it is impossible to 
conceive of any system of knowledge which ‘represent[s] no particular 
set of social interests and desires, and thus exist [s] outside of societies’ 
power relations.’lxxv According to this assumption, she is calling for a 
feminist standpoint epistemology in which ‘men’s dominating position 
in social life results in partial and perverse understandings, whereas 
women’s subjugated position provides the possibility of more complete 
and less perverse understanding.’lxxvi Since universal objectiveness is 
impossible, therefore the objectiveness of this theory is grounded in 
‘the unique resources of the particular social locations.’lxxvii Through 
the living situation of women, the scientific knowledge obtained will no 
longer be apolitical and static, instead, it is associated with the daily 
struggle of women against male supremacy as a constitutive factor, 
and it can also mark changing gender relations and global political 
economies.  
 
Certainly, this approach resolves as much as it inflicts further theoretical 
problems. One kind of critique points to its dangers of essentializing the 
situation of women. Social locations and situations of women are not 
fixed categories anyway, ‘therefore women’s subjectivity, caring, 
holism and harmony, to which they (standpoint epistemology feminists) 
appeal, cannot be universal aspects of women’s experience.’lxxviii 
Further critique of course includes the danger of ‘epistemology 
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inflation’, which is to say, women, no matter how subtle their difference, 
will be entitled to their own epistemologies. However, understanding 
Harding not from an either-or viewpoint, instead of encouraging an 
‘everything goes’ attitude, feminist standpoint epistemology grounds 
the possibility of scientific knowledge of difference, and the tension 
between the differences. 
 
Another line of critique, explicated by Helen Longino, argues that if 
standpoint epistemology seeks to reject traditional empiricism, which 
fundamentally assumes unconditioned knowing objects, by inserting 
the conception of knowing objects at standpoints, on the one hand, 
the problem would be: 
 
if genuine or better knowledge depends on the correct or a 
more correct standpoint, social theory is needed to ascertain 
which of these locations is the epistemologically privileged one. 
But in a standpoint epistemology, a standpoint is needed to 
justify such a theory. What is that standpoint and how to identify 
it?lxxix  
 
On the other hand, Longino discovers that standpoint epistemology, 
the traditional empiricism, and even the tradition of rationalism since 
Rene Descartes, rely on an individual as knowing object, conditioned 
or unconditioned. This assumption is then exactly the origin of the 
inadequacy of the standpoint epistemology, even after exposing the 
oppressiveness and impossibility of traditional empiricism. As a solution, 
she suggests a strategy of ‘multiplying the subjects’ by attributing to a 
science community, rather than an individual knowing subject, the 
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basic unit of scientific knowledge production.lxxx   
 
I would like to raise two points which I believe are crucial. First, if the 
concept of ‘scientific community’ is appropriated to resolve the 
problem of the singularity of an individual knowing subject, on one side 
of the extremes, then how are we to guard against the temptation of 
reverting back to the all-embracing, unconditioned knowing subject 
which claims to represent us all? Secondly, the notion of community, 
like the notion of science, knowledge and so on, is never given and 
fixed. One can unearth the process of the construction of the notion of 
science and technology as well as community. This point would easily 
lead one to recall the fact that the right to vote, to attend schools for 
girls are all very late developments. However, not to count one as a 
member of the community does not only mean not allowing one to do 
something, the recognition of something already done is also 
important to the construction of membership. Say for instance, in the 
history of technology, women indeed contributed during the industrial 
era: the cotton gin, sewing machine, small electric motor, etc. are all 
inventions by women. Yet, all of them are not recognized and written 
into history; instead, the patent records of all these inventions are 
registered with the names of their husbands, or the one who provided 
the capital.lxxxi  Even if the concept of community is not a project 
intended to incorporate every one of us, what and who are ‘us’ is still 
utterly relevant.  
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Technologies of power, power of technologies 
From all these historical-philosophical reflections upon science and 
technology, the idea that science and technology is heavily 
power-invested is manifest. This situation of our modern science and 
technology is perhaps best illustrated with Foucault’s idea of the 
panopticon. The panopticon works by generating self-discipline on the 
part of the prisoners, who know well enough that in the darkened 
chamber at the top of the central tower it is always possible to have a 
watchman up there observing them. Whether the prisoners really 
discipline their bodies and their minds, whether they do it 
unconsciously or pretentiously, is another important empirical problem, 
however, the whole organization of the penitentiary space is intended 
to make sure the prisoners know that they are being watched 
constantly and that they have to behave accordingly.  
 
With the panopticon, we can further understand the subtle relation 
between power, science and technology, not only  in terms of the 
oppressor/oppressed distinction, no matter who the oppressors and the 
oppressed are. Yet, this conception may seem suspicious enough to 
resurrect the charge of neutrality regarding the nature of science and 
technology: the panopticon seems to suggest a kind of political 
neutrality whether the guard in the monitoring chamber is, say, 
politically to the left or right. However, it is exactly this apparent 
neutrality that leads Foucault to investigate the conditions and 
processes by which these technologies of power work, instead of just 
seeking to identify who is the ultimate agent.lxxxii And in the case of 
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modern science and technology, then, that means to investigate the 
conditions and ways that technologies, and the ‘technologies of 
science and technologies’ as well, generate power, instead of only 
who are the abused and the abusers. 
 
Historians of science and technology also address the problem of the 
extent to which technologies and techniques of various kinds effect 
social change, and these changes in turn feed back into the 
technologies and techniques: the thesis of technological 
determinism. lxxxiii  Leo Marx and Merritt Roe Smith offer a pair of 
analytical tools for this thesis: hard determinism and soft determinism. 
For hard determinism, ‘the power to effect change is imputed to 
technology itself…  thus the advance of technology leads to a situation 
of inescapable necessity.’ Soft determinism, ‘instead of treating 
“technology” per se as the locus of historical agency, locates 
technology in a far more various and complex …  matrix.’ Manuel 
Castells, however, further argues that the point is not to choose 
whether ‘the momentum to effect necessary social changes lies in 
technology’ or ‘different socio-politico-economico- historical factors 
are the reason for scientific and technological innovations’. 
Comparing the history of technological and scientific advance in 
Japan and China, Castells shows that the two positions in the debate 
of technological determinism are both non-answers.lxxxiv  
 
Historians have already pointed out that China before the 14th century 
indeed was ahead of the world in terms of scientific and technological 
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advancement. Examples include iron-casting blast furnaces, water 
clocks, weaving equipment, gun powder, paper and printing 
techniques, and so on and so forth. According to one historian, ‘China 
came within a hair’s breadth of industrializing in the fourteenth 
century.’lxxxv However, between the 14th and 19 century, the progress 
in this regard came almost to a complete stop. Quoting historian Joel 
Mokyr, Castells maintains that the intervention of the state is the origin 
of the sudden stagnation. Yet, state intervention does not essentially 
bring negative effects to science and technological progress. This can 
be illustrated in the case of Japan, where the state built the academy, 
imported technique and personnel, assisted in founding firms, etc. To 
Castells, therefore, understanding the relations between different 
parties and changes is more important than arguing for either side of 
the determin ism debate. 
 
Nevertheless, before going so far as to say that there is no position 
reasonable enough or that all the answers are non-answers in the 
debate of technological determinism, it is helpful to first reconsider 
some basic categories by which we think about this issue. Very often, 
one of which is the notion of ‘growth’. Arnold Pacey argues that 
‘growth’ is largely what a chart or graph represents, what is included 
and excluded in these charts and graphs restricts and constructs our 
notion of growth. As a result it is important to be aware that the 
representations of ‘growth’ tend to be ‘over-selective, and lead us to 
overlook the fact that improvements in one dimension are sometimes 
accompanied by less desirable developments elsewhere.’lxxxvi  
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If technological determinism gains its convincing force solely from the 
supposed connection between scientific and technological progress 
on the one hand, and the general growth in productivity of all kinds on 
the other, then it might be worthwhile to juxtapose the above 
connection and Pacey’s insight. In the process of progress of science 
and technology, we have always focused only on what positive 
changes it brings to our daily life and society, and ignored the other -- 
all too many -- operations occurring simultaneously, for instance, 
changes in the organization of labour, which can be quite devastating. 
Harry Braverman, in his classic work Labour and Monopoly of Capital 
(1974), already analysed the changes that management and 
organization of labour in terms of time and body motion bring to the 
process of production.lxxxvii  
 
As a result, we have to rethink whether the scientization and 
mechanization of the production site is the trigger of social progress. 
Also, it would be a mistake to ignore the simultaneous negative effects, 
like de-skilling, and even massive laying off of manufacturing 
workerslxxxviii brought about by the mechanization and the change of 
organization of labour. After all, it is precisely the ignorance or even the 
intentional oblivion of those processes that makes the connections 
between progress in technology and science and positive growth of 
various kinds hegemonic. 
 
Susan J. Douglas’s study of the early development of American radio 
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broadcasting by amateur operators also argues for the complexity of 
relations of determination. Her study shows that amateur radio 
operation was already very well developed in the early 20 th century, 
and even played a crucial role in various accidents by relaying 
asking-for-rescue messages, all at a time when corporations still did not 
quite see the profit potential of it and were not interested in it. However, 
due to the managerial discourse of government, amateur operations 
were portrayed as evil. As a result, the once autonomous and 
energetic development of these amateur operations became 
stagnant through bureaucratic administrative intervention. Finally, they 
were even almost replaced by the monopoly of corporate radio 
broadcasting.lxxxix    
 
Robin Mansell and Roger Silverstone take another routeto frame the 
question of information technology as the question of interaction 
between information technology and the users in the process of 
innovation.xc They borrow the sociological concepts of structure and 
agency to explain the dynamics in the technical and institutional 
innovation process, to look at the interface between structure and 
agency where ‘meanings are produced and values created and 
enforced and so too are the material artifacts’. xci  They cite Paul 
Quintas’s study of software as an example. The politics of software 
innovation is between the tendency of the software producers to 
standardize and normalize the production process on the one hand, 
and the increasing demand of the users to participate in determining 
the operating language of organizations, institutions as well as the 
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machine’ on another.xcii This approach is obviously strong in revealing 
the actual constructive tension between end users and producers, and 
in particular the role of users in negotiating for their own needs. 
However, methodologically speaking, in focusing on the role of users, 
this approach risks overlooking the various factors crossing over and 
constituting the preferences of the users, and treating users as intact, 
closed and given entities emitting unexplainable decisions.     
 
Arguing that no position in the debate of technological determinism is 
viable leads only to the conclusion that there is no point in insisting on 
deciding whether technology determines society or vice versa. It 
nevertheless does not imply that technology is effect-neutral or 
effect-free. David Morley’s study on broadcasting and the construction 
of the national family shows that through public broadcasting such as 
national weather forecasts and the royal Christmas broadcast in the UK, 
a synchronized experience is generated among the audience. By the 
way the imagined audience is addressed, a sense of unity is created, a 
unity of different people in the forms of family and nation. However, 
Morley also argues that such a broadcasting-created unity, or a public 
sphere, if it is the only single one, is a public space full of discriminations 
and prejudices towards, say for instance, women and non-white 
persons. xciii  Women and non-white people nevertheless enjoy 
watching or being watched (i.e. being in the show) in programmes or 
even TV stations catering to them specifically, even though these 
programmes are stereotypically perceived as irrational and chaotic. 
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Though Morley’s project is to investigate the concept of ‘home’, to see 
how the identity of people is affected by the changing meanings of 
home, nation, public, private, as effected by information technology, 
his general description of methodology is still relevant for the study of 
science and technology. He takes TV and radio broadcasting as a 
‘conceptual space through which a number of trajectories pass’, in 
other words, the method is to identify and articulate the different 
discourses passing through that conceptual space extended by TV 
and radio broadcasting.xciv  
 
For the methodological requirements suggested by Morley, Kristin 
Ross’s excellent cultural history of the period between the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, the decade prior to the full- fledged modernization of 
the French -- the decade ‘after electricity but before electronics’ -- is a 
more illustrative example. She seeks to explain the emergence of the 
particular mode of French modernization: Americanized and implicitly 
racial. She argues that this mode of modernization is possible due to 
the cross-weaving of various discourses: the industrialization (hence the 
rise of the middle-class), decolonization of Algeria (hence excluding 
Algerians from the French national memory and experience), the 
internal spatial rearrangement of the city of Paris (resulting in the 
automobile-transported middle-class living in the inner area 
‘surrounded by islands of immigrant communities a long RER ride 
away’), the intellectual movement of structuralism and the Annales 
school of historiography are all central around and catalyzed by the 
important physical artifacts and imaginary of the then-advanced 
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technology of automobile and domestic appliances such as the 
refrigerator and washing machine, or chemical laundry detergents.xcv  
 
One of Ross’s main arguments is the ambiguous relationship between 
the French, especially the emerging middle-class, jeune cadre, and 
the Algerians, especially the revolutionary cadre. While Frantz Fanon 
was calling for the birth of ‘new man’ as the de-colonial revolutionary 
subject in the late 50s and early 60s, the intellectual movement of 
structuralism and the Annales school of historiography were trying to 
proclaim ‘the death of man’ and trivialized ‘event’ for the ‘longue 
duree’. Ross argues that it was precisely this intellectual atmosphere in 
France that rendered the French intellectuals role-less in the process of 
Algerian decolonization. Ross, however, discovers the conceptual and 
historical similarities between the collusion of both the ideas of ‘new 
man’ and ‘death of man’. She insightfully points out the technocratic 
nature inherent in both the Algerian revolutionary cadre  and the 
French jeune cadre. Both are more or less middle persons responsible 
for organization and management -- of the proletariats on the part of 
jeune cadre, and the Algerian national on the part of revolutionary 
cadre. Their jobs require high, machine-like discipline and order. While 
the jeune cadre are usually working in Fordist factories, securing their 
positions by accumulating technically advanced skilled, the 
revolutionary cadre also equip themselves with all the technicalities for 
organizing and mediating the bureaucratically structured revolutionary 
body.  
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On the other hand, a sense of complex emphasis of hygiene and 
cleanliness is also noticed by Ross. We have seen in the experience of 
India and elsewhere that the elements of hygiene and cleanliness both 
physically and metaphysically are important in the project of scientific 
and technological modernization. Ross sees no exception in her study. 
Jeune cadre  require a modern, hygienic, easily manipulable interior in 
their homes, made possible and mediated by the domestic electrical 
appliances of washing machine and refrigerator, isolating them from 
the outside world. As for the revolutionary cadre , their concern is more 
mental and behavioral. To Ross, therefore, the jeune cadre ‘is both the 
agent and the product of capitalist modernization just as Fanon’s ‘new 
man’ is both the agent and the product of decolonization’. xcvi As a 
result, it is in the colluded embrace of the principle of technicality by 
both the French jeune cadre and the Algerian revolutionary cadre that 
French modernization is clearly demonstrated as a nexus through 
which different discourses pass through. Simultaneously, this same 
collusion paradoxically renders the French and Algerian the 
constituted factors of their own mutual exclusion in the modernized, 
homogeneous and hygienic French national identity and memory.       
 
Political economy of science and technology 
Home, the common focus of Morley’s and Ross’s studies, is also, but a 
bit differently, studied in relation to information technology from the 
more empirically oriented perspective of political economy, in the 
framework of the locale or city.  
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Manuel Castells argues that aided by information technology, the 
‘space of flow’ is emerging to replace the space of places. In his own 
words, th is trend is ‘the deployment of the functional logic of power 
holding organizations in asymmetric networks of exchanges which do 
not depend on the characteristics of any specific locale for the 
fulfillment of their fundamental goals.xcvii Once the large corporations 
are able to escape from being confined to any particular place, once 
they are able to take advantage of the information technology in 
organizing their business around the globe, they also escape from 
social, economic and political controls that are particular to any 
particular place. Consequently, these place-based societies will have 
to succumb to the requirements of the corporations if they are to 
compete and survive. As one critic puts it, ‘for business, networked 
information circuits free business clusters to choose the location of their 
operational headquarters for command and control. Firms can now 
circumvent government disincentives whether embodied as taxes, 
rules, interest payments or capital restrictions.’xcviii  
 
According to Castells’s observation, resistance of communities to such 
forms of transformation usually takes the form of isolating and 
fundamentalizing themselves, in order to affirm their local identities. 
However, Castells argues that this strategy risks cutting them off from 
communities that are also facing the same situation, thus rendering 
themselves powerless. Consequently, ‘between a historical flow and 
irreducible identities of local communities, cities and regions disappear 
as socially meaningful places.’xcix  In order to revert this situation, 
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Castells calls for a ‘network of flows’ constituted by different 
place-based communities, to share their information, to come up with 
more specific bargaining agenda, to respond to the demands of 
corporations’ more flexibly.  
 
Saskia Sassen has similar observations of the current global situation 
caused by the advanced information technology. She also points out 
that a network linking major centers, or nodes, as she sometimes calls 
them, is enabled by information technology.c These centers are more 
than the sum of the headquarters of the big corporations, these 
centers are also where firms such as those specializing in legal, 
accounting, financial, and advertising services are concentrated. For 
her, these centers, though articulated through cyberroutes or digital 
highways, and scattered throughout the world, are basically detached 
from the region where they are located. As a result, places outside this 
net of centers and digital highways ‘are peripheralized.’ci She also sees 
the paradoxon of the current global situation, a paradoxon that she 
cannot account for satisfactorily. cii  If globalization fuelled by 
information technology is about expansion and dispersion beyond 
what had been the confined realm of national economies and floor 
trading, ‘why [do] financial centers matter at all’ciii?  
 
This paradoxon, involving at least the entangled rhetoric and theories 
of both globalization and information technology, is very important but 
out of scope here. What might be of interest here is the difference 
between Sassen and Castells, who have similar observations, but 
 50 
different attitudes and prescriptions. While Sassen keeps being critical 
of the inequality generated by the phenomenon of global cities, 
Castells sees the possibility of a win-win situation. Basically , he thinks 
that what local communities, including both the local governments 
and the people, should do is to equip themselves to face the dramatic 
and abrupt changes brought about by advanced capitalism as a 
result of the development of information technology.  
 
John Downey argues, however, in the context of the EU, this possibility 
in which everyone has the capability and easy accessibility to the 
Internet provided publicly is fundamentally contradictory to the 
attitude of the EU on information technology , which puts a heavy 
emphasis on deregulation and privatization. The greater use of 
information technology is likely to bring more benefits, he argues, but 
this assumption, does not guarantee that the benefit will be distributed 
equally.civ Some often-cited examples are worth mentioning again 
here. Until 1999, 29 OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development) countries had less than 20% of the world’s 
population but transmitted more than 80% of the world’s telephone 
traffic (9 of them with three-quarters of all telephones) with 90% of the 
world’s mobile telephone users and 95% of all computers. Almost 85% 
of the world’s people have no telephones, and well over half have 
never made a telephone call.cv 
 
Inequality resulting from the uneven development of information 
technology certainly requires our attention, yet, the supposedly 
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positive side of the information technology should not be accepted 
uncritically. A team of researchers consisting of Doreen Massey, Paul 
Quintas and David Wield look into the working of science parks in the 
UK, examining the hierarchical social structure, the assumed model of 
innovation, and the spatial arrangement unfolded in the various 
science parks. They point out that the whole conception of science 
parks in the industry is founded upon a linear model in which the 
processes of innovation and production are strictly separated, and 
upon a scientific elitism (in contrast to the actual production process) 
which believes that technocrats know best. However, they argue that 
this conception is neither realistic nor plausible.cvi  
 
And indeed, even evaluating according to the official objectives, 
science parks in the UK right from the establishment of the first one in 
1972 until the early 1990s, they powerfully demonstrated that science 
parks are far from being successful. One major objective of the 
Science Park is the facilitation of R&D and technology transfer. 
However, in an atmosphere of university budget cuts, the opportunities 
for university staff to start up firms in the science park have been 
transformed into a tactic the university adopts to live with a decreasing 
budget. In extreme cases, universities redeployed staff to set up 
part-time businesses, some are even set up by the universities to 
‘continue the contracts which the university department formerly 
undertook!’cvii  This kind of firms, nevertheless, is already part of a 
start-up minority in the park --the majority of them are relocated units, 
subsidiaries or branches. Contrary to this situation, promoting new 
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start-ups is one of the major objectives of the parks. With the support of 
the development of advanced technology by the government, 
Science Parks become an outlet for the university to actualize their 
academic entrepreneurship.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, before we go into the particular analysis of the 
governance and the discourse of both the government and business 
sector on technology, we can see that the terrain extended by the 
notion of science and technology is indeed quite large. Every theory or 
analysis can be enormously interesting and inspiring, yet they can only 
articulate a limited amount of elements in the terrain or discursive field. 
What may be a more important implication from the above, precisely 
because every theory or analysis can only dominate the relation and 
assigning of meaning in the discursive field partially: one might argue 
that the meaning and the terrain of the notion of science and 
technology are still yet to be completely settled, and maybe ultimately 
uncompletable, or -- from another perspective – at least none of them 
can claim an almighty prominence.  
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HK as a blackbox of ‘rational progress’? 
 
 
 
 
Wolfgang Becker’s recent movie Goodbye, Lenin! is a film about the 
efforts of Alex, the son of a mother who totally devotes herself to 
socialism, to pretend in front of his mother that the socialist regime in 
East Germany is perfectly normal and intact. He has to protect his 
mother from emotional shocks, however slight, after she wakes up from 
a ten-month coma, during which the fall of the Berlin wall, the 
unification of East and West Germany and, most relevant to his mother, 
the influx of the capitalist way of life into her socialist home country are 
witnessed. Although this project, or lie, as some may say, does not last 
forever, the film does not end with a passive adaptation to, or 
acceptance of, the capitalist ‘reality’ per se . 
 
It is seemingly tempting to read Goodbye, Lenin! in terms of a cold war 
mindset, one that lures us to reach the conclusion that the film is either 
anti-capitalist or anti -communist. For instance, the effort of Alex for his 
mother is simply futile, and the socialist ‘reality’ created will certainly be 
ruthlessly crushed by capitalist reality that is more ‘natural’ or 
‘inevitable’. Yet, instead of being chained by this blackmail of choices, 
which is antagonistic and mutually exclusive by design or even by 
definition, it is more fruitful to read the story in terms of, say, the 
meaning of faith and aspiration, their coming to terms with what is 
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supposedly mutually exclusive, how this coming to terms after the 
original meanings of the so -called communism and capitalism works, 
the situation of people in these circumstances, and all the above in 
respect to the imagination and ontological status of the state. Or from 
another perspective, it can be analyzed how those abstract 
categories are themselves transformed as a result of this particular story, 
in that particular articulation of elements. 
 
Owing to, and despite, all the efforts of Alex, East Germany persists only 
as long as Alex keeps putting up various symbols and artifacts of the 
socialist regime of East Germany. And it is precisely by putting up all 
these that the socialism of Alex’s mother can remain intact. When the 
ex-astronaut (who was Alex’s hero when he was still a child) dresses up 
as the leader of East Germany, and proclaims the rather sympathetic 
acceptance of West Germany as a result of the decision of unification, 
the ‘leader’ insists on asking people to be brotherly, loving and 
supportive of each other. Whether this is the case for Germans is not 
our concern here, yet in any case, if this were the case, the resulting 
unified Germany can no longer be comprehended by the aggressive, 
and conceptual, dichotomy of capitalism and communism, and 
hence an ultimate ‘defeat’ of communism by its capitalist counterpart. 
After all, the request of the ‘leader’-- brotherhood, love and 
support— should be ready to form some very heterogeneous and 
contradictory constituents of the liberal, free market capitalism that is 
supposedly based upon atomic and selfish individual subjects.    
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That the nature of state is performative, and even theatrical, that is to 
say, that the state exists nowhere else but in what the state does is 
precisely captured by what the anthropologist Clifford Geertz termed 
the ‘theatre state’. An understanding of this dimension of politics is 
certainly helpful for us to reconceptualize the meaning of politics and 
state. For Geertz, all the political performances, the demonstrations, 
‘the pageants were not the mere aesthetic embellishments, 
celebrations of a domination independently existing: they were the 
thing itself.’cviii According to his ethnographical studies and historical 
record, Geertz observes, in other words, that the relationship between 
the state, large-scale public performances of the state, and the kings is 
not one of instrumentality. There is no independent state whose power 
and status can be enhanced ‘externally’ by large-scale performance. 
Public performance is no mere performance, for it implies 
fundamentally an ability to stage such a thing; it is the ability to 
‘express a view of the ultimate nature of reality and, at the same time, 
to shape the existing conditions of life to be consonant with the 
reality.’cix In Goodbye, Lenin!, Alexander is of course not comparable 
to the king of Bali, yet the basic structure is similar, and it is even 
precisely the extent to which one can mobilize reality and at the same 
time lay down the standard and rules of reality that determines the 
status and the magnitude of power. 
 
In this sense, the conception of state and politics no longer relies on the 
assumption of a political essence or core, which is usually assumed as 
being signified by certain arbitrary political operations, events or 
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symbols. And the mission of political analysis is then no longer an 
exercise of decipherment. In other words, it is tempting to conclude 
that the meaning of state and power, and their terrain as well, is 
retroactively defined by which public performances are held, and it is 
hardly likely to have any transcendental and necessary characteristic 
of state and power. As a result, instead of simply sticking only to such 
notions as coercive or fictitious, which may sometimes be too crass, 
Geertz’s conception is insightful for the recovering of the etymological 
themes originally condensed in the word ‘state’. cx The conceptual 
tools from the theory of performative utterance can furthermore break 
down and expose the significance of the different parts within political 
actions and processes.  
 
For any utterance to be performative, the utterance should not merely 
be ‘a description of some action, inner or outer, prior or posterior, 
occurring elsewhere than in the utterance itself.’cxi Yet, as Timothy 
Gould reminds us, the illocutionary force of a performative utterance 
does not depend on whether there is a true correspondence of the 
utterance to the outside world. However, it also does not mean that 
the effect of the utterance, or the ‘perlocutionary force’, is irrelevant or 
can be ignored by the theo ry of performative utterance. cxii And 
indeed, it is Gould’s insight that the perlocutionary effect that 
subsequently happens is not necessarily what a certain illocutionary 
utterance desires. Nonetheless, this situation does not prevent the 
utterance from being performative. To cite one example offered by 
Gould: I have successfully advised you – but I have not succeeded in 
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influencing you. cxiii  This discrepancy is referred to by Gould as 
‘illocutionary suspense’ or ‘perlocutionary delay’, and he emphasizes 
that it has to be recognized.  
 
This recognition is significant in the following sense: If a performative 
utterance is defined as non-descriptive, and hence not subjected to 
verification on the one hand, and not grounded in any ‘extralinguistic’ 
realitycxiv in any way on the other, then this over-retreated version of 
performative utterance will ultimately confine itself within a little 
isolated domain, debilitating itself rather severely. However, with the 
recognition of the delay or suspense, performative utterance can still 
be possible and confirmed even if incoherence exists between the 
illocutionary intention and the perlocutionary effect.  
 
Judith Butler’s analysis takes a step back. By calling the subject of the 
utterance into question, she situates the subject back in a genealogy 
of the subject of the utterance. She observes that in regard to the 
illocutionary part, an uttering subject has to be assumed. This subject is 
only interpellated when a certain action, and hence accountability, 
has to be attributed to someone as its initiator, its origin.cxv However, it 
is this very consideration of the subject that brings forth a paradoxon. 
Butler points out, citing Derrida, that no performative utterance could 
have succeeded if the utterance pronounced ‘in order to open a 
meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable in some 
way as a conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then 
identifiable in some way as a “citation”’(original emphasis).cxvi In other 
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words, without echoing prior actions and accumulating ‘the force of 
authority through the repetition or citation of a prior and authoritative 
set of practices’, cxvii the transitivity of illocutionary intention could not 
possibly be effective. Butler even argues that without this historical 
establishment of a model of iterability, the ‘singularity and discreteness’ 
of any action and utterance could not be effectively defined. 
However, the paradoxon is that, should the accumulation history not 
be dissimulated, no accountability and responsibility could be 
established with the subject, who is exactly and only intelligible as long 
as accountability and responsibility are attributed to him/her. To sum 
up, the performative works only by forbidding its own constitutive 
convention and model by which it is essentially made possible and 
effective.  
 
Butler’s argument is certainly inspiring in that it urges one to situate 
different performatives back to their proper context, whereas the same 
performative will subsequently becomes the constituting convention 
for other performatives to come. And at the same time, it is then 
possible for one to map out the location, level and relationship of and 
between various performatives that constitute our situation. It is this 
double characteristic of the performative that bring us back to Geertz. 
In his study of Bali, Geertz points out that power in Bali is manifest 
through the ability to physically occupy and perform the standard, the 
convention in public ceremonies, which in turn invests power to the 
one occupying the position. In the rituals, ‘it was in the ability to stage 
productions of an eleven-roof scale, to mobilize the men, the resources, 
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and not least, the expertise, that made one an eleven-roof lord.’cxviii It 
might seem strange that power is exercised and manifested through 
this very ‘sitting’ on the eleven-roof: a common person like me sitting 
on a common seat like the one I am now sitting on does not have any 
power effect. With the conception of the genealogy of the constitutive 
conventions supplemented by Butler, the performative not only 
becomes intelligible, new areas of research are also opened up. Say 
for instance, in the case of hate speech analyzed by Butler, legal 
precedents form the ground and resources by which the court judges 
certain acts to constitute hate speech. A genealogy of these 
precedents will reveal the basis and meaning of what Butler calls the 
‘transitivity’cxix of words into injurious illocutionary force.  
 
Introducing this theatrical and performative dimension of state and 
politics is expected to elicit objections, especially when the theoretical 
elaboration of this dimension is originated from the context of Bali in the 
nineteen century: the problem of validity. The modern state is 
conventionally characterized by its legal-bureaucratic nature, which 
includes qualities such as effectiveness, efficiency, hierarchy, 
impersonality, system, and so on. All these qualities seem to be in an 
extreme opposition to the large-scale rituals and religious 
performance/ceremonies-orientated conception of state and politics. 
Especially when aspiration, religious faith, and struggle are the main 
protagonists of the latter.  
 
According to the official version, especially before the financial crisis in 
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1997, Hong Kong is well-known for possessing three major strengths that 
make Hong Kong out-perform other places. Fundamentally, Hong 
Kong has a solid foundation in the ‘rule of law’; we have a solid 
foundation in its finance; as well as in its civil service. According to a 
speech delivered by the Chief Executive, Mr. Tung Chee Hwa, at the 
sixth Annual World Economic Development Congress, the civil servants 
are ‘very valuable assets’ to Hong Kong because of their locally and 
internationally renowned ‘efficiency and productivity’. cxx  Mr. Tung 
even revealed in his first policy address that, after working with the civil 
servants for three months, he was ‘struck by their professionalism and 
continuous quest for improvement’. cxxi After the outbreak of the Asian 
financial crisis, during which Hong Kong was severely tested, the 
philosophy, or at least the rhetoric of the philosophy to respond to the 
crisis, can be seen in the titles of the government budget. The English 
names for the budget in 98-99 and 99-00 are ‘Renewing Hong Kong 
Strength’ and ‘Onward with new strength’ respectively. The Chinese 
titles, however may be even more explicit, the direct translations are 
‘ease the people, lessen the difficulties, and keep 
self-strengthening’ cxxii  (98-99) and ‘strengthen the foundation, 
economize expenditure, and invent new strengths together’cxxiii (99-00). 
Both titles function as an expression of hope to achieve what the titles 
mention. We can see that even if the government before the crisis 
mistakenly over-praised the foundations of the ‘success’ of Hong Kong, 
it did want to show that the government officials had learned a lesson. 
They want to show people that they would, as a result, be pragmatic, 
and would focus on something more fundamental, more practical 
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regarding its governance of the Hong Kong economy. Therefore no 
more illusion, no more myth, no more bubble. In a famous statement 
made by the ex-financial secretary Donald Tsang in the radio 
programme ‘Letter to Hong Kong’ before delivering the budget 98-99, 
this ‘be practical and no bubble attitude’ is presented no more clearly. 
He said, ‘frankly speaking, it is possible to disregard the long term 
interest of Hong Kong to give Hong Kong people some short term 
excitement, however, I think, exchanging the tax revenue for a 
moment of applause is an irresponsible, and even dangerous action of 
the government.’cxxiv 
 
As a result, for such a practical and even pragmatic government, at 
least willed by the rhetoric, the theatrical and performative dimension 
of politics as a valid approach of analysis must be seen as irrelevant, or 
indeed as something to be avoided and even criticized and 
combated. Yet, in the rest of this chapter, I am going to argue that 
instead of accepting this convenient but misleading dichotomy laid 
down by the government, and merely reverting the emphasis from one 
extreme to another, what we can see is rather the intermingling of 
these two dimensions, and the government’s non-recognition of the 
very theatrical and performative dimension. One can indeed 
hypothesize that the very need to combat and criticize is grounded 
precisely in the need to obliterate the often less eye-catching 
dimension and function, while it indeed occupies a no less important 
proportion of what the government is exactly doing, hence diverting 
the sight of the people from any other perspective according to which 
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the governance can be judged and other things can be done. In 
other words, not only in the emphasis on the practical and pragmatic 
face of the government is power at work, an even more important 
trace of power may be found where the emphasis is at the expense of 
making invisible other dimensions. Power, echoing Foucault’s famous 
analysis in his essay ‘The subject and power’, is ‘an action upon an 
action, on existing action’ or more importantly, ‘on those which may 
arise in the present or the future’, power functionally is the guidance of 
the ‘possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible 
outcome’. cxxv 
 
Foucault’s essay explicates how power and the project of modern 
states deal mainly with the construction of the subject, which is not our 
concern here. However, his analysis supplements the ideas outlined 
above in that the supposedly binary opposition between the 
practical/pragmatic vs. theatrical/performative is off the mark. 
Whereas the construction of the subject is the purpose, it really then 
does not matter whether the government is pragmatic or performative, 
nor does the controversy of whether they indeed epistemologically 
and ontologically exclude each other. Instead of insisting on either side 
of the opposition, we have to look into the power relation embedded 
in various social nexuses, through different kinds of grass-root level 
institutions such as hospitals, markets, schools, and even ceremonies, 
although policies about them may seem to be made ‘up there’ by the 
government officials ‘at’ the moment they decide. As a result, the 
question opened up then will be to locate the theatrical and 
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performative moments in modern politics, at work in various institutions 
embedded in the whole social nexus.  
 
Before really going into the analysis of the Governance of Hong Kong, 
a clarification needs to be made. To investigate the theatrical and 
performative dimension of governance should not be mistaken for a 
complete denial of the relevant institutions, policies or actions. For 
instance, if a mother wants to deter her daughter from her frequent 
night-life, she might say to her daughter: you know what, the number 
of girls assaulted at night every single year is surprisingly blah blah 
blah…  We can take this statement as persuasion or even a threat, yet 
in any case whether the figure here is right or wrong is not relevant. In 
this context, what is worth investigating is instead how this threat or 
persuasion is articulated and on what grounds the articulation transits 
into an effect that might occur on the part of the daughter.  
 
Bird flu 
Hong Kong’s becoming the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(HKSAR) under the People’s Republic of China from a British colony was 
a difficult transition for both the government and the people. During 
the second half of 1997, a time when it was still a newborn baby, Asia 
experienced a tremendous financial crisis, and Hong Kong inevitably 
was one of the targets in jeopardy. This is not the place to elaborate 
the political economy involved, but put briefly, in October 1997, Hong 
Kong dollars were ‘short-sold’ by some speculators and international 
hedge-funds, causing intense economic strain on the SAR Government 
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to maintain the pegged exchange rate between Hong Kong and the 
U.S. dollar. As a result, interest rates between banks experienced a 
huge thrust, and consequently credits became very difficult to obtain, 
prices of the stock and property markets declined steeply.  
 
Whereas the SAR Government takes seriously the degree of economic 
prosperity as an important constituent of its legitimacy, the financial 
crisis that struck Hong Kong turned out to erode a considerable portion 
of the prestige and legitimacy of the SAR Government. Almost 
simultaneously, the bird flu crisis broke out in the area of public hygiene 
by the end of November 1997. The bird flu, technically known as H5N1, 
was by that time unrecognizable even for the international scientific 
and medical community. Within a month, 13 people were infected (a 
total of 18 people were infected in the outbreak), and 6 people were 
killed by the virus in less than 2 months.cxxvi Exactly a month after the 
outbreak of the virus, on the same day, the government decided to 
slaughter all the chickens and poultry in the wholesale markets and 
retail outlets, as a result of the sudden death of chickens in a local 
poultry wholesale market and the discovery of the H5 virus in a sample 
taken in a local chicken farm.  
 
This decision launched a lasting series of spectacles which arguably 
have become part of the shared memory of Hong Kong people -- 1.5 
millions chickenscxxvii and other poultry, weighing about 1300 tons,cxxviii 
altogether were slaughtered in just about 3 day’s time. The slaughter of 
this huge number of chickens and other poultry in almost 200 spots 
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around Hong Kong, including wholesale markets, chicken and poultry 
farms, was, however, not the most important part of the spectacle; the 
most spectacular part was seen in the process of handling the 
aftermath of the slaughter. In a way represented by the 
sensation-oriented practice of the local media, the city became the 
great tomb of the slaughtered animals. Hong Kong people were 
confronted with images of piles and piles of animal bodies at the 
locations of slaughter; the heads and feet not wrapped well and 
scattered around in the three designated dumping areas. Headings 
such as ‘Uncollected sacks of rotting carcasses, picked apart by rats 
and wild dogs, littered village roads’ and ‘Renegade chickens were still 
roaming around rural farms’ cxxix  appeared in newspapers at 
newsstands and were read all over Hong Kong. 
 
One day before the government decision on the slaughter, the 
government freshly reported on a study jointly done by the Hong Kong 
Department of Health, the WHO and the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) and Prevention in Atlanta, USA. The study shows that the 
anti-body to the virus is found in poultry workers and those who have 
direct exposure to the virus, while no such anti-body is found in the 
control of the experiment. Meanwhile the government tried to keep 
Hong Kong people’s confidence with the message that ‘the main 
mode of transmission of this virus is considered at this stage to be from 
bird-to-man. The transmission from man-to-man, if occurring, is 
considered inefficient.’cxxx If man-to-man indeed does not seem to be 
the source of infection, the slaughtering of chickens and poultry in 
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Hong Kong should be considered as a way to actively block the more 
likely source of infection: bird-to-man. However, this deduction works 
only if we, and the government, (intentionally or not) ignore the fact 
that chickens are delivered daily from chicken farms in South China, 
and the supply from these farms constitutes 80% of the daily 
consumption of chickens in Hong Kong;cxxxi otherwise, the government 
would not take their decision of slaughter as ‘an attempt to rid the 
source of influenza A H5N1 virus’.cxxxii 
 
To take this seeming mismatch of problem and solution as a mere 
mistake, a wrong decision, would, however, probably undermine a 
chance to investigate the working or the governance of the SAR 
Government. As put amusingly enough by a critic , apart from the bird 
flu, the ‘malaise’ of Hong Kong certainly includes ‘a weakened stock 
market and a slowing economy’; therefore it takes ‘more than a health 
department order to give Hong Kong a clean bill of health’. cxxxiii This 
comment juxtaposed the images of hygienic crisis and the economic 
situation in the context of Hong Kong, which is what occupies the 
government’s mind and what the government keeps constructing. 
Nevertheless, the comment separates the tasks of the different 
departments of the government a bit too neatly, as we have always 
imagined it to be. As shown above, destroying the poultry might have 
been off the mark, effectively putting to the back stage some 
arguably more relevant responses and measures, such as securing a 
virus-free supply of chickens from China in the future, although at the 
same time, the slaughter paradoxically does more than just halt the 
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spread of bird flu. 
 
SARS 
Another case similar to the outbreak of bird flu is the well-known case 
of the global out break of the Severe and Acute Respiratory syndrome 
(SARS), which brought about a much larger scale of loss of both 
human and economic resources than the bird flu. With the source of 
the virus brought by a medical doctor from mainland China by the end 
of February 2003, SARS broke out in Hong Kong in early March.cxxxiv The 
virus spread tremendously quickly during the subsequent four months in 
Hong Kong, and culminated at the end of March, with a record of 80 
infected cases admitted to the hospital in one single day. Altogether, 
1755 people got infected and 299 died.cxxxv During the SARS outbreak, 
directly or indirectly affected by the virus, the unemployment rate rose 
to a historical high of 8.6%, amounting to 300,000 of the Hong Kong 
population; the World Health Organization, for the first time ever, 
warned travelers to avoid traveling to Hong Kong and other high risk 
areascxxxvi; the Secretary for Education and Manpower, Arthur Li, was 
almost ‘forced’ to announce class suspension officially, as a result of 
the tremendous public pressure and the land-sliding voluntary class 
suspension of primary and secondary schools.cxxxvii The government 
even issued a 10-day ‘isolation order’ to the residents in Block E of 
Amoy Garden, where more than 100 residents had already been 
infected by that time; and evacuated the building 2 days later, 
quarantining the residents in a recreation center in Sai-kung. In 
addition, the severe criticisms of government officials, especially the 
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senior health department, regarding delayed and ill-informed 
treatment on the brink of the community-wide spreading of the virus; 
and the enormous recognition given to the frontline medical workers, 
janitors, etc., all combined with the conditions described above to 
yield the unprecedented size and scope of different types of 
interactions and tensions, highly condensed in this historical four-month 
period in Hong Kong.  
 
Mechanical explanation of cause and effect, problem and response in 
this incident, in the sense that goals were first laid down and the 
policies and measures implemented to fulfill the goals, probably would 
not take us too far to comprehend the situation in Hong Kong, and the 
working of the government. When the government considered that 
they began to contain SARS, Tung subsequently summoned senior 
officials on a ‘cross-bureau, inter-departmental’cxxxviii basis, to form two 
task forces. The one which deals with public hygiene was led by the 
Chief Secretary, Donald Tsang; the other, aiming to revitalize the 
economy, was led by the Financial Secretary, Henry Tang. The 
common and ultimate task for both teams was to engage the whole of 
Hong Kong, as soon as the WHO had lifted the above-mentioned 
travel advisory, in a ‘promotion exercise’ that conveys the following 
message: ‘SARS is now being contained, Hong Kong is a safe and 
environmentally friendly and hygienic place and travelers, tourists and 
investors should feel safe to come to Hong Kong to stay, be tourists or 
to invest’.cxxxix ‘Setting’ up task forces ‘to involve’ the whole of Hong 
Kong in a promotion exercise certainly falls into the category of power 
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described by Foucault. To look at the actual practice and policy 
suggestions made, at what both task forces have really done, with 
Foucault’s notion and Geertz’s idea that ‘theatre, performative as the 
domination itself’, makes possible not only a better understanding of 
the power relations here in Hong Kong, but can also avoid off-the-mark 
judgments and criticisms. 
 
To the government officials, the outbreak of SARS is not a problem of 
administration of health-related governmental departments (say for 
instance the communication of information between health units of 
different places, the implementation of urgent measures regarding a 
highly contagious virus, etc.). It is also not a problem of the increasing 
flow of population between Hong Kong and mainland China, and all 
over the world (however, the issuing of a travel advisory by the WHO; 
the locations where the carriers of the virus were staying along their 
journeys; which flight they subsequently took, etc.: the government 
indeed took all of these seriously, didn’t it?)cxl. Instead, they considered 
it as fundamentally and essentially a matter of hygiene. As explained 
by Donald Tsang, the chairman of the task force, namely Team Clean: 
‘… to deal with epidemics like SARS …  many fundamental things have 
to be dealt with. Starting from personal hygiene, followed by 
household, environmental hygiene, eating habits, and then 
workplace… ’ cxli  When Donald Tsang had to make a public 
presentation on the suggestions recommended by the task force, the 
relationship between hygiene and SARS was even taken one step 
further: ‘we would not forget its (SARS’s) devastating Hong Kong, taking 
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away the precious lives of almost 200 Hong Kong citizens …  Hong Kong 
is now a different Hong Kong from 3 months ago, demanding more 
and more public, personal and household hygiene’. cxlii As a result, 
hygiene has to be observed not because it is virtuous, not because 
prevention is a merit, but because we are effectively destroying 
people’s precious lives if we don’t.  
 
Echoing the military tone of government officials, a local newspaper 
understands the hygiene issue as a war, and the task force has to ‘win 
the war of civilization by using rationality’. cxliii After establishing the 
almost- exclusive relationship between hygiene and responsibility for 
SARS, readers should not be surprised by the famous notion of a ‘zero 
tolerance’ attitude, adopted by the task force, when their ‘Report on 
measures to improve environmental hygiene in Hong Kong” cxliv 
expressed an abstractly negative perception of, for instance, fresh 
markets, which occupy quite a proportion of attention and treatment 
in the report. According to the report, the fresh market has a perennial 
condition of wet, dirty and slippery floors. (p.77) Market tenants litter 
the ground with all kinds of rubbish, such as damaged fruit and 
vegetables, plastic bags, discarded cartons, tissue papers, cigarette 
butts, etc.; when they are indeed required to provide rubbish bins for 
themselves, though some tenants do not even have one. (p.78) 
Tenants also seldom have the initiative to clean their own stalls. The 
collected dust produces an untidy look of the market. (p.78) The 
description particularly given to the poultry stalls is fascinatingly 
sophisticated and worthy to be reproduced in full length. ‘Poultry 
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feathers block drains while dirty, poultry droppings despoil the 
environment. Empty transit cages are often stacked in common parts 
of the market to await collection. Dressing of poultry in the stall, and 
not in the scalding room, makes the situation even worsecxlv’ (p.78)  
 
Now let us take a close look at the basic structure of the descriptions, 
or one may say accusations, in the perception of the task force of the 
fresh markets and food premises. They commonly consist of highly 
abstract, non-contextual adjectiv es (dirty, untidy, bad, despoiled, lack 
of initiative, and so on) applied to general, unspecified subjects. The 
report does not show an intention to differentiate among the fresh 
markets and their tenants, the description provided also practically 
ignores and even denies any improvement ever in the markets, before 
the overhaul of the task force. In that case, it would be interesting to 
know what then comes out of the encounter of the ‘zero tolerance’ 
resolution and such a general, non-contextual, yet negative 
perception of the places and practices to be disciplined.  
 
In the presentation of what has been done so far after the formation of 
the task force, the following items are mentioned. Regarding the fresh 
market and food premises, according to the report, the Food and 
Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD) alone has inspected all the 
18,000 licensed food premises, issuing 3009 verbal warnings, 111 written 
warnings, 580 summonses, 264 statutory notices to keep the 6-m 
surroundings clean; and seized 1220 kg of open food. And the FEHD 
and Housing Department (HD) have joined forces with the police to 
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organize 153 blitz operations in 15 public housing estates, during which 
42 people were arrested and 280 seizures of goods recorded. Focusing 
on the hygiene problem of the public housing estates, the report 
explains that ‘intensive cleansing[s] of 258 hygiene black spots in 99 
public housing estates’cxlvi were carried out. Among them, 239 were 
‘eradicated’. Controversial punishment mechanisms were also 
introduced, among them a raise of the fixed penalty for spitting and 
littering from $600 to $1500cxlvii, repeated violations of public housing 
residents resulting in the termination of tenancy.  
 
The relationship between unhygienic conduct such as spitting/littering 
and tenancy (and hence the right to do business) can certainly invite 
considerable reflection on the problem between ‘crime’ conducted 
and scale and scope of punishment. Time and space do not allow me 
to go further into this issue. I will, however, take issue with the 
compatibility between the hygienic problems as the government sees 
it and the measures they suggested. And transcending this issue is a 
more fundamental one: even if they are compatible, to what extent 
does this compatibility refer to the eradication of SARS? What will be 
the boundary of reasonable sanctions implied by this compatibility? 
Critics have already made the point clear, severe punishment for those 
who litter and spit, for unhygienic food premises, changing the way 
food markets sell food, eradication of hygiene ‘black spots’, 
renovation and restructuring of buildings, all these actions are trying to 
convince us that the source of SARS is exactly somewhere inside the 
markets, hawkers and buildingscxlviii  – which are in effect also the 
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exclusive targets of the government’s actions. Grounded in the fact 
that several public housing estates have been major sites of the spread 
of the virus, public housing, and their residents, immediately become a 
major object for discipline, but if one does not intentionally ignore the 
fact, the situation in private housing estates (which always represent an 
image of modern management) in places like Chai Wan are at least 
equally severe, not to mention Amoy Garden in Ngau Tau Kok.    
 
What the government has kept doing is, however, borrowing power 
and legitimacy from primitive binary oppositions of old vs. new and 
civilized vs. uncivilized. cxlix  Team Clean begins the chapters on 
measures towards community hygiene this way: The number of 
supermarkets carrying fresh food items has increased significantly in 
recent years, but public markets remain a traditional source of daily 
food provisionscl  (my emphasis). The word ‘but’ in the middle is 
significant, it refers to a turn of tone. In fact, focusing on the effort to 
maintain cleanliness and tidiness should be more fundamental than 
attaching these two qualities essentially to something else, making 
them seemingly mutually exclusive. Less than a month after the Team 
published this report, a fish tank of a major supermarket of Hong Kong, 
Park n’ Shop, was found to have choleracli, and by the end of 2003, 
staff of the FEHD found in another major supermarket in Hong Kong, 
Wellcome, stock of chilled pork and pork of dubious origin, the 
supermarket was suspected to sell chilled meat as fresh meat. clii 
Combining these two cases with the mixed major sites of SARS spread, 
it would be very important to question where the borderline between 
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civilized and uncivilized, modern and traditional lies, even if we do not 
deem these analytical concepts impossible or simply void and 
discardable.  
 
Raising this issue is not intended to relativize all differences. The 
problem is, cleaning Hong Kong at the expense of spreading the 
non-constructive binary opposition does not seem to help Hong Kong’s 
economy, or prevent life-devastating epidemics. As mentioned above, 
paralleling the formation of Team Clean is the formation of another 
task force aiming at revitalizing the Hong Kong economy. One of its 
tasks is to achieve this aim by reintroducing more tourists. The 2 most  
famous outdoor markets, the Lady Market and Temple Street Market, 
are precisely areas where abundant street hawkers and other snack 
shops make their livings. They are certainly among the victims of this 
official endorsement of the binary oppositioncliii, when at the same time 
Hong Kong has to get its tourism going again, probably by trumpeting 
them as major tourist attractions.cliv As the historical studies of T. G. 
McGee of hawkers in Hong Kong argued, hawking has been a 
constituent part of the Hong Kong economy. It functioned to ease the 
employment pressures of Hong Kong, at a time when the population of 
Hong Kong was increasing rapidly, especially in both the 30s and 50s. 
The way they did business, their location, the price of their goods, all 
functioned to keep the cost of living down. The government’s effort to 
allocate them to established markets, to issue licenses to them, in fact 
is a source of creating additional revenue.clv Whether the historical 
functions of hawkers are still valid as they were a couple of decades 
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ago is certainly open to discussion; however, the process of emptying 
their social meanings and stuffing in meanings like dirt-makers and 
residues of a traditional way of life should not remain invisible in 
discourse. In other words, it is by almost reinventing the categories of 
hawker, fresh market tenants, etc., in this way with all those 
characteristics and features, some of which are true and some are 
certainly not, that a network of apparently coherent meanings can be 
established, and that actions can be taken about them. In this case, 
the way that goals that are supposed to be fulfilled remains distant 
precisely as a result of the action itself, while other effects, which 
subsequently emerged, might illustrate Gould’s concept of 
illocutionary suspense/ perlocutionary delay, if we emphasize the 
operations involved rather than the linguistic origin of these concepts 
for the moment.  
 
Space mania 
Apart from the prolonged economic recession that has been straining 
Hong Kong almost from the beginning of the HKSAR, and the 
above-mentioned epidemics that spread both insecurity and 
discontent towards the government’s handling, countless large and 
small social and political scandals, messes and provocations such as 
the Equal Opportunities Commission saga, the organization of Harbour 
Fest, the Article 23 legislation debate and the resulting historical 
demonstration of 500,000 people on July 1, 2003, etc., are all incidents 
directing the response of the people in the same direction. clvi 
Apparently the only moment when the whole of Hong Kong seemed to 
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enjoy a moment of togetherness is the period when we saw the space 
launch of Shenzhou V, and the first Chinese man in space. An 
understanding of this event against such a context might reveal the 
operation of power, especially in the way that Geertz understands it 
with the theatre state.   
 
On the fifteenth of October, 2003, Hong Kong people witnessed the 
space launch of the Shenzhou V. This space launch is considered 
significant because it carried the first Chinese astronaut, Yang Liwei, 
into space. Hong Kong was able to be the first to invite Yang, along 
with China's first manned space mission to visit Hong Kong – the second 
stop of the whole delegation, with big cities like Shanghai lining up 
behind Hong Kong. Yang and the delegation finally came to Hong 
Kong at the end of October. A very particular space was constructed 
here in Hong Kong within which three factors were constitutive, 
according to a pro-Beijing newspaper analyst: attention from the Chief 
Executive, government officials being responsible, and the 
engagement of society. clvii  However, I will suggest one more 
contribution, borrowing Piyush Mathur’s observation of the Indian 
nuclear test 1998, which is the surrender of the media. Mathur argued 
in the Indian case, ‘the media very likely fell vulnerable to the sheer 
force of the event that had been thrust upon it, by the secretive 
compulsions of the nuclear statehood, to “cover”’. clviii  As a result, 
universal values like science, progress, development thrust were 
simultaneously appropriated by the media, reproducing hegemonic 
imaginations. The whole event, driven by protagonists such as the 
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government and the media, ‘through its span of immediate 
effectiveness, was able to create a people as its legitimate 
receptionists and representatives’. clix  The suffocating wave of the 
nuclear test, however, has the effect of voicing down discontent from 
the anti-fundamentalists, the environmentalists and human right 
activists. And here we can see the double meaning of the choice of 
word ‘cover’ –to reveal and conceal at the same time.  
 
In Hong Kong, it is still debatable whether this thrust was rooted in the 
independently existing ‘universals’ such as science and development 
or the thirsty media. Yet, what was achieved by these performances, 
and the coverage of these performances, should be clear enough. A 
newspaper description reads, ‘in the marches and national anthem by 
the military parade, Yang Liwei stands up on the stage, salutes the 
slow-rising national flag. Then he steps down from the stage and walks 
to the center of the football court, to receive the welcome and 
blessing from Hong Kong people, to receive the gifts from students and 
people, then has a brief conversation with 3 student representatives.’clx 
The leader of the delegation, Hu Shixiang, expressed that they were 
immersed in the ocean of flowers, national flags and the SAR flag ever 
since they arrived in Hong Kong. He also mentioned that it is ‘only in 
Hong Kong that we can experience the pride of being a space 
missionary, that we can experience the importance of prosperity and 
strength of our mother nation’.clxi 
 
Over the days when Yang and the delegation were in Hong Kong, 
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Hong Kong people, in the words of Yang in his letter to Hong Kong, 
‘young and old, no matter days or nights, all keen to watch the 
exhibition of the first manned space mission. They go to the music hall 
and gymnasium to dialogue with experts, teachers, and students on 
the topic of space technology.’ The impressive spectacle in which the 
40, 000 people in the Hong Kong stadium, waving national and SAR 
flags, sang the national anthem is also an unforgettable moment to 
Yang and the delegation.clxii 
 
In the welcome speech of the Chief Executive to the delegation, Tung 
pointed out that ‘since the launch of Shenzhou V, the people of Hong 
Kong have longed to see and meet Mr. Yang, who epitomises the 
ambition and courage of the Chinese nation’. He also pointed out that 
how this wish of the ‘Hong Kong people’ came true with his own effort, 
he recalled ‘I personally conveyed to President Hu Jintao the Hong 
Kong people's wish and our invitation to Yang and his colleagues to 
visit Hong Kong as soon as possible. The Central Government 
responded quickly and positively ... -- testament to the Central 
Government's regard for the people of Hong Kong.’clxiii 
 
All these events simply combined to form a theatrical spectacle, 
resembling almost exactly the ‘making of an ‘eleven-roof lord’ in Bali, 
as mentioned above: ‘it was in the ability to stage productions of an 
eleven-roof scale, to mobilize the men, the resources, and not least, 
the expertise, that made one an eleven-roof lord’. clxiv  The SAR 
Government is able to mobilize the ‘Hong Kong people’, at least those 
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Hong Kong people captured by all kinds of media in this event, to 
stage a perfo rmance which combines the representation of the 
aspirations of nationalism, progress of science and technology, social 
solidarity, festivity, etc. And the most important part of the 
performance is played by Tung -- as he claims the initiative to ask the 
leader of the President of the PRC, with the leader giving a quick and 
positive response.  
 
This event, although almost unanimously appreciated, invited criticism. 
Some argue that Hong Kong is in a milieu of deep crises, yet Tung still 
puts all his attentions to inviting Yang and the delegation to come to 
Hong Kong. This just shows that the crisis of the governance of Hong 
Kong is just on the brink.clxv Some ironically point out that both the 
media and the SAR Government engage in idolizing Yang, which 
provides relief and happiness to Hong Kong – but that is alright, Hong 
Kong people are bruised all over anyway. clxvi  The discursive 
appropriation and transformation of Yang’s and the delegation’s, one 
might argue, is never implicit. In the welcoming ceremony in the Hong 
Kong Stadium, Donald Tsang reminded Hong Kong young people to 
take Yang as a role model, to learn from him and face life’s 
challenges.clxvii This remark would not have been significant without 
the general atmosphere of economic recession, the urge to face the 
adverse and self-strengthening. As for the implication of nationalism, 
nothing can be more explicit than Yang’s now famous quotations, 
‘seeing the fellow Hong Kong people, I got a feeling of 
home-coming’clxviiiand ‘my heart was beating normal in space, but is 
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beating faster here in Hong Kong’. clxix  In other words, both the 
government and its critics indeed fully acknowledge the ways this 
space mania are appropriated. The difference is only that while the 
critics see the appropriation as something to blame, the government 
simply appropriate the space mission without feeling the need to 
disguise. 
 
Both critics seem to have an assumption about politics. They assume 
that politics has its own essential and independently existing domain, 
where it is a violation of rules to solve political problems by mobilizing 
and borrowing from the astronauts, to which the discourses of science 
and nationalism are attached. However, insisting that politics has its 
own rules and domain does not logically and empirically mean that 
those rules and domain are immune from any other thing but politics 
per se. The politics of the first manned space mission visit lies precisely in 
whether one can articulate it with their own projects, to create and 
mobilize an audience large enough, and hence support and 
legitimate it in the process of the creation and mobilization of an 
audience.  
 
Yet, the creation and mobilization of an audience as a form or a 
medium in which power operates could not have been a one-off and 
isolated incidence, and it is only because the creation and 
mobilization of a similar type previously yielded the effect of powerclxx 
that the space mission’s visit can be considered successful and 
important to Tung’s governance. Apart from the size and scale of the 
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people involved – people which provided the basis and are 
appropriated for the manifestation of power -- the element of science 
and technological advance played a due and resourceful role. Tung 
expressed it in his congratulation: ‘Following the successful launch and 
return of this manned spacecraft which has been designed and 
developed by our country, our manned spacecraft technology has 
entered an important era’. He also said that the space journey of 
Shenzhou V shows the increasing strength of our nation, represents the 
most stable, powerful, all-rounded and successful period in the 
development of contemporary China.’clxxi The media also suggested 
to take this chance to stimulate more interest and passion of the 
people in the area of technology.clxxii And all these emphases in 
technology can indeed be referred to the government, public and 
business discourses on the issue (which will be investigated in later 
chapters); they provide the ‘conventions and models’ for the 
government’s words and actions to be effective in this case. 
 
Conclusion 
In both the cases of the epidemics (bird flu and SARS included) and 
that of the visit of the first manned space mission, we can see the 
attempt to articulate an internally coherent and consistent picture, 
which is ultimately quite impossible when we are able se e the 
heterogeneous elements penetrating through the articulation. Yet the 
different ways in which these two types of cases attempt to articulate 
the picture are already revealing enough to clarify the situation in 
which these articulations could be staged and appropriated. In the 
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case of the epidemics, the act of attributing hygiene as the ultimate 
cause is an act through which people are told to re-learn the different 
features and positions and the appropriate attitude of the different 
agents in society. At the same time, the social meaning and terrain of 
hygiene itself is also transformed. And all of them were necessary at a 
time when the government was actively looking for a ‘scapegoat’ and 
wanted to refill the space opened up by the crisis of legitimacy -- 
precisely caused by these epidemics.  
 
In the other case, the visit of Yang and the whole first manned space 
mission, while the mechanisms of articulating dissimilar elements into 
the same discourse are rather similar in these two cases, the major 
difference is that the launch of Shenzhou V and the subsequent visit 
did not create a problem/crisis/lack of legitimacy comparable to that 
in the case of the epidemics. Therefore, the staging of the launch and 
visit does not in itself refer to any political problem from which they are 
inevitably derived, and which they specifically constitute. On the 
contrary, they are themselves contingently mobilized to alleviate/fill 
the crisis/lack of legitimacy which originated somewhere else. One 
can almost call this a ‘s tand-in’ quality, except that the specific 
characters of a stand-in are usually negligible in terms of transforming 
the role that the stand-in is supposed to play. In the case of the launch 
and visit, if one is not able to figure out clearly what indeed is a 
problem of legitimacy, no problem, fetch Yang and the mission to 
Hong Kong, then the lack of legitimacy will, at least in part, become a 
lack of national pride due to a low level of scientific advance.  
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The descriptions above of events in Hong Kong after the Handover 
should not be mistaken as intending to provide a comprehensive 
social and political record of post-Handover Hong Kong. The events 
are analyzed in the light of revealing the observation that the nature 
and characteristics of the social and political operations indeed 
cannot do away with a constitutively discursive and performative 
dimension. As a result, a way to look at these issues is to focus on the 
basis and operations of these performatives, their intended effect, 
whether disclosed or not, and their subsequent effects, rather than 
strictly assessing their chronology, the linear causal relationship both 
within the different components of the same event and between 
different events.  
 
Regarded from this direction, the governance of Hong Kong does not 
have an essential and independent core to which all effects of the 
cases above are directed from the ‘outside’; the governance is also 
not a long journey heading to a single and fundamental goal, 
ultimately in a rational manner with different morphologies at different 
temporal stages. Instead, the loose cluster of the discursive subject 
‘government’ can be viewed as a chance-taker, adopting different 
strategies at different moments regarding different problems it 
confronts, without any predetermined route, but only a highly 
contingent one that we retroactively grant causal relations. This view 
does not deny the complex relationships between what happened in 
the time and space within and outside Hong Kong, it is not trying to 
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claim that ‘Hong Kong’ is indeed empty, metaphysical or even nihilistic. 
All the discourses, narrations, actions and policies pursued come with 
concrete material and institutions. This view, however, requires us to be 
highly skeptical of Hong Kong as a black box of rational progress. 
 
As Jessop and Sum also argued, Hong Kong can indeed be viewed as 
an entrepreneurial city, in the sense that the city has its own strategies 
adapted to changing circumstances, despite its long reputation of 
laissez-faire .clxxiii  According to them, one criterion for a city to be 
entrepreneurial is that, ‘the promoters of entrepreneur cities adopt an 
entrepreneurial discourse, narrate their cities as entrepreneurial and 
market them as entrepreneurial.’ clxxiv  I  only differ from this 
interpretation, instead of opposing it, in the sense that I further 
acknowledge that the notion of ‘city’, and the validity of city (as a 
discursive subject) is possible only when we associate the 
entrepreneurial strategies with the notion itself and hence confer it the 
status of a valid discursive subject.  
 
Certainly the content of the discourse and narration almost inevitably 
involves the linearity of progress or economic development; however, 
what should not be overlooked is that the adoption of these discourses 
and narrations is strategic and historical. The SAR Government is 
entrepreneurial in the sense that it produces discourse and narrations 
of this kind; the government is entrepreneurial also in the sense that 
these discourses and narrations ‘are more or less explicitly formulated, 
and pursued in an active, entrepreneurial fashion’clxxv  – another 
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criterion, according to Jessop and Sum.  
 
One of the most important discourses and narrations produced, and 
actively pursued by the SAR Government, especially during the period 
when Hong Kong had to actively rebuild itself from the Asia financial 
crisis, is about technology, and IT in particular. The following chapters 
will explore in detail the ‘entrepreneurship’ of the government 
regarding this aspect, and what kind of entrepreneur is nourished by 
this very kind of entrepreneurship -- taking the building process of the 
business empire of Richard Li as an example.  
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What does the ITC mean by technology? 
 
 
 
 
In his second policy address, Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa clearly 
spelled out his ambition to develop Hong Kong as both a ‘leading city 
in the world for the development and application of information 
technology, especially in electronic commerce and software 
engineering’ and ‘a regional centre for supplying professional and 
technological talents and services’. clxxvi  Setting these goals was a 
response to the realization of the over-heated, ‘bubble’ economy of 
Hong Kong and the economic recession following the Asia financial 
crisis that strained Hong Kong starting from October 1997. 
Recommended by the Chief Executive's Commission on Innovation 
and Technology, the Innovation and Technology Fund (ITF) was 
established as a statutory fund on June 30, 1999 under the Public 
Finance Ordinance, with an allocation of 5 billion Hong Kong dollars. 
The objective of the fund is to ‘increase the added value, productivity 
and competitiveness of our economic activities.’ It also encourages 
and assists Hong Kong companies ‘to upgrade their technological 
level, and to introduce innovative ideas to their businesses’.clxxvii  
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Example: Zi acquisition of Telecom Technology 
center  
Much earlier than the establishment of the Innovation and Technology 
Commission, the Hong Kong Productivity Council (HKPC) was set up in 
1967 to ‘promote increased productivity and the use of more efficient 
methods throughout Hong Kong's business sectors’. Ever since at least 
the mid-90s, the government had already been working under the 
conception that ‘Hong Kong is transforming from a center of low-cost 
production to a commercial center and a production base of 
high-value-added products in the Asian-Pacific region.’clxxviii 
In order to fulfill its role of channeling creative applied technology, the 
HKPC ‘has invested heavily in both new technologies and in-house 
training in order to upgrade the performance of its talented 
workforce.’ The services provided by the HKPC cover a wide range of 
product development, consultancy, training and technology transfer. 
And the services are provided for both the industrial and commercial 
sectors, including textile and apparel, innovative enterprises, watches 
and jewellery, software and information, transport and logistics, to 
name but a few.clxxix  
One of the major responses of the HKPC in the mid -90s to the 
apparently up-and-coming transformation to a knowledge-based 
economy was the establishment of the Telecom Technology Center 
Co. Ltd. (TTC).clxxx TTC was established as a result of a $83.9-million 
grant of the Industrial Support Fund (ISF) in 1995. The ISF was in turn set 
up in 1994 to support initiatives that were considered beneficial to 
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Hong Kong's industrial or technological development. The Commerce 
and Industry Bureau (CIB) and the former Industry Department were 
responsible for the administration of the fund. (I will return to the ISF 
later). The objective of the TTC is to enhance the competitiveness of 
Hong Kong-based companies by developing building block solutions 
for the next generation of telecommunications products. clxxxi  In 
particular, the major task of the TTC was to develop low-cost, critical, 
but highly value-added components, ‘on which the economical 
production and competitiveness of the Hong Kong 
telecommunication industry depends’.clxxxii 
After 5 years of operation, TTC had already accomplished 70 projects 
for 29 clients, some of them even pioneering among Asia, and 
examples include ISDN phone and terminal adapters, GSM handsets, 
and digital VCRs. ‘(N)ow is the time for TTC to go to the next level,’ said 
the executive director of the HKPC Thomas Tang. This so-called 
‘going-to-the-next-level’ refers to the acquisition of TTC by Zi. And the 
comment was indeed made at the acquisition ceremony of TTC by a 
Nasdaq-listed Zi’ Corporation in August 2000. The agreement was 
reached between Zi and HKPC at a price of $25 million, in which $22 
million was injected back into the ITF and $3 million into the HKPC. 
When asked to account for the financial situation of TTC, the executive 
director only said that ‘the value and function of the center cannot be 
measured in terms of profit’. The acting commissioner re-stated the 
position of the government, ‘one cannot evaluate the effort the 
government pays to support Hong Kong industries as a whole in terms 
of money.’ The CIB in a later report also claimed that CIB would 
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consider handing over the operation of similar government-funded 
programmes to private organizations according to public interest.clxxxiii  
While according to the common sense logic of privatization of public 
organizations, the so-called ‘public interest’ involved in the act of 
privatizing public organizations usually refers to higher profitability and 
efficiency, etc. regarding government revenues or other public 
resources, the CIB report claimed that ‘...privatization would add value 
to the services of TTC with commercial strengths of the private 
sector’.clxxxiv In this case of privatization, the notion of ‘public interest’ is 
less than obvious. The public gains interest, of course, through the 
injection of HK$ 22 million and HK$ 3 million respectively into the ITF and 
HKPC, which will continue to provide support and funding for 
prospective units. However, how is public interest involved in the 
operation of the ITC itself caused by privatization? In other word, how, 
by privatizing ITC itself, can the improved efficiency of the ITC count as 
public interest?  
Now let us recall the policy direction of the HKSAR in the ’97 policy 
address. The government wants to develop Hong Kong into the 
‘leading city in the world for the development and application of 
information technology’, and ‘a regional center for supplying 
professional and technological talents and services’. And indeed, by 
finishing 70 projects for 29 clients in 5 years, the executive director of 
HKPC believed that TTC had already reached this goal. Moreover, the 
government’s wishes and efforts are not to be measured in terms of 
money, as the statements of the government officials quoted above 
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seem to indicate. So if the government is so keen on developing 
innovation and technology, and ifthe TTC was working well in terms of 
technological advancement according to the standards of the 
government officials, instead of simply dismissing it as hypocrisy, it 
would be interesting to find out for what reason the Hong Kong 
Productivity Council decided to sell the TTC, and what rationale is 
implied.    
As revealed further by a previous Financial Committee document 
prepared also by the former Trade and Industry Branch in June 94clxxxv, 
the $83.9 million grant from the ISF was only intended for the setting-up 
and operation during the first 3 years. The HKPC expected ‘the center 
to become self-financing in its sixth year of operation’, and as a result, it 
was estimated that, starting from 94-95, the center would require a 
total amount of $112.3 million. It was initially stated in the document 
that before the end of the first 3 years of operation, HKPC would 
undergo a management review, on which further funding would 
depend.  
Well until the acquisition, the recurrent income of the center was only 
$10 million per annum, which only covers half of the recurrent costs. 
And in addition, at least one local company with a similar business 
nature began to compete with the TTC after 1999. As a result, the CIB 
estimated that the center ‘would only be self-sufficient by 2004-05 at 
the earliest’. And since $83.9 million, the initially capped amount for the 
first 3 years, has already been disbursed, the CIB deemed it ‘highly 
undesirable’ to continue TTC as a public entity by ITF.clxxxvi   
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While no one ever expects endless subsidies from the ISF, and later ITF, 
to TTC, it is quite obvious that the privatization of TTC cannot be 
attributed, in a negative sense, to the insufficiency of its level of 
technological advancement, at least according to the standard of 
the government. At the same time, in a positive sense, it also seems 
that the privatization cannot be attributed to reasons such as a simple 
drive for improving the performance of TTC for the sake of public 
interest. Apart from that, on the one hand, the center is increasingly 
facing competition in the industry, on the other, the recurrent income 
of the center barely compensates for its recurrent cost. Indeed, 
according to the report of the CIB, the privatization of the TTC may well 
be explained by the unwillingness of the ITF to be burdened by the 
grant to TTC. All these elements tell a story of an unrewarding 
investment. Therefore in the CIB report, the untold, but major principle 
guiding the policy implementation is indeed ‘expelling the 
unrewarding investment!’. The government’s action of privatizing the 
TTC simply cannot be understood if we do not take that major principle 
into consideration, and if we only take into consideration 
high-sounding principles like ‘developing Hong Kong into every center 
possible’ and ‘the government is willing to spend money to promote 
innovation and technology’.  
 
Connecting the truth 
We have just seen how the discourse of privatizing TTC appeals to the 
public common sense advantages of higher profitability and efficiency, 
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as if these are the unanimous interest of the people as such. On the 
other hand, the more general development of innovation and 
technology is also constantly appealed to, and indeed needs to 
appeal to an ultimate ‘truth’ for legitimation. 
Truth and power are invested in each other. On the one hand, ‘true 
discourse... that prophesying the future, not only foretold what would 
come to pass, but participated in its coming, bringing to it men’s 
acquiescence and thus weaving itself into the fabric of fate.’clxxxvii In 
other words, true discourse, instead of just anticipating what would be 
the future, anticipates it in the right way by paving and shaping the 
path to a future already prescribed by the discourse. This explains the 
way in which discourse has the implication of action and the effect of 
power. ‘On the other hand, no power can be exercised without the 
extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge’.clxxxviii 
Foucault illustrates this the following example: the penal code started 
out as a theory of right; then, from the time of the nineteenth century 
onwards, people looked for its validation in sociological, psychological, 
medical and psychiatric knowledge. It is as though the very words of 
the law had no authority in our society, except insofar as they are 
derived from the true discourse.clxxxix Power, to Foucault, is certainly 
more than mere coercion, he finds it inadequate to define power as 
repression, as something that ‘only weigh(s) on us as a force that says 
no;’ power instead ‘traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, 
forms knowledge, produces discourse’. cxc Therefore power has to 
produce truth, which in turn acts as its source of sanctioning, the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and 
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false statements, and to determine the status of those who are in 
charge of saying what counts as true. 
In elaborating the subtle nexus between power and truth, one 
characteristic of the nexus mentioned by Foucault is that truth is largely 
‘centered on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which 
produced it’. cxci He asserts that the important problems ‘of the status, 
of the conditions of exercise, functioning and institutionalization of 
scientific discourses’ remain more or less unanswered.cxcii For him, the 
importance of studying discourse is to see how disciplines came to call 
themselves sciences, disguised themselves as sciences, for the power 
inherited in the truth claim. However, what the study of discourse, as a 
method to investigate this problem, seeks to do is to look at the 
condition of emergence, insertion and functioning, and how all of 
them transform the mode of existence of the discourse. cxciii  This 
intention of dealing with discourse is important and applicable for the 
exercise here in Hong Kong. The point is not that science and 
technology did not previously appear in Hong Kong, there was 
certainly a discourse of science and technology. Yet, by looking at the 
conditions under which the present discourse emerges, how it is 
appropriated, to what end, in the name of which kind of truth, we may 
have a better understanding of the concrete truth/power nexus in this 
case.  
Giving priority to innovation and technology in an era of a 
knowledge-based economy is usually understood in terms such as 
awakening or enlightenment. According to Francis Ho, the 
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commissioner for Innovation and Technology: ‘before the reign of the 
HKSAR Government, Hong Kong had a severely distorted economy. 
Making money is easy in the bubble economy driven by finance, real 
estate and stock ... and precisely because making money is such an 
easy task, people lost the cognition of technology and the interest in 
pursuing advanced knowledge.’cxciv Having such a ‘distorted’ mind, it 
is not a straightforward process for Hong Kong people to be 
enlightened and awakened; the implication is that we did not see the 
truth (i.e. the importance of, and also the present emphasis on, 
innovation and technology) because the growing economic bubbles 
are too appealing to Hong Kong people.  
In the opening ceremony of the Hong Kong science Park, Tung 
addresses the few years of experience for Hong Kong people, ‘the 
deep reflection of the community on the state of the economy in the 
past few years has in fact been a much more positive process than it 
appears at this moment. Amidst the bewilderment and mixed feelings, 
one gratifying outcome is that there is a clearer degree of recognition, 
particularly within the business community, that innovation and 
technology holds the key to the future of Hong Kong. This awakening 
and acceptance is important ... the need ... to promote innovation 
and technology in the unique Hong Kong context has now been 
undisputedly accepted.’cxcv  
The Innovation and Technology Fund is thus considered by the 
government and the fund’s administration itself as a ‘major policy tool 
to drive innovation and technology upgrading in Hong Kong 
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manufacturing and servicing industries’cxcvi, whose importance can be 
demonstrated by the fact that this is one of the only two institutional 
suggestions cxcvii  made by the Commission of Innovation and 
Technology in their first report. The turn to innovation and technology is 
in turn one of the major initiatives of the administration of the HKSAR as 
a whole.  
a) The ambivalence  
This production of truth within discourse is powerful. ‘Waking up’ to this 
ahistorical and universal truth of innovation and technology at this very 
historical moment provides the government with the necessary ground 
(or excuse, some probably insist) to reduce or even dismiss any differing 
opinions as immature and inappropriate. People who do not side with 
the government are ‘reasonably’ dismissed as immature simply 
because they are portrayed as not knowing much about innovation 
and technology, because they do not know what the key to the future 
is, or because they still dream of a resurrection by another wave of the 
bubble economy, etc. When posing the question in this way, the 
government bypasses the debate of whether the government itself 
should actually participate in promoting innovation and technology. 
The government also bypasses the debate of whether the way in 
which the government promotes Innovation and Technology is 
reasonable and beneficial for Hong Kong, and for which part of the 
Hong Kong population in particular, if any. Just as Francis Ho confided 
to readers in a newspaper interview, ‘... we can see that the role of the 
government is changing, and the key question now is not whether the 
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Hong Kong Government should join (in promoting innovation and 
technology), but under which circumstances the Hong Kong 
Government should join.’cxcviii  The position of criticism here is not 
against government intervention as such. Freedom defined as 
government intervention-free economic activity in civil society is 
paradoxically a product of the government. cxcix  When a high 
government official is so affirmative in his promotion, it seems that 
problems like that of allocating resources, in other words: which part of 
the society is targeted by the innovation and technology policy to be 
the winner, are practically off the agenda.  
As a result, a line between right and wrong is drawn, and it is drawn by 
claiming innovation and technology as the key to the future. Being not 
supportive can be quickly considered wrong within this regime of truth. 
The ‘success’ of Hong Kong is subsequently measured and constituted 
by the extent to which Hong Kong people identify with and practice 
this awakening and enlightenment, again, under the assumption that 
other economic options simply do not work and should be eliminated 
from the very starting point.  
Besides, within this regime of truth erected by government discourse, 
facing it is presented as accepting the inevitable. The sacrifice of o ther 
needs is considered as the inevitable bridge to the future. According 
to the imperative of the truth (emphasis on innovation and technology, 
and the transition to the era of knowledge-based economy) certain 
groups of people in society are distantly portrayed as destined to 
suffer. And it is exactly in their suffering that we see the transition under 
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way. In his Policy Address in 2001, Tung announces that  ‘the 
transformation will be more complicated because the restructuring is 
the result of several different but inter-related factors ... businesses now 
require substantially fewer staff because of developments in 
information technology. The emphasis in the past was on a fine division 
of labour, whereas today it is on multi-skilling ...  if we are to preserve 
our economic vitality, create greater prosperity, and maintain living 
standards, economic restructuring is the only way. Our people, our 
businesses and the SAR Government must have the foresight to see 
changes coming, to adjust to those changes and to manage them. 
We must all do our best to move up to higher value-added activities.cc 
If we put this in a broader context, we can see that this ‘moving up’ is 
accompanied by budgetary cuts in different areas like tertiary 
education, social welfare, and housing, to name just a few. Suffering is 
not exactly the result of personal misfortune (although on the other 
hand, the Government always urges people to equip themselves, to 
add value to themselves, as if fortune and misfortune is merely a matter 
of personal initiative and responsibility). The social condition upon 
which this suffering is based is never natural and objective, as it might 
easily be mistaken at first glance. Suffering in this context always 
appears alongside with active systematic institutional initiatives, though 
usually in an apparently unrelated manner.  
The objectivity of the need to change, the advantages and necessities 
of quick change are all produced within the discourse of innovation 
and technology, and the government in turn seems to be compelled 
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to accommodate. However, if the case of innovation and technology 
is juxtaposed with other cases in which there is an apparent necessity 
to accommodate, the meaning of this accommodation is often 
blurred and difficult to distinguish from its opposite. Take, for instance, 
the property market: against the peak in 1997, overall property prices 
have tumbled by over 60%. The volume of transactions also shows a 
marked decline. The total volume of transactions in February 2003 is the 
lowest since 1995. cci  In this case, the government, urged by the 
property sector ever since the collapse of 1997, responded by 
introducing nine measures by the end of 2002 to stabilize the property 
market, as pronounced by Michael Suen, the Secretary for the Housing, 
Planning and Lands Bureau.ccii  
Another example concerns the population policy. According to the 
report of the Task Force on Population Policy headed by the Chief 
Secretary, Donald Tsang, Hong Kong has one of the lowest fertility rates 
in the world, with every Hong Kong woman on average having only 0.9 
children over their lifetime. It is predicted that one quarter of our 
population will be aged 65 or above by the year 2031. Among them, 
those older than 85 are expected to triple from the current 67,000 to 
209,000. During that period, the total population is forecast to rise 30 
per cent from 6.72 million in 2001 to 8.72 million, but the labour force will 
grow by only 8 per cent, from 3.43 million to 3.7 million. By then, the 
report estimates that 58% of the 8-million population in Hong Kong 
(about 5 million of people, including the retired and children) will be 
economically inactive.cciii It is in this context, especially accompanied 
by the ‘burden’ of the increasing population of dependent elderly and 
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immigration from Mainland China, that Hong Kong seems to be in 
need of developing a new direction in its population policies. When 
asked, however, whether the Hong Kong Government would launch 
any policies to encourage families to have more children, both Donald 
Tsang and the Executive Director of the Family Planning Association of 
Hong Kong, Susan Fan, demonstrated a very firm negative attitude. 
Both of them maintained that in a liberal  society like Hong Kong, and 
regarding such personal matters as birth-giving, it is inappropriate for 
the government to adopt a special policy to encourage people to 
give birth.cciv  
Both the cases of the collapse of the property market and of the 
critically low fertility rate can be clearly discerned empirically and are 
thus more visible, at least numerically speaking, than the coming of the 
knowledge-based economy. The status of Hong Kong’s need to 
accommodate to the knowledge-based economy resembles a wish or 
self-motivated propensity more than an inevitable compulsion. 
However the government is far more reluctant (at least in 
appearance), temporarily in the case of property market and in terms 
of attitude in the case of fertility, to assume an active role, like the one 
for information technology. If we understand the responses of the 
government in these two cases as a kind of accommodation, it would 
be difficult for us to comprehend the institutional practices and policy 
directions regarding innovation and technology also as a kind of 
accommodation, in particular regarding the accommodation to an 
irreversible, inevitable and clearly definable transition to a 
knowledge-based economy, especially before the government has 
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presented a concrete explanation of exactly what is understood as a 
knowledge-based economy, and what it considers crucial in the 
expected transition to it. 
One can also reasonably consider the actions taken by the 
government in these cases as active intervention for revitalizing the 
economy: the nine measures are designed to boost, instead of stabilize, 
the property market, the population policy is intended to attract 
capital and specialists. However, the government demonstrates a 
particularly enthusiastic and high-sounding gesture in the case of 
innovation and technology against a need that is not particularly 
pressing. Anyway, the poin t I would like to make is that the so-called 
pressing ‘need’ to accommodate to this transition and to pick up 
innovation and technology can only make sense within its own 
discourse and rhetoric, or at least cannot be applied to other areas in 
the same way. One of the natural consequences, at least, is the 
constitutive trade-off, as suggested by Tung above, which can make 
sense also only within this particular discourse. 
This production of truth in discourse is also ready to dissolve 
counter-discourse. As a matter of fact Hong Kong was once a home of 
manufacturers, especially between the 50s and early 80s. And all 
through this economic phase in Hong Kong the government kept 
providing resources to improve productivity, technological 
advancement and innovation. One important example is The Hong 
Kong Productivity Council that we mentioned before. Established in 
1967, its aim is to ‘promote increased productivity and the use of more 
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efficient methods throughout Hong Kong's business sectors.’ And the 
government indeed considered the HKPC as ‘playing the role of the 
agency of the government, to assist the sector in increasing the 
productivity and the transition to high value-adding production’.ccv  
Besides, different funds and supporting programmes have long been 
operating before the HKSAR, and probably before the staging of the 
slogan of the ‘era of a knowledge-based economy,’ as the 
government puts it. Take the example of the Industrial Support Fund 
(ISF), which was set up in 1994 for ‘projects which may contribute to  the 
competitiveness or technological development of the local 
manufacturing industry as a whole or a specific sector within it.’ccvi  
Since 1994, and up until 1999, the ISF has supported 373 projects, 
involving a total financial commitment of over $1.38 billion.ccvii With the 
establishment of the Innovation and Technology Fund, the ISF no 
longer approved any application and had itself transferred to the 
Innovation and Technology Committee. The projects initially funded by 
the ISF have also been shifted under the ITC, with the detailed rules and 
regulations involving the approval of the application remaining largely 
unchanged.ccviii All is amounts to a story in which the line dividing 
innovation and technology on one side and pure labour-intensive 
production on the other does not exist, or at least does not overlap 
with a line beyond which lies ‘the era of knowledge-based economy’, 
if there is any such thing.  
However, to argue against the government’s discourse of innovation 
and technology with historical facts, to contend that innovation has 
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always occurred and technology has always been progressing to a 
certain extent, can be unfruitful. The present discourse can easily 
subsume the argument, as I will show. The present discourse can further 
affirm itself by saying that people in the past few years have been 
blinded by the bubble economy. It is even exactly because Hong 
Kong people were indulging in the bubble economy that they did not 
see the universal and global importance of innovation and technology, 
as maintained above by Francis Ho. This logic of universality can clearly 
be seen in the design of the ITC symbol. Although the Innovation and 
Technology Committee was only established in 1999, the ITC is 
symbolized by the Greek letter ‘p’ for two reasons. Firstly, the character 
p is a combination of the 3 characters ‘I’, ‘T’, ‘C’; secondly, the number 
p has been studied mathematically both in the eastern and western 
cultures for thousands of years. According to the committee, p 
symbolizes a scientific and technological orientation. It has been 
important in the history of man's scientific and technological 
advancement, from astronomy to probability to the physics of sound 
and light’; ‘the 4,000-year search for the ultimate value of p symbolizes 
the constant aim of technology to develop improved solutions to 
problems’. ccix  
Even if we do not doubt that advancement is a process that goes on 
and on for thousands of years, it is too easy to come to the conclusion 
that this history of advancement can be linked up and appropriated 
linearly and teleologically according to the present mode of the 
discourse of innovation and technology. We have to recognize that 
historical development is not a linear process with definite origins and 
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progressive stages toward a predetermined destiny.ccx  What one has 
to locate in the development of Hong Kong is then not the point in time 
when Hong Kong changed from labour-intensive to 
technology-intensive economic activities, because it supposes two 
definite stages in a progressive sense, both heading towards a 
universal Truth called ‘The Future.’ Rather, the development of 
innovation and technology on the one hand, and the development of 
society on the other, are not initially two discreet and independent 
paths. The path of innovation and technology did not come to merge 
with the path of development of society naturally, but the two have 
always been invested in each other. It is too intentional to mute the 
economic initiatives in the discourse of innovation and technology, 
and too hasty to incorporate thousands of years of advancement into 
the present development of a knowledge -based economy, especially 
when we can obviously see that this awakening in fact means the 
active subjection of people to suffering by our SAR Gov ernment.  
b) Innovation and technology as interest?  
On different occasions, government senior officials like Tung Chee-hwa 
and Financial Secretary Antony Leung reinforced the importance of 
education and human resources as the determining factors in 
innovation and technology. ccxi  As a matter of fact, substantial 
resources are being put into the promotion of innovation and 
technology. The General Support Programme under the ITC aims 
precisely at supporting ‘those projects that contribute to fostering an 
innovation and technology culture in Hong Kong’, which include 
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mainly studies, surveys, conferences, exhibitions, seminars, promotional 
and training programmes. The expenditure on education has 
increased from 37.9 billion in the fiscal year 96/97 to 55.3 billion in the 
fiscal year 01/02. Tung is satisfied with the achievement Hong Kong 
attained regarding education and human resources, and he gave 
some examples: ‘the best of the world’, like Paul Chu at the Hong Kong 
University of Science and Technology, Tsui Lap-chee at the University of 
Hong Kong, Simon Wong at the Applied Science and Technology 
Research Institute, etc., are coming together in Hong Kong, and six 
outstanding scientists were conferred the prestigious membership of 
the Chinese Academy of Science in May 2002. (I will return to this 
conferment of membership later in this chapter)  
The government introduces Innovation and Technology as a method 
to cope with the ‘challenges’ of the knowledge-based economy. 
However, in regard to education, the government seems to suggest 
that innovation and technology are still more a means to develop 
interest and potential than a vehicle oriented merely towards profit. 
The second report of the Commission of Innovation and Technology 
states that ‘more students must be attracted to take up courses in the 
science and technology field ... pursuing graduate research studies 
with a view of a career in R&D ... We urge the government and 
non-government institutions to do more to inspire interest in science 
and technology among young people’.ccxii If interest in innovation and 
technology is not readily reducible to economic interest, or indeed 
does not equal economic interest yet, then it should be logical to 
expect innovation and technology on the one hand and economic 
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interest on the other to be conceptually separated. Although they do 
not have to be distinct and totally independent, stimulation of interest 
in innovation and technology through education should not be a mere 
vehicle of economic interest. 
However, if one takes a closer look at the operations of ITC, which are 
those of institution- and regulation-confined research, one can see 
what this mode of research and interest in science and technology 
might really mean. This is where one can find out ‘on the ground’ if 
interest in science and technology really keeps an irreducible distance 
from economic interest.   
One year after the establishment of the ITC, Francis Ho, the 
Commissioner of Innovation and Technology commented in a report 
to the LegCo panel on trade and industry that ‘the quality of the ITC 
applications in the general categories, namely Innovation and 
Technology Support programme (ITSP) and General Support 
Programme (GSP), is declining, which means ‘a lack of focus in 
research programmes’ and that the ideas of local researchers are 
‘drying up’.ccxiii As a result, the ITF started to solicit proposals in the 
category of ITSP, according to clear project objectives decided on by 
the ITF, with the hope that this would ‘increase the collaboration and 
competition among research institu tions and enable projects initiators 
to think and plan their projects in a more focused manner.’ccxiv  As 
Francis Ho puts it, ‘the operation of the fund has changed from 
‘bottom-up’ to ‘top-down’, which means that the ITC would decide 
several major themes and directions and then solicit proposals from the 
 106 
academies or research institutions’.ccxv Examples of solicited themes 
include, ‘Industrial Applications of Micro-Electro - Mechanical Systems’ 
and ‘Innovative Product Development for Textiles, Clothing and 
Footwear Industry’ in 2001, and industrial applications of 
micro-electro-mechanical systems; development and application of 
biosensor technologies; advanced surface coating technologies and 
applied genomics in 2002. 
The act of solicitation of ITC can of course be  viewed as a responsible 
response to the need for better fund management. My interest here, 
however, is not to know whether it succeeded in improving the quality 
and quantity of the applications, but what the government considers 
to be innovation and technology in this problem-solving situation. Let 
interest in science and technology still be an irreducible factor in all the 
considerations concerning the operation of the fund, and an interview 
with Francis Ho reveals how the focus is heavily balanced in fav our of 
economic interest. He recalled that in 1996, when he visited South 
Korea, companies like Samsung and LG were all but invisible in the 
fields of plasma TV and CDMA mobile phones, and after 6 years, they 
have all become bright and shining in the world. He commented that 
‘due to its different economic system, it is difficult for Hong Kong to 
resemble South Korea’. ccxvi  Nevertheless, the Commission of 
Innovation and technology would become more and more focused, 
as is the investment made by the ITC. This ‘more-and-more-focused’ 
approach includes at least the project-solicitation strategy. 
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Drawing on the difference between South Korea and Hong Kong, the 
utterance of the commissioner demonstrates a lack of forcefulness. His 
pledge to make the ITC and ITF ‘more and more focused’ further 
demonstrates that his idea of innovation and technology indeed has 
less to do with an ‘interest’ in science and technology. Never mind 
whether the ‘different system’ noted by Francis Ho is the liberal 
economy per se  (when referring to the economic process of South 
Korea, the state of South Korea is usually recognized as a 
developmental state, in which the state is considered to be assuming 
an entrepreneurial role).ccxvii Never mind also whether he is referring to 
the apparent contrast between the ‘liberal economy’ in Hong Kong 
and the developmental state in South Korea. For Francis Ho, the 
problem and weakness of Hong Kong is that Hong Kong is not focused 
enough, that each company is doing its own research, and ‘small 
companies are facing difficulties in ‘growing up’, and very often abort 
before maturation.’ccxviii  After he sighed over this different system, 
which made Hong Kong less competitive than South Korea, he 
suggested to tackle this situation by making the research, and 
investments as well, more focused, to invest money thematically.  
Conceptually the tension between an interest in science and 
technology on the one hand and the return of money invested by the 
fund on the other, is elided, it becomes just a matter of which aspect to 
emphasize more, or which to sacrifice more. In the hands of the 
commission, the space necessary for different levels of innovation and 
technology in different areas has to give way to a more focused and 
thematic organization of researches. The task is not to let the success of 
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innovation and technology, and hence the smooth transition to the 
knowledge-based economy, be eroded by a diffused and confused 
scenario, anyway. If this is really the basic position of the government 
officials, it just effectively demonstrates the second meaning of our 
common usage of the word – interest is curiosity, and it is also 
advantage.  
Structure and circulation 
Just as we do not relate every statement possible to every discourse 
possible, and just as we understand that the commentaries of Ulysses, 
are produced out of, or in relation to, the work Ulysses, but not, say, 
arguments against the legislation of national security 5 years after the 
Handover of Hong Kong, ‘in every society the production of discourse 
is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according 
to a certain number of procedures’. ccxix  And in the discourse of 
innovation and technology here in Hong Kong, it is possible for us to 
recognize certain criteria for elements allowed in the discourse, a 
structured mode (not necessarily ‘logic’ per se ) of inference, as the 
rules and procedures for the regulated production of the discourse.  
When evaluating the ITF, Henry Tang, the Secretary for Commerce, 
Industry and Technology said that, ‘The business community is putting 
increasing emphasis on the commodification of the product of 
scientific and technological research and technological transfer, and 
the collaboration with the universities is also becoming more and more 
frequent.’ccxx What he meant by this, and under w hich conditions, is 
revealed in his following elaboration: ‘Say for instance, having 
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received the subsidy from the ITF, a herbal medicine company is now 
collaborating with two Universities in Hong Kong. Drawing on the 
knowledge and resources from the universities, the company is 
developing new Chinese medicine through advanced 
pharmaceutical science and clinical tests. The company is now listed 
in the ‘Growth Enterprise Market’. ccxxi 
In this elaboration of what he understands as a successful example of 
the collaboration between the business community and the universities, 
he barely includes information on the technological accomplishment 
that he explicitly recognized. In other words, what exactly, or at least 
generally, describes of this collaboration, or the herbal medicine 
remains unsaid. He does not tell the audience what kind of medicine it 
is, what its function is, what specific advancement this collaboration 
achieved, etc. All the audience learns is an expression of a formal 
structure in which anonymous parties are collaborating; the 
knowledge and resources of the universities are utilized, and 
something –  what, we supposedly need not to know from this 
expression -- is developed out of it. In short, the Secretary of Commerce 
wants to convey a message of recognition and acknowledgement 
through putting forward a formal structure, with the object of his 
discussion left vacant throughout. Above all, and quite abruptly 
indeed, the company is listed in the ‘Growth Enterprise Market’, ‘a fund 
raising venue with a strong identity to foster the development of 
technology industries in Hong Kong and the region’; a market catering 
to the ‘alternative of investing in ‘high growth, high risk’ businesses’. ccxxii  
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It seems that the example quoted here is not even intended to give 
the audience any specific and substantial information, except that the 
company is now listed in the Growth Enterprise Market. Nevertheless, it 
is suggested that certain elements are required for a particular 
instance to be considered noteworthy or remarkable by a government 
official, almost like entering name and amount in a legally authorized 
lease contract, to make it legally binding and effective. As a result, if 
one is to sort out the criteria the government is using to measure the 
effectiveness of the ITF, the level of technological advancement would 
not seem to acquire a plausible position on this list. As in the case 
mentioned above, whether certain innovative and technological 
products are considered significant, and how significant the product is, 
can readily be reduced to the function of the market, and even further 
to the stock market; evaluating an innovative or technological 
product in the name of technological advancement is unfortunately 
‘insufficient’.  
Apart from the criterion of being listed in the stock market, we can also 
recognize other elements by which the government constructs the 
formulation of their version of the success of Hong Kong. In a speech in 
a forum, CE Tung said, ‘to evaluate the development of innovation 
and technology, one has to see if the people are actively adopting 
innovation and technology to improve their living standard, to see if 
the companies are adopting innovation and technology to improve 
their productivity, to provide services and products of better 
quality.’ccxxiii  
 111 
With these criteria, Tung believed that Hong Kong began to flourish. 
This is illustrated by  
¾ Hong Kong households’ increasing possession of PC from 35% in 
1998 to 61% in 2001 
¾ the increasing rate of household penetration of the Internet, 
from 12% in 1998 to 50% in 2001 
¾ the increasing broadband coverage in Hong Kong, from 50% in 
1998 to 95% in 2001.  
¾ the increasing number of electronic currency smart cards from 
4.8 million in 1998 to 7.8 million in 2001.  
Simply speaking, with all these soaring numbers, people in Hong Kong 
are ‘actively’ adopting innovation and technology, and have their 
living standard improved as well – disregarding the fact that 
accessibility and living standard is not in a transparent, causal relation.  
However, even within other dominant discourses in Hong Kong, like the 
discourse on youth, sex, and personal relationships etc., immediate 
access to a PC and the Internet are not unproblematically considered 
an improvement in life at all. Young people are criticized for spending 
too much time surfing the web, playing online games etc.ccxxiv People 
are also supposedly becoming more and more ‘alienated’ when they 
are making more virtual than actual friendsccxxv, abusing the web by 
spreading or reading pornographyccxxvi, etc. Those are all common 
sense drawbacks of technology. Young people and even adults who 
are considered to be engaging too heavily in online games and virtual 
communication are usually accused of being dishonest. They are also 
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considered unsociable, lacking communication skills, violently 
emotional, and even vulnerable to nutritional disorder. A social worker 
even attributed the increase in child sexual abuse to the persistent 
spreading of net pornographyccxxvii.  
Nevertheless, not only the media trumpets the negative impact of the 
increasing penetration of science and technology, the government 
even took action to halt people’s access to computers, or at least 
acted as though it knew for certain that increasing access is 
problematic. LegCo approved The Occupational Safety and Health 
(Display Screen Equipment) Regulation on 24 April, 2002 to protect the 
safety and health of employees who use display screen equipment at 
work for prolonged periods of time. And the Occupational Safety and 
Health Council issued the newsletter ‘Sedentary Workers Safety and 
Health Bulletin’, to advise on the selection and arrangement of 
computer workstations in offices.ccxxviii  
I am not suggesting here that we need to accept all these 
‘drawbacks;’ but they nevertheless prevail in Hong Kong, and within 
the government, as significantly negative consequences of the 
penetration of innovation and technology.  
Francis Ho clearly stated in an interview that education, alongside with 
and ranked first among, a favourable business environment and 
economic freedom, are the major premises for the success of the 
development of innovation and technology. ccxxix  On another 
occasion Tung spoke of the achievements of Hong Kong in the 
development of innovation and technology, specifically the aspect of 
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fostering local talents. He mentioned that six scientists from Hong Kong 
were recently conferred the prestigious membership of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, as evidence for what Hong Kong has 
achieved.ccxxx  
However, what is perhaps ambiguous here is the meaning of ‘local 
talents’ and the ‘fostering’ of local talents. All of them are indeed 
working now at universities in Hong Kong, and studied in institutions in 
Hong Kong a long time ago. If one cannot leave out and deny the 
effect and influence of postgraduate training in the process of 
‘fostering’, among other factors, then it would be noteworthy that all of 
them received their professional qualifications from overseas institutions, 
and only one from the University of Hong Kong.ccxxxi It is one thing that it 
is important for Hong Kong to foster local talents in order to develop 
innovation and technology, but whether the evidence presented by 
Tung confirmed the achievements of Hong Kong in this respect is quite 
another. This is of course not meant to denounce these scientists. The 
problem is just to what extent their conferment can be attributed to 
being ‘fostered by Hong Kong,’ and hence be counted as Hong Kong 
achievement. The government officials seem to fail to recognize 
‘fostering’ as a timely process, and are hasty to explain all the 
achievements in terms of their own efforts. In explaining why the 
Austrian/Czech scientist of genetics, ‘Mendel spoke the truth, but he 
was not within the truth...’ in his often quoted inaugural speech, 
Foucault told us that the objects of Mendel’s studies, his methodology, 
the theore tical perspective in which he situated himself, ‘was simply 
not along the line in which objects and biological concepts were 
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formed (before Mendel).’ccxxxii Taking this insight into another direction, 
one could say that our sense of conviction and acceptance exa ctly 
does not rest on the substances of the argument, but more on the fact 
that these substances are situated within commonly accepting 
frameworks, in which the presence of experts or authoritative 
figureheads usually plays a prominent role.  
Foucault’s point is strikingly valid in both Tung’s and Henry Tang’s 
arguments and elaborations. Let us put aside first the validity and truth 
content in their arguments and elaborations (although those are also 
highly questionable if we look at them in detail, as I have 
demonstrated above). What I want to highlight is the positioning of 
these statements as valid arguments and elaborations according to 
the standard of the government officials and the media who cover 
them so that we can find out within what kind of ‘truth’ we are in this 
case.  
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Does it matter, to you? 
--PCCW and Narratives of technology and the market 
 
 
 
 
locating the focus 
This chapter is about the story of Richard Li, Tzar-kai, and his company, 
Pacific Century CyberWorks -- Hong Kong Telecom. The company 
witnessed, and was undoubtedly one of the most active protagonists 
in, the years during which Hong Kong was most enthusiastic about 
information technology. But before turning to the story of Richard Li 
and his PCCW empire, let us spend some time on an excellent 
example given by Daniel Miller in his recent book, The dialectics of 
shopping. He analyses a story of the merger (in Britain) between a 
discount grocery store, ‘Kwik-save’, which concentrates on cutting 
back the costs; and a core high-street supermarket, Somerfield, which 
represents itself as a ‘focal point and active member of the 
community’. ccxxxiii Both of the retailers have their own market niches, so 
the merger, or to be more precise, the takeover of Kwik-save by 
Somerfield, is a seemingly very logical result for both of them, serving 
the same market, in an atmosphere of growing competition in the 
retailing industry (which we usually understand as ‘the context’). Miller, 
however, provides another version of the merger, in which the real 
struggle at the level of the day-to-day operation of the retail business 
as the reason of merger is far less important; in which the driving force 
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of the merger lies somewhere else.  
 
According to his version of the merger, the driving force comes, 
surprisingly, from a Hong Kong-based company, Dairy Farm, which is a 
retail subdivision of a long-standing Hong Kong group, Jardine 
Matheson. The history of Jardine is even longer than the colonial history 
of Hong Kong. It started as an opium trader, and one of their bosses, 
William Jardine, had entered history for persuading the British 
Government to declare war on China and seize Hong Kong.ccxxxiv As a 
group of British capital based in Hong Kong, Dairy Farm started to 
expand its business on a global scale in response to the impending 
Handover of Hong Kong from Britain to China. Kwik -Save, initially a 
company growing in an ‘organic and self-funded’ mannerccxxxv, is one 
of the mismanaged items in the global portfolio of Dairy Farm, which 
took over control of the former company’s management in 1987. The 
shares of Kwik-Save underperformed the whole sector by almost 70 
percent between 94 and 98. The merger between Kwik-Save and 
Somerfield, and the subsequent sale of the shares of the merged 
company by Dairy Farm, is therefore a decision made ‘quite 
irrespective of its local performance or its relationship to other 
supermarket competition within the British market’. ccxxxvi  In the 
atmosphere of ‘deregulation’ in the Thatcher era, the impact resulting 
from this distance between the consideration from the point of view of 
finance, capital reproduction and the consideration of day-to-day 
operations of the retail business is even more significant. While the 
primary basis of the Thatcherite governance lies in its inability and 
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unwillingness to intervene in the business sphere, mega-businesses, 
such as the merged Kwik -Save and Somerfield, by virtue of their 
enormous market-share, will come to represent consumer interest. As 
the ‘agent’ of the consumers at large, the management of merged 
retailers in fact makes decisions in terms more of financial performance 
than of consideration of their daily business performance, yet 
legitimized in the name of the consumers. The content and reality of 
consumers are exploited in this abstraction process. 
 
Indeed, in his conclusion to Virtualism: a new political economy 
co-edited with James G. Carrier, ccxxxvii  Miller juxtaposes several 
phenomena from different areas under the umbrella notion of 
‘virtualism’. The phenomena include the obsession with auditing 
practices in higher education, an argument made initially by Michael 
Powerccxxxviii. The argument is that academics ‘may reduce their actual 
teaching quality in order to spend more time demonstrating to 
managers that their teaching quality has improved.’ ccxxxix  The 
prevalence of management consultancies and pension funds and 
their de facto domination of contemporary capitalism are also 
examples of virtualism. Management consultancies, due to their 
increasing size and scope of responsibility, replace the management 
of the firms that consult them in the first place. Pension funds, at least in 
the case of Britain by virtue of their gigantic volume, demand ‘a voice 
in the companies in which they invest – for instance, a veto over board 
appointments, executive compensations, and critical corporate 
charter provisions’. ccxl All the interests of ‘actual consumers’ are no 
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longer the only stake or even a significant consideration in the 
operation of businesses and education. Instead, the major scramble 
for interest has shifted to that between the auditing unit and the 
academics, the management and the management consultancy, the 
management of the pension funds and the shareholders of it; in other 
words, ‘virtual consumers’ reign.ccxli  
 
In such a situation, what is contestable is no longer the simple and 
original accumulation of capital and exploitation of workers. The 
argument that Miller wants to advance is that if consumers still 
constitute an integral part of capitalism by being impoverished, they 
are now impoverished by being abstracted, for the benefit of the few. 
No matter whether the consumers are students who consume the 
‘education services’, firms which pay for management consultancy or 
people whose pension money the pension fund is investing, they are 
bypassed and abstracted. People who dominate in contemporary 
capitalism are not in any sense less greedy than before, but they are 
now benefiting from what Alain Touraine considers the real danger: 
‘the unrestricted movement of capital, which can suddenly destroy 
whole economies on the basis of a purely financial and short-term 
calculation’. ccxlii However, it goes without saying that this unrestricted 
movement of capital, though it does not, or is not patient enough to, 
extract most of its profit from ‘actual consumers’, has no reason to be 
benevolent.    
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A clean and clear version  
Here begins the story of Richard Li. The business career of Richard Li is 
usually dated back to the early 1990s. He first became well-known for 
his sale of Star TV (which ‘never made any money’ and was 
threatened to be shut down by his fatherccxliii) to Rupert Murdoch’s 
News Corp with a profit of $800 million, which is almost 8 times the 
founding seed money, $125m, in 1993. ccxliv  The profit was halved 
between him and his father’s Hutchison Whampoa. He then founded 
the Pacific Century Development, which subsequently bought a 
Singapore-listed company, and got itself listed in the Singapore stock 
market under the name of Pacific Century Regional Development. At 
that stage, its business included insurance, hotels and some real estate.  
 
In 1998 the Pacific Century Group formed a joint venture with Intel 
called Pacific Convergence Corporation (PCC), which ‘intends to 
provide high speed Internet services’. ccxlv This is one of the earliest and 
most well-known IT-related businesses of the group. In the second 
policy address delivered by Chief Executive Tung Chee-wah during the 
same year, Tung explicitly announced his intention for the government 
to participate actively in the promotion of technology, in particular 
information technology. He said: ‘we need now to strengthen our 
support for technological development, build up a critical mass of fine 
scientists, engineers, skilled technicians and venture capitalists, and 
encourage the development of a significant cluster of 
technology-based businesses’. ccxlvi  In 1999, the Hong Kong SAR 
Government, through a private treaty, granted the Pacific Century 
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group the exclusive license to develop Cyberport, a combo of 
residential and information technology infrastructure, in Pokfulam, 
Hong Kong.  
 
In order to raise money to develop the project, the group bought a 
company called Tricom, as its listed vehicle in the Hong Kong stock 
market, and eventually changed its name to Pacific Century 
CyberWorks (PCCW). About half a year after the name PCCW had 
replaced Tricom in the stock market, PCCW was already planning 
another merger, which was seemingly quite impossible for a company 
which had not yet made any significant profit. The target of the merger 
this time was the Cable and Wireless Hong Kong Telecom, one of the 
largest listed companies in Hong Kong. It took about a month for the 
PCCW and British Cable and Wireless, and also one more competitor, 
Singapore Telecom (Sing Tel), to complete the negotiations. With the 
aid of a consortium led by the China Bank group, which provided a 
total of HK$100bn, PCCW successfully reached an agreement with the 
management of British Cable and Wireless about taking over the 
Cable and Wireless HKT.  
 
The Cable and Wireless HKT was also not PCCW’s exclusive target for 
acquisition and merger, indeed by the time PCCW made the decision 
to take over HKT, a significant amount of acquisition and investment 
projects had already taken place. Between August 99 and February 00, 
PCCW had already accumulated 19 items in its acquisition and 
investment portfolio, with  the total cash invested more than 
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US$273m. ccxlvii  As a result of all these acquisitions, mergers and 
investments, the stock price of PCCW rose from about HK$3 in early 
August, 1999, to a historical high of HK$28.5 on Feb 15, 2000, in the 
midst of the negotiation between PCCW and the British Cable and 
Wireless.ccxlviii Despite the enormous fluctuation of the stock price of 
PCCW, by the end of 1999, the HK$164bn-PCCW had become one of 
the ten biggest listed companies in Hong Kong, with Richard Li 
accumulating HK$50bn for himself. ccxlix By then, the story of Richard Li 
was widely regarded as a legend in the history of Hong Kong.ccl 
 
The standard interpretation of this history in Hong Kong is certainly the 
discourse of technological innovation and the global trend of 
liberalization and deregulation of the telecommunication market, 
which in itself is one facet of the neo-liberal discourse emerging from 
the latter half of the 1970s. The claims are: enhancing competition, 
deregulation, ‘freedom of choice, the market society, laissez-faire, and 
minimal government’ccli, etc.. From this perspective, the narrative is 
presented in a straightforward and exclusively positive way: the 
synergy arising from the collaboration between the SAR Government 
and the technologically very potent PCCW to develop the project of 
Cyberport, which is the cradle of a future development of both industry 
and commerce in Hong Kong; the deregulation of the 
telecommunication industry resulted in more competition and the take 
over of the former monopoly Cable and Wireless HKT by PCCW as one 
of the promising competitors. However, following the steps of Miller, I 
also would like to suggest other versions of interpreting of this story, in 
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order to understand more about the underlying impetus and dynamics, 
in short, what really happened?  
 
Angle obscured 1: scrambling for ‘Hong Kong’ 
Telecom 
To begin with, regarding Hong Kong, what is strikingly coincidental is 
the historical context in which Miller’s story about the supermarket 
merger in Britain and the acquisition of HKT by PCCW took place. We 
mentioned the reason why Kwik-Save changed from developing in a 
stable and self-funded manner to an over-developing one, and finally 
merged with Somerfield. When Dairy Farm became the major 
shareholder of the retailer, it mismanaged it and had to quit by selling 
all its shares in the end. However, the very reason why Dairy Farm had 
to go global and acquire Kwik-Save echoes that of the acquisition of 
HKT by PCCW.   
 
The competition between PCCW and Sing Tel over the control of HKT 
mattered to the public in Hong Kong because the nature of 
telecommunication has always had a strategic dimension and is 
politically highly sensitive.cclii That is why after Sing Tel announced its 
intention to acquire HKT, the secretary of Telecommunication and 
Information Technology of Singapore visited Hong Kong and 
proclaimed that it was not their intention to control the 
telecommunication industry through this acquisition. ccliii  Moreover, 
Singapore has long been one of the major competitors in Asia in 
various fields. All of these amount to a widely recognized notion that 
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the competition was indeed a battle to preserve something belonging 
to Hong Kong.ccliv 
 
Yet, the irony is that one has to ignore quite a lot of historical details in 
order to hold on to such a notion, not to mention whether to be 
grateful for Li’s triumph. A very brief history of HKT will suffice to make 
this point clear. Cable and Wireless Hong Kong Telecom was the 
company name after the acquisition of Hong Kong Telephone by 
Hong Kong Cable and Wireless in 1987. The former was founded by 
British Cable and Wireless, which itself was established back in 1873 in 
Britain, and started to run the international telecommunication services 
in Hong Kong in 1936. The latter, owned by the local Li Kwok Po family, 
had been developing as the exclusive operator of local 
telecommunication services ever since the post World War II period. 
And British Cable and Wireless held more than 50 percent of the 
merged company.cclv This makes it obvious that Cable and Wireless 
HKT was a company founded and operated by British capital. Even 
after the acquisition of the Hong-Kong-capital based Hong Kong 
Telephone, and the subsequent ownership of the shares by the Hong 
Kong Government after the acquisition, the notion that the company is 
a valid ‘Hong Kong’ company can be defined merely by its local 
operation and very recent involvement of local capital.  
 
In this sense the notion that Richard Li’s PCCW was fighting to preserve 
HKT as belonging to Hong Kong is only valid in a very narrow sense. 
Moreover, and herein lies the echo to Miller’s story, the reason why 
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PCCW had to compete with Sing Tel has to be attributed more to 
political elements, rather than economics, much less competition. In 
the middle of the 1990s, the then recently appointed managing 
director of Dairy Farm stated, ‘it would be a pity if Beijing were to 
believe the firm is anything less than 100 percent committed to Hong 
Kong’. cclvi The background of this statement was the going global of 
the company and its implied retreat from Hong Kong facing the 
approaching Handover of Hong Kong. If the political dimension is 
selectively purged out, it would be difficult to comprehend the validity 
and relevance of the above statement, especially when the topic is 
the highly calculating and rational business decisions. 
 
This very historical background was undoubtedly intimidating HKT as 
well, but we can see quite a different response from Hong Kong Cable 
and Wireless. The late 70s witnessed the beginning of the negotiation 
over the future status of Hong Kong between the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) and the British Government. In September 1984 both 
parties signed a draft text of the Joint Declaration, the main 
agreement being that Hong Kong would be handed over back to the 
PRC by the British Government. Well before the Handover, Cable and 
Wireless HKT had already sold 10 million and 20 percent of its shares to 
the Guangdong Government and a Chinese capital company, Citic 
Pacific, respectively in the late 80s.cclvii Accordingly, the decision of 
British Cable and Wireless to merge Hong Kong Cable and Wireless and 
Hong Kong Telecom, and the following engagement of the Hong Kong 
Government as a major shareholder of the company, are interpreted 
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by commentators as an exercise to localize or decolourise the British 
element in this highly strategic and politically sensitive business cclviii. 
After all, the decision of British Cable and Wireless can be interpreted 
at least equally, if not more, reasonably as a gesture to secure its own 
profit out of its monopoly status in the Hong Kong telecommunication 
market. 
 
The final decision of British Cable and Wireless to exit the market and 
sell Cable and Wireless HKT to PCCW can also be explained from the 
angle of the decision of the colonial government to open the 
telecommunication market. As a matter of fact, owing to the 
emerging local pressure to stop the monopoly of HKT in the 
telecommunication market in the middle and late 1980s, the colonial 
government had mandated a consultancy firm, Booz Allen and 
Hamilton, to assess the issue of opening up the telecommunication 
market. (So it should not be surprising to recognize the relevance and 
validity of Miller’s theory of virtualism – management consultancy is 
indeed in a position to decide on our behalf). The suggestion of Booz 
Allen and Hamilton was that the government was to issue 3 more 
licenses for the operation of the local fixed telecommunication 
network services (FTNS). Hutchison Global Communication, New World 
Telecom and Wharf T&T were the 3 winners of the additional operation 
licenses, effective from July 1, 1995. This was also the day when the 
exclusive license of Cable and Wireless HKT came to an end. The 
exclusive license of international telecommunication services was 
likewise surrendered about 8 years earlier (late March, 1998 instead of 
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2006), as a result of an agreement of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) concerning the opening up of the international 
telecommunication market back in 1996. cclix  Consequently, the 
telecommunication business of HKT has been declining steadily (and 
somewhat enormously). For instance, a recent report of the company 
stated that up until 2003, the performance of FTNS had already 
dropped by almost 30 percent from its apparently total monopoly.cclx  
 
Figure 1, situation of the operation of fixed telecommunication network 
services and international telecommunication services after the Booz 
Allen and Hamilton consultation 
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In other words, the story of the acquisition of Cable and Wireless HKT by 
PCCW -- although it constitutes an important part of the ‘legendary’ 
business career of Richard Li and his PCCW, and represents an 
apparently incontestably linear success of Hong Kong in its 
re-orientation in the direction of innovative and information 
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technology -- is rather misleading. It can on the contrary be argued 
that, even if Sing Tel had really successfully acquired Cable and 
Wireless HKT, the situation was just a transfer of property and capital 
from the hands of Britain to that of Singapore, especially when the 
business will nevertheless be run in Hong Kong, and especially after the 
Handover of Hong Kong from the British Government to the PRC. It is 
not particularly sound and reasonable to assume that a British -owned 
company belongs to Hong Kong.  
 
Therefore, the story can be at least equally, if not more reasonably, be 
interpreted as a story in which an emerging businessman triumphed in 
taking the opportunity to make huge sums of money through the stock 
market, and by the hype of its out-competing the Singapore rival, after 
insatiable British capital no longer sees any profit potential in the 
telecommunication business and quits. Apart from those who were 
able enough, in terms of sensitive decisions and capital competence, 
to make quick money in the stock market, the benefit of PCCW’s 
acquisition to Hong Kong as a whole is not to be unquestionably 
assumed, and has yet to be convincingly argued. So the uniqueness of 
the phenomenon of technological hype in Hong Kong is yet to be 
located in the actual interaction between technological artifacts and 
the everyday life of people. At least as far as everything said above is 
concerned, Hong Kong people as consumers and users of 
technological products are by and large bypassed. Nonetheless, they 
are abstracted as a rather empty reference upon which articulation of 
justifications can be imposed. And this is a clear Hong Kong resonance 
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of Miller’s virtualism thesis.   
 
Angle obscured 2: how successful is the ‘success’?  
The dimension of the whole phenomenon of Richard Li and his PCCW 
that concerns Hong Kong people is mainly connected to financial 
performance. Therefore, the third version of the story concerns the 
actual business and financial activities of the biography of PCCW. As 
mentioned above in the first version, the first business success of 
Richard Li, even before his founding of the Pacific Century group, was 
his sale of Star TV to the Australian media tycoon Rupert Murdoch. The 
sale was significant because Star TV, despite its regional household 
subscription of 53 millions, with its enormous operational cost, ‘is 
thought to have lost more than $600m in less than a decade (both the 
Li and Murdoch era included) and is still losing money’, according to a 
report from the Economist in 2000.cclxi Richard Li himself earned a huge 
sum and divested himself of a burdensome TV station; Murdoch paid, 
in effect lost a huge sum, had to take care of a mediocre TV station, 
and could not make money out of it. This asymmetry constituted the 
‘legendary’ quality of the story.  
 
This particular significance is, however, paradoxical. If an 
underperforming TV station sold for an unexpectedly high price is worth 
celebrating, effectively, the merit derived from the practical operation 
of the TV station and the merit derived from its monetary value 
materialized in transaction are two matters to be considered 
separately. In reality, it seems almost customary to separate these 2 
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realms. However, if the remarkable moment of the whole transaction 
lies precisely in this imbalance, then in other words, for this story to be 
‘successful’, the two realms should be different, yet not separated: the 
worse the TV station, the unreasonably higher the price paid, the more 
wonderful the story. The excitement and noteworthiness generated 
from other combinations, including bad operation/low price, good 
operation/low price and good operation/high price, are simply 
different in kind and far lower in magnitude. However, this conclusion is 
just drawn from the style in which this transaction is represented, 
meaning that a direct and accurate correspondence between the 
words and descriptions from these media representations and what 
these words and descriptions represent is not intended, and simply 
does not exist. However, it is also this very intended distance between 
them which constitutes the paradoxon between the discourse of 
satellite TV as an innovative and information technology (and our 
celebration of it, of course) and the benefit and enjoyment of the 
people, or at least of its subscribers. This kind of strange logic in the 
finance and business activities is nonetheless exceptional.  
 
Another moment of the acquisition of Cable and Wireless HKT by the 
PCCW that is considered highly significant is usually characterized by 
the rhetoric of the ‘new economy’. It was popular to point out that one 
of the reasons why Sing Tel was out-competed by PCCW is that a 
merger between Sing Tel and HKT was still pretty much in the realm of 
the ‘old economy’, not much synergy could be expected. Rather, 
mergers between the traditional telecommunication business and 
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corporations with the concept of information technology reflect an 
irresistible global trend.cclxii Read literally from these words, it is difficult 
to figure out what exactly the notion ‘new economy’ do means, and 
what the difference between the old and the new is, except if we 
simply characterize it tautologically as the acquisition of Cable and 
Wireless HKT by PCCW itself. In order to understand what comes out of 
this merger, it is helpful to borrow from the notion of myth according to 
the classic definition of Roland Barthes.  
 
Myth, to Roland Barthes, is constituted by at least 2 levels of 
signification. The combination of a primary signifier and a primary 
signified is called a sign, which in turn further constitutes the secondary 
signifier of another signified. Through this process of signification, the 
arbitrariness of the relationship between the signifier and the signified is 
reified as a natural and essential relationship, the process through 
which the secondary signifier is constituted by a match up of the pair 
of primary signifier and signified is also drained out. Myth ‘has a task of 
giving an historical intention a natural justification, and making 
contingency appear eternal’. cclxiii Accordingly, a successful myth is 
one that is ‘able to naturalize and universalize the interests of the 
dominant groups as if they were the interests of all members of 
society.’cclxiv Nevertheless, this naturalization and universalization of 
myth does not happen under any veil, since ‘myth does not deny 
things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it 
purifies them, it makes them innocent, …  it gives them a clarity which is 
not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact.’cclxv 
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Referring to the story of PCCW and Richard Li, what is most frequently 
talked about and has acquired the status of almost a statement of fact, 
is certainly the fortune made. An interpretation of the profit from the 
sale of Star TV to Murdoch is already a case in focus; the celebration of 
the profit made by Richard Li naturalizes and universalizes the virtue of 
the notion of profit itself, and by doing this, drains off the problems 
regarding the operation of the TV station and the benefits to its 
subscribers.  
 
As mentioned in version 1, PCCW borrowed a total of HK$100bn from a 
consortium led by the Bank of China. This approach is crucial, as Miller 
argues, ‘the financier’s logic is that a company should take on a huge 
burden of debt’, because ‘debt is seen as helpful in imposing the kind 
of discipline upon a company that will force it to take the ruthless 
decisions that will lead, in turn, to the most efficient use of capital’. cclxvi 
Unexceptionally, the imperative of growth conditioned by the huge 
amount of debt is the principal atmosphere of operation of PCCW. The 
signification of this ultimate signified, this particular condition of growth, 
can indeed be truly ruthless.  
 
In fact, starting from mid-2001, the company had 3 redundancy 
exercises within one single year, in July/August 2001, December 2001 
and March 2002.cclxvii Back to the date at the end of February 2000, 
when PCCW and British Cable and Wireless finally came to an 
agreement about the acquisition, the decision was worrisome enough 
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for the employees of HKT because of the increasing competition in the 
telecommunication market and the huge burden of debt taken by the 
new company. Richard Li came out and publicly proclaimed, ‘we 
never thought of any layoff, we emphasized human assets!’ cclxviii 
However, a quick glance over the interim report 2003 of PCCW reveals 
the following in a section entitled ‘management’s discussion and 
analysis’, ‘the improvement (of group EBITDA margin) was primarily due 
to greater cost efficiency achieved as a result of various strategic 
realignment plans and efficiency programs implemented in 2002.’cclxix 
Regardless of the technical meaning of the EBITDA margin, the 
sentence looks neutral and certainly acceptable, considered from the 
point of view of growth and repayment of debt. Indeed, in early 
September, PCCW announced a plan which should be one of the 
‘strategic realignment plans and efficiency programs’. The plan 
required that staff in several categories of work (such as customer 
service and outdoor maintenance work) should start up their own 
companies, in order to compete for the jobs previously assigned to 
them in-house. The management did not promise those who failed to 
join the startups that they would not be laid off. The management 
promised to secure all the contract jobs to the new startups, but only 
for the first year, and no promise was made concerning the second, 
the third or the later years.cclxx  
 
There are no data available to show whether, in which aspects, and to 
what extent this realignment arrangement helped to improve the 
quality of the services, but what we can be sure of is the cut of the 
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various kinds of allowances, lengthening of working hours, and a 20 
percent reduction of salary cclxxi . In other words, the notion of 
‘improvement’ mentioned in the interim report or the notion of 
‘efficiency’ claimed by the name ‘efficiency program’ has to be 
understood not in terms of more output by the same input, but the 
same output by less input – the reduction of the responsibility of the 
company to its staff, and the more concrete deterioration of the terms 
of employment. After all, both the ‘strategic realignment plan and 
efficiency programs’ only restructure the production process, instead 
of any de facto improvement of sale of the company, especially its 
business core, the telecommunication process. It is in all of these that 
we may develop a concrete understanding of the choice of word of 
‘strategic’ – not for the absolute sense of improvement of quality, but 
an improvement of efficiency in a negative sense.  
 
As a matter of fact, the overall performance of PCCW also recorded a 
total of two years of consecutive decline of almost HK$14bn in 2002 
and 2003, which is HK$7.76bn and HK$6.1bn respectively.cclxxii  In 
particular, the sale and the market share of telecommunication 
services of PCCW has been suffering a decline for all the four years 
since its acquisition of HKT. cclxxiii  In other words, since the 
telecommunication services of PCCW is not efficient, competitive and 
attractive enough to even retain its customers, improved efficiency 
can again only be understood in terms of the reduction of its 
responsibility to its staff. As a result, to accept or acknowledge such a 
kind of improvement as a catalyst of better performance is to accept 
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or acknowledge a paradoxon on improvement without improving 
either sales, or the welfare of its staff: a paradoxon that resembles that 
of the sale of Star TV.  
 
Hong Kong cultural critic Ackbar Abbas argues that the culture of 
Hong Kong is a culture of disappearance. In a culture of 
disappearance, according to Abbas, one does not see what is there, 
but mis-recognizes it as something else; a thing does not vanish without 
a trace, it simply dis-appears. cclxxiv  Before anything about the 
advantage of the ‘new economy’ over the ‘old economy’ is visible in 
terms of technological content, we again see only the abstraction, the 
virtual operation on the part of finance. The operation calls for a 
mis-recognition of what indeed should be our focus, or at least for an 
elusion of a comparable consideration of the quality of the services 
provided, at the expense of the corporate responsibility to its staff at 
the same time. The examples of Star TV and the discourse of efficiency 
in the interim report, viewed through Abbas’s concept of 
disappearance, complements Miller’s theory with a more concrete 
status and function of the ‘real’ in regard of the working of the whole 
story. The ‘real’, the benefits to customers, the staff of the company, 
and the subscribers of satellite TV, has to be mis-recognized as 
something irrelevant, or simply made invisible, in other words, 
disappear, in order to render the story of PCCW and Richard Li 
legendary.   
 
 
 135 
Angle obscured 3: doing businesses by (merely) 
talking about them 
So much for the discursive treatment of the paradoxical relationship 
between the sale, redundancy and improvement of efficiency. 
However, all of them are still pretty much within the realm of the old 
economy – we do not have particularly convincing reasons to attribute 
these subtle operations to the ‘new economy’, if this notion is to have 
some positive content. In fact, all of the above concerns only the 
financial operation of Cable and Wireless HKT; in the merger between 
the old and the new economy, they are simply considered, and even 
denounced, as elements of the latter. So how exactly can we 
characterize the notion of ‘new economy’? I would suggest and argue 
that the notion of ‘new economy’ is elaborated quite succinctly by a 
coverage from The Economist, ‘These days businessmen are more likely 
to hit newspaper headlines for thinking of doing a deal than for 
actually doing one.’cclxxv 
 
We can start with the case of Cyberport, testimony of commencing of 
the Science Hub project in Hong Kong’s rival Singapore in 1998, and 
based on the vocal manifestation of emphasis by the HKSAR 
Government expressed in policy addresses in 1997 and 1998, in which 
Tung’s administration came up with a range of innovation and 
technology related policy suggestions in an urgent tone. (See the 
chapter on the discourse of government innovation and technology 
policy. In March 99, Mr. Donald Tsang, the then Financial Secretary, in 
his second budget speech proposed the project of Cyberport, ‘the 
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essential infrastructure to form a strategic cluster of information services 
companies’. He further elaborated,  
for Hong Kong to meet the challenges of the 21st Century, it 
must adapt to the new forces of the Information age and 
respond to the mega trends of technological advances which 
were introducing new ways of doing business, transforming 
traditional markets and altering existing competitive 
advantages…  Hong Kong must race against time to have a 
quick and decisive response in developing its own niche in view 
of the speed with which the information technology sector was 
advancing and the emphatic efforts of practically all of its 
competitors in trying to carve out their own corners of the 
market.cclxxvi 
The whole proposed Cyberport project, located in Pokfulam, aims at 
providing 100,000 square meters of office space, with facilities of retail, 
entertainment, education, and a hotel. The tenants already moved 
into the first phase of the project in mid-2002, and the whole project is 
planned to be completed by mid-2004.cclxxvii Insisting on the positive 
non-intervention and free market policy of the government, Donald 
Tsang points out that ‘it is the rightful role of the government to provide 
an appropriate environment and suitable infrastructure to promote, 
facilitate and support our manufacturing and service industries.’cclxxviii 
As a result, the proposed Cyberport is to be built on the basis of a 
partnership between the government and a private company. 
Paradoxically, this privileged exclusive license was granted to Richard 
Li’s Pacific Century Development, through a private treaty instead of 
public auction, a method which in itself manifests to a certain extent 
the competitiveness of the market. When the Secretary for Information 
Technology and Broadcasting, K.C. Kwong, was asked about the 
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rationale behind the decision of dealing with PCD through a private 
treaty, he listed five reasons. First, the company has to be attractive 
enough for the best IT companies worldwide to come to Hong Kong; 
secondly, the company has to bear the development of the project 
and also the risk of it; thirdly, the readiness of the company not to be 
out-paced by other regional competitors; fourthly, whether there are 
other interested developers; and finally, the company has to be 
capable of managing the whole project.cclxxix  It seems confusing 
enough why all these reasons should not amount to the choice of 
public auction. This case nevertheless sheds light on our understanding 
of the notion of market competition and positive non-intervention.  
 
What should not be surprising is that while the popular notion is that 
Hong Kong is or has been practicing a Laissez-Faire governance, the 
notion is indeed more assumed than critically examined. It is almost 
conventional among serious academic investigations of the topic that 
the extent of the Laissez-Faire is rather limited and has to be 
understood in very particular terms.cclxxx Anyway, despite the fact that 
PCD won the exclusive license through a private treaty, if we are to 
examine whether Cyberport fulfills the goals laid down by the 
government, it is necessary, as Doreen Massey, Paul Quintas and David 
Wield did for the science parks in Britain, to ‘examine them in their own 
terms’. cclxxxi According to their research, two major objectives of the 
science parks in Britain are: promoting the formation of new firms, and 
creating job opportunities. The result they found was that science parks 
practically did not perform well to breed new startups, the ‘majority of 
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them are relocated units and firms’, in the milieu of university budget 
cuts, ‘university staff are recommended to start their own companies 
as an alternative for their position in the university’. Both findings 
confirm that both objectives laid down by the science parks are more 
or less under-accomplished. cclxxxii  These experiences in Britain are 
useful for us to decide whether the proposal of Cyberport helps Hong 
Kong in re-orienting itself in the direction of innovation and technology 
industry or is, at the opposite extreme, promoting like a loud-speaker 
the government’s emphasis, for the benefit of capital in the stock 
market.cclxxxiii 
 
Reports from various sources show that a considerable proportion of 
the tenants of the Cyberport are in fact just relocating firms. Up until 
early 2004, a total of 28 companies were occupying 64% of all the first 
two phases of office space in Cyberport; of the 28 companies, 12, 
which amounts to less than half of the total, are new startups. With the 
completion of the construction work of the third phase in February 2004, 
the total occupation percentage will fall to 40 percent.cclxxxiv Among 
the eight major tenants that PCCW solicited in the very beginning of 
the project are multinational corporations such as Microsoft, Yahoo!, 
HP, all of which were renting office space in Hong Kong before the 
proposal of the Cyberport project. Only 2 companies were exceptional, 
one is the Pacific Convergence Corporation, which is the joint venture 
formed between PCCW and Intel, the other is Softbank, a 
Japan-based group.cclxxxv The lease record of Cyberport can also be 
assessed indirectly from the fall of leases in other properties which also 
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specialize in IT-related companies. Taikoo Place, in particular, where 
the headquarter of PCCW-HKT is located, experienced a loss of 
tenants as a result of the completion of Cyberport, while major tenants 
like CSL and Microsoft were all moving out to rent office space in 
Cyberport. 
 
The effect of a strategic cluster is also not to be assumed, but to be 
argued. Indeed, Taikoo Place, for instance, was arguably a candidate 
for the ‘strategic cluster’ pursued by the government. Taikoo Place 
once housed multinational tenants such as Cable and Wireless, 
Microsoft, PCCW, Time-Warner, etc. It has built-in information 
infrastructure connecting the 11 buildings among themselves and 
facilities connecting to databases of various multinational 
corporations. cclxxxvi  I f  IT-related multinational corporations are the 
ultimate juicy fruit for Hong Kong to alter our ‘existing competitive 
advantages’, to ‘adapt to the new forces of the information age -- 
and respond to the mega trend of technological advances’cclxxxvii, 
then it must be quite annoying for the government to acknowledge 
that Hong Kong got these juicy fruits long ago, at least well before the 
establishment of Cyberport. Before the government even tries to 
account for the difference Cyberport and other similar private 
experiments make, and the limitation of the latter, contradictions and 
discrepancies remain unsettled. The spectre of promoting technology 
by merely announcing it is still haunting. 
 
At this stage, the way in which both the SAR Government and Li’s 
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PCCW ‘hit newspaper headlines for thinking of doing a deal rather 
than for actually doing one’ should already be clear enough. Indeed, 
this irony echoes Sum Ngai-ling and Bob Jessop’s definition of Hong 
Kong as an entrepreneurial city. According to their theorization, ‘the 
promoters of entrepreneurial cities adopt an entrepreneurial discourse, 
narrate their cities as entrepreneurial and market them as 
entrepreneurial. This involves the articulation of diverse economic, 
political and socio -cultural narratives and complementary 
nonnarrative discourses to contextualise and reinforce calls for 
entrepreneurial action’cclxxxviii. While the government’s promotion of 
Cyberport by articulating the context in which Cyberport is conceived 
(see also chapter 3 on the discourse of government innovation and 
technology policy) is certainly entrepreneurial in the sense of Sum and 
Jessop, the way in which Richard Li is developing his business from Star 
to PCD to PCCW and finally to PCCW-HKT was no less entrepreneurial.  
 
As long as stock price does not have any essential relationship with the 
company it represents, activities of making quick money in the stock 
market are merely ‘trad[ing] on emotion and the perceptions of 
emotion’. cclxxxix  It is even due to this intentional dissociation and 
abstraction of the perception and emotion from the operation of the 
business that the stock price of Tricom can rocket 2270 percent, from a 
mere HK$0.136 to the highest of HK$3.225, within one single day in early 
March, 1999.ccxc And between the time when Tricom was renamed to 
Pacific Century CyberWorks and mid-February 2000, the time when 
PCCW announced its intention to acquire HKT, PCCW energetically 
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invested, acquired and formed joint ventures. Some of its more 
well-known counterparts included City Telecom, CMGI, Outblaze, 
StarEastNet, SoftNet ccxci ; a joint venture between PCCW and the 
Australian Telecom, namely Telstra, was also formed in April. During this 
period, all these joint ventures, acquisitions and investments practically 
alluded to technological excellence and hence profit, therefore, 
‘firms…  are working hard to fuel rumours that buyers are about to 
pounce and unlock the value of their assets, so as to prop up sagging 
share prices – even though few hard deals materialise’ ccxcii , a 
commentator satirized. The commentator revealed that Richard Li 
‘withdrew a mooted offer for Cable and Wireless, but not before 
newspaper headlines worldwide had brightened his fading 
image.’ccxciii Accordingly, the stock price of PCCW finally reached 
HK$25.8 in February 15, 2000, even if, with the exception of particular 
joint ventures, investments and acquisitions only refer to changes of 
stake or financial structure, in other words, irrelevant of the sales or 
operation of the business. This irrelevance was not insignificant, some 
small public shareholders who have been holding the shares of HKT for 
its stable dividend suffer from Li’s business style: dropping sales figures 
already imply decreasing dividend, the huge sum of debt incurred by 
PCCW at the time of acquisition further held the group from paying 
dividend.  
  
The craze of people over IT-related stocks did not remain without 
criticism. As noted by a biographer of Li, regarding the enormous rise in 
stock price of PCCW in December 1999, when people criticized Li for 
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pushing the price too high, he simply responded, ‘am I really 
competent enough?’ccxciv This is an interesting response that could 
connect two incidences. Oei Hong Leong, the original stake holder of 
Tricom, which was the shell company acquired by Pacific Century 
group, sold a huge amount of Tricom shares in mid-May, before the 
even larger amount of shares held by institutional investors were 
allowed to enter the market. He sold 400m shares for about HK$500m. 
The day then witnessed a drop of the share price by 16 percent.ccxcv 
Another instance was the same thing done by those who suffered from 
the sale by Oei. Cable and Wireless HK was renamed PCCW-HKT on 
August 10, 2000; this was also the day when British Cable and Wireless 
was allowed to sell their 1.1bn of PCCW shares. 1.1bn of share freshly 
entering into the market naturally and inevitably created pressure for 
the stock price to fall. Therefore, before August 10, the senior 
management of PCCW, including Richard Li, collectively took a step 
ahead of British Cable and Wireless, and sold more than 260m of 
PCCW shares for almost HK$40bn. August 8 also witnessed a drop of 
almost 12 percent.ccxcvi  
 
The subtlety here is that Li thought that the almost irrational rise of the 
stock price was not his fault, and that he did not distort the stock price 
single-handedly. By the same token, if he was conscious enough when 
he asked ‘am I really competent enough’, the question at the other 
side of the token should be, ‘how can I fail to take this opportunity to 
make a big fortune?’ And if this is the case, then what Oei did should 
also not be considered as ruining the deal.ccxcvii This view does no more 
 143 
than confirm the popular conception of the market that the craze and 
the collapse are merely in sync with the inevitable outside world, say 
for instance the sudden surge and gradual decline of the Nasdaq in 
America. However, if the premise that he did nothing to push up the 
price does not stand, which means that he really anticipated and 
indeed participated in pushing up the price, then it qualifies just in an 
indirect way his quality as an entrepreneur, who actively articulates an 
irresistible and inevitable context, in which his articulation is significantly 
constitutive. As an entrepreneur who pretentiously denies 
entrepreneurship, he is able to narrate and perform strategies that are 
apparently advantageous in themselves, purifying the process through 
which this irresistible and inevitable context is popularly affirmed, 
reducing any alternative consideration and subordinating them under 
unquestionable contexts. It is here that we clearly see the practical 
‘talking’ dimension of the myth of the ‘new economy’.  
 
Explaining our supportive attitude 
One of the handful of standup comedians in Hong Kong, Wong 
Chi-wah, demonstrated in one of his shows the mentality of people 
engaging in the stock market by the time of the Handover and the 
‘technology bubble’ in 99. 
 
A: Chi-wah, let me tell you something reliable: 731 
Chi-wah: What? Never heard of it. 
A: Certainly. Strictly inside information. I have friends from the 
north (Beijing)ccxcviii 
 144 
 
In another case 
 
A: Chi-wah, let me tell you something reliable: 005. 
Chi-wah: 005 stands for HSBC, doesn’t it? Let me tell you something 
reliable instead: mothers are womenccxcix. 
 
The concern here is not that the extent to which the profitability of 
buying the stock of HSBC is as self-evident as the notion of ‘mothers are 
women’. The above examples, however, humorously problematize the 
characteristics of the activities in the stock market. If economics tells us 
that we make a decision of buying something out of rational 
calculations, the examples turn this understanding upside down: 
knowing something well enough is irrelevant for our buying decisions; 
perfect information is neither the necessary nor the sufficient condition 
for our decision to buy certain stock. On the other side of the coin, 
knowing not enough does not hinder our buying decision: inside 
information refers to information that we recognize or concede as such. 
Basing upon inside information means giving up our active articulation 
or understanding of the present situation or the tendency of the stock 
market, we let the ‘inside information’ do the articulation or 
understanding for us.  
 
In Michelangelo Antonioni’s Blow Up, labeled by Slavoj Žižek the ‘last 
great modernist film’, Žižek juxtaposes the way in which the protagonist 
Thomas investigates the actually non-existing dead body he 
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discovered in his own photographs, and the way he ends up 
accepting to play the mimic tennis game without the physical 
presence of the tennis ball. Žižek regards this juxtaposition as the ‘lesson 
of modernism’, in which ‘the structure, …  works as well if the Thing is 
lacking, if the machine revolves around an emptiness’. ccc As a result, 
what is worthy of investigation or even critique in the case of the stock 
market is therefore not whether people’s decision to become involved 
in the ‘technology bubble’ is made out of their perfect knowledge or 
the lack of it. To cite a Marxian maxim, ‘they do not know it, but they 
are doing it’. ccci  It is the mechanism in which this phenomenon is 
allowed or even encouraged to occur that is of interest. 
 
As mentioned above, mysteriousness is the fundamental quality of 
‘inside information’ on the tendency of the stock market. Indeed, in 
the example given by Wong, the significant moment is when people 
simply seem to be betting merely on ‘inside information’ as a form, 
following wherever the ‘inside information’ directs them to go, without 
even trying to comprehend what content or message is present in the 
form. The appropriation of this recognition of non-recognition (of what 
is inside the ‘inside information’) is indeed the assumed ground or even 
justification for decision. In another example provided by Žižek to 
explain the working of ideology, he points out that the ideology of 
anti-Semitism probably depicts Jews as the incarnation of evil. 
However, in everyday life, any German might easily encounter Jews 
which are indeed the opposite of what propaganda teaches them. 
Yet if this everyday experience is effective enough as resistance to 
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ideological interpellation, then the ideology is not a successful one. 
Ideology, according to Žižek, functions by turning this gap itself 
(between the ideological figure and the actual everyday experience) 
into the argument for anti-Semitism, and it succeeds ‘when even the 
facts which at first sight contradict it start to function as arguments in its 
favours’. cccii    
 
Here we can identify a parallel situation. In the case of anti-Semitism, 
no matter how the anti-Semitic propaganda tries to structure our ways 
of conceiving Jews, it is by our own irreconcilably confusing 
interpretation of our normal and even pleasant perception of Jews 
that we can see that ideology is at work. And in the case of the stock 
market activities, by the same token, even if people know that they are 
able to profit stably from the stock of HSBC, one of the top 3 largest 
groups in the stock market, people tend to invest in something they 
have not even heard of, by virtue of ‘inside information’, by virtue of 
the label of Beijing, and the mysterious working of the label that follows. 
If these phenomena involve the working of ideology, they work not by 
completely internalizing our sense of truth as defined by ideology; it 
works not by convincing us with its own rationality. Quite the opposite, 
it precisely works by allowing a residual region defined by its traumatic, 
senseless and contradictory quality. This region ‘far from hindering the 
full submission of the subject to the ideological command, is the very 
condition of it.’ ccciii  This is what Žižek calls a ‘vicious circle of 
authority’ccciv, a tautology in which we believe simply because it is the 
authority, even if nothing beneficial can be gained out of it. Do we 
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have to be reminded of the couple of collapses of the stock market in 
1997 and 2000? 
 
This exercise helps us to distinguish, if we refer again to the maxim: ‘they 
do not know it, but they are doing it’, the sphere where investigation 
and criticism are urgently needed and appropriate. It may be a bit 
off-target if we focus solely on whether a certain discourse or ideology 
intends to transform or successfully transforms the mind, the people’s 
‘knowing’ part, it would be frustrating if we found that people know 
already that everything is ‘false-consciousness’ after all, yet they still 
decide to act accordingly. On the contrary, it is the ‘doing’ part that 
matters. Like the practice of canned laughter in soap operas and 
chorus in Greek tragedies, what are the mechanisms in which our 
sensitivity and response are disregarded and trivialized to the story of 
PCCW and Richard Li? And the phenomenon of the technological 
hype in general? What is our understanding of these mechanisms that 
enables the preservation of our traumatic, contradictory and senseless 
residual region? Such that this region with all our traumas, 
contradictions of the gain and loss, love and hate, the obvious and the 
ambivalent will ‘start to function as arguments in its favour’?  
  
Conclusion 
Following the steps of Miller, this chapter has developed different 
versions and angles of the story of Richard Li and his PCCW. It focuses 
on the underlying dynamics, impetus and intentions that are actually in 
operation, and tries to uncover the significance constitutive of the 
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whole phenomenon. This exercise is important, as confirming the 
popular notion of the linear triumph of innovation and technology that 
is beneficial to the social and economic life of Hong Kong is simply 
futile, even if we see technological development as in some sense 
important. Undoubtedly, virtualism in the sense of abstraction appears 
in different moments of the story. It is clear that unique and particular 
logics of both discourse and capital are at work, and Touraine’s 
critique of the popular critique of the neo-liberal view of globalization 
should be an appropriate reminder here: economy, finance and 
politics (one might perhaps add, society) are not a monolithic bloc.cccv 
From the above analyses, it is obvious that different relations and forces 
indeed constitute the story to such an extent that it would be difficult 
to conceptualize it as a technological issue per se . However, we might 
have unduly granted Richard Li and his PCCW too much if we 
conceive of all the political, financial and economic forces and 
relations as intrinsic to the story. By the same token, all of the above 
might be virtual enough, yet if we still insist that all of them are just 
undifferentiated operations for making profit, we will not be able to 
comprehend the problem and will be rendered in many senses 
inactive. 
 
According to the analyses in this chapter, the operation of these logics 
is quite indifferent to, does not regard, and sometimes works at the 
expense of the counterparts that they refer to. These logics seem to 
dominate the constitution of our sense of what the group is about. All 
the operations described in this chapter have their own agendas, no 
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matter whether financial or political, yet the social and the everyday 
life dimensions are by and large absent and omitted. A commentator 
talking about the ‘burst of the technology bubble’ said, ‘it is the 
“investors” who are first exposed to the burst of the bubble, instead of 
the “consumers”’.cccvi Let us for the moment put aside the problem of 
how we can meaningfully distinguish these two kinds of people; still this 
statement is interestingly coherent with Miller. To Miller, investors are of 
course exposed to the burst before the consumers. However, 
consumers (at least part of them) and investors do not stand opposite 
each other. No matter whether the bubble bursts or expands ever after, 
investors always seems to be the only ones exposed; consumers, on the 
other hand, simply have never been in the game, or are replaced by 
their virtual stand-ins.  
 
To counter the interpretation of the supposedly sudden emergence of 
the social and economic prevalence of information technology that 
supposedly improves everything in terms of the inevitably linear process 
of an actualization of rationality, one of the best critiques is to insist on 
the concrete and contextual. For instance, Paschal Preston points out 
that, at least in the context of Britain, the mania for information and 
communication technology (ICT) did not emerge until the late 1970s, 
as a result of the rise of Thatcherism and with the aim to combat and 
manage acute social and economic problems. The emergence of ICT 
discourse at that time, with the help of the popularization of ‘books 
and magazines concerned with (and usually, enthusing over) the …  
then relatively new ICTs’, had a special emphasis on its job creation 
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potential.cccvii And in the context of Hong Kong, ‘it can be argued that 
the technocultural imagination has created a post-crisis (Asian 
financial crisis) euphoria that may be conducive towards the 
rebuilding of a new form of urban governance’cccviii. Nevertheless, it is 
one thing to expose the official discourse which requires us to 
acknowledge that their abstracted and ahistorical logic of 
technological development is indeed tackling problems other than 
what they claim they are handling. How we are to conceptualize the 
situation in which we practically live with or paradoxically do not see 
the obviously visible discrepancies arising out of this virtualism is quite 
another. Especially when these discrepancies also have no reason to 
be benevolent, as we see from the analyses above.  
 
Žižek’s skilful analysis critically bridges the gap. Simply exposing the 
discrepancies, irreconcilables, and senselessness seems inadequate 
because it does not explain our supportive attitude. After all, if we find 
people in this apparent confusion, it is simply not necessary that they 
do not know about the confusion, quite the opposite, it is well probable 
that the confusion, and hence the getting away of making exclusive 
judgment, are precisely what they consciously identify with. cccix 
Through the notions of virtualism and abstraction, Miller seems to 
endorse the existence of a realm that is ‘real’ or not yet abstracted, 
however, the notions are different from Žižek’s notion of the traumatic 
and senseless residual region. Methodologically, Miller builds his notion 
of abstraction and virtualism upon the realm that is ‘real’ and not yet 
abstracted. In other words, he assumes that the level of everyday life is 
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not ill-represented and there is some method to recover somewhat 
authentically this region. But for Žižek, the very traumatic and senseless 
residual quality is the real stake. Without it, it would be impossible to 
understand the workings of ideology, and it will have to be assumed as 
an undistorted human subject at risk of being interpellated – precisely 
the Miller’s starting point. If Miller is not to straightforwardly assume a 
natural and real subject and develop his theory upon this assumption, 
effort will have to be put into formulating an articulation between the 
subject and the social and historical context of the subject. But this 
effort of formulation shall inevitably be political, and is itself a contested 
domain.  
 
According to Žižek, we believe in, instead of being convinced by, the 
discrepancies and contradictions in a direction towards the dominant. 
One more point to add is that explaining the working principle of 
ideology is far from claiming that a particular ideology can completely 
dominate the whole society and its people. After all, such a claim 
would inevitably be empirically inaccurate and theoretically disabling; 
not only because it is far from potent enough, but also because the 
very subjects (society and people) that are being referred to are 
definitely not entirely clear and immediately valid subjects of ideology. 
Who is to be included? What can be the benchmark of a total 
interpellation? The list of questions can be expanded further, but the 
implication is simple: the obstacle on the way to a better 
understanding of the working of ideology and discourse is only the 
nostalgic imagination that a society and its history can easily be 
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conceived of as a unified whole. With this in mind, we can turn now to 
the final chapter. 
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Conclusion: rethinking through HK’s history 
 
 
 
 
The history of Hong Kong, as many writers have noted, and of course 
like the history of any place ever written, is contested terrain. This terrain 
was even full of contestations at the time when Hong Kong had to be 
handed over back to China from the British after one and a half 
centuries of colonial rule.cccx In the context of handover politics, one 
important aspect that the writings and interpretations of Hong Kong 
tend to focus on is the issue of nationality: to what extent people in 
Hong Kong are Chinese or Hong Kong people per se; what kind of 
historical events can be mobilized to support that Hong Kong people 
are anti-colonial or colonial collaborators; what the relationships 
between colonialism, anti-colonialism, communism, and 
anti-communism are, etc. Critics argued that this aspect of Hong Kong 
history is by and large dominated by colonial scholars from Britain and 
patriotic scholars from the mainland.cccxi  
 
Another important aspect of Hong Kong history (though not 
completely separable from the former, see later in this section) 
concerns the impetuses and the meaning of the place’s economic 
development and success. According to the textbook-style narrative 
of K.Y. Nyaw, Hong Kong started out chronologically as a trading port 
in 1842. Between 1842 and 1941, Hong Kong was effectively, if not 
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exclusively, an entrepot and free port. Despite the suspension of 
economic activities during the Second World War, the industrialization 
of Hong Kong started in 1947. cccxii  Before industrialization, the 
prominent figures in Hong Kong’s economy were apparently the banks 
and hongs, assisted by Chinese compradorscccxiii. While Hong Kong has 
always been considered a free port, practicing the policy of 
laissez-faire, practically all the changes in the economic structure 
during the history of Hong Kong were due to changes in ‘external’ 
circumstances. For instance, the beginnings of the industrialization of 
Hong Kong were the combined effects of both the embargo placed 
on China by the United Nations after the former’s involvement in the 
Korean War (which resulted in the loss of the entrepot status of Hong 
Kong in the early 50s, and a turn to industry), and the establishment of 
the Communist regime in China in 1949 (which resulted in Hong Kong 
receiving the fleeing Shanghai capitalists and their capital).cccxiv  
 
From this perspective, the significance of the Hong Kong Government 
is unique. Due to the pressure of factors and influences both from inside 
and outside Hong Kong, it would simply be futile for the government to 
attempt in any way to intervene in the operations of the economy and 
any inevitable structural shift. Paradoxically, it is precisely through the 
government’s very intention and effort to limit its reach that Hong Kong 
was able to float in the global economic current, accommodating 
itself to whatever the circumstances required. Therefore, on the one 
hand, these writers described the early economic development in 
Hong Kong as a neat and clear path from trade and finance activities 
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to industrialization, under the non-interventionist colonial administration. 
On the other hand, even when they could not deny that 
manufacturing industries were not altogether absent in Hong Kong, 
Nyaw attributes their taking root in this  early phase of colonial 
development to factors that were quasi-inevitable, and had nothing to 
do with any active determination on the part of the government 
whatsoever -- for example, the free port policy (again!), the stimulation 
by population growth, and the Imperial Preference granted to Hong 
Kong by the home country.cccxv 
 
Yet, this explanation of the take-off of the economic development with 
respect to the development of the manufacturing industries in Hong 
Kong in particular is not unanimously accepted. For those who 
considered Hong Kong’s pre-War manufacturing industries to be 
absent or at least insignificant, one of their most standard supporting 
arguments comes from Edward Szczepanik’s The economic growth in 
Hong Kong , published in 1958. Szczepanik reports that among the 1.8 
million population in Hong Kong in 1940, only 30,000 workers were 
working in about 800 factories.cccxvi Other sources, however, reveal the 
moment where this mistaken understanding of the industrial 
development could have occurred. Frank Leeming argued that this 
might have to do with the way ‘industry’ was defined. He argues that 
well before the coming of the 20 th century, a considerable proportion 
of property (around 30% between 1845 and 1847) in the Victoria area 
was recorded to be in industrial use. These ‘industries’ engaged in small 
businesses like bakeries and cabinet making, where factories, shops, 
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and residence alike were under the same roof in those premises. 
Leeming goes on to argue that most of these factories, instead of 
being discrete businesses in their own right, indeed in one way or 
another were the extension or continuation of the same business 
started in Guangdong and the Pearl River Delta in particular.cccxvii 
 
David Faure, through uncovering old archive material, also argues that 
pre-War, and even pre-20th century, industries were by no means 
insignificant and were already producing a whole range of products 
for domestic use.cccxviii This very position is also held by Ngo Tak -wing, 
who argues that ‘Hong Kong’s modern industries can be traced back 
to at least the turn of the twentieth century, rather than to a sudden 
spurt after the Korean War, as is commonly assumed’. cccxix  In a 
document published in the mid-1930s, it is first reported that out of the 
850,000 people in Hong Kong, 110,000 engaged in the manufacturing 
of different everyday life goods. The figure even exceeds that in the 
sector of commerce and finance, from which the fortune of Hong 
Kong was commonly believed to come.cccxx  The significance of 
pre-War manufacturing industries can also be inferred from their 
competitive edge in respect to products from other regions. Faure 
mentions that according to another document published in the late 
1910s, for example, ‘the Taikoo sugar works is said to be the largest 
refinery which is under one roof in the world.’cccxxi The manufacturing 
sector in Hong Kong was so strong that one commentator asserted in 
the mid-1930s, ‘despite the size of the country, the industrial goods from 
Shanghai and Hong Kong ranked equal among the exhibits.’cccxxii Ngo 
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even points out that the rubber shoes produced in Hong Kong led the 
British official to admit to Hong Kong’s ‘invasion of the United Kingdom 
market’, and other products such as cosmetics and leatherwear 
effectively displaced imports in the domestic market by the 1920s and 
1930s.cccxxiii And if this evidence apparently implies only the possibility 
of the illusionary self-pride of Hong Kong industrialists, the reaction of 
the overseas authority was certainly significant. Ngo reports that Hong 
Kong’s exports even led the British Government and Canadian 
Government to attempt to impose quotas and raise tariffs to footwear 
exported from Hong Kong.cccxxiv 
 
While the earliest industrial activities in Hong Kong were not recognized, 
Faure argues, it may just be due to the fact that ‘until the 1920s, little 
was manufactured for export’ cccxxv . However, as shown in the 
evidence and interpretation of other writers, when Hong Kong 
products began to gain a competitive edge over overseas products, 
the reason for the ignorance and non-recognition may have more to 
do with more complex colonial projects. On the one hand, Leeming 
and H.F. Cheung cccxxvi  argue that manufacturing industries were 
mainly businesses run by Chinese. Even if we put aside the prejudice of 
the colonial officers against Chinese people, it is still undeniable that 
the evidence advanced by these writers comes mainly from local 
newspapers and classified directories. On the other hand, up to this 
point, the argument is still referring to the debate about the 
periodization of the process of industrialization of Hong Kong. Anyway, 
even if we really assume that industrialization indeed took off in the 
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post-war period, the issue of another dimension, namely the role and 
function of the ‘laissez-faire’ government in relation to this process, still 
remains unresolved.  
 
More precisely, the problem is about our attitude towards the claim 
that the colonial administration of Hong Kong has always been a 
fiscally healthy, laissez-faire  government, and economic success has 
been the result of the decision and adaptability of the Hong Kong 
economy and civil society regarding ‘external’ economic conditions, 
the positive and intentional outcome of a positive non-interventionist 
government. Conventional literature on Hong Kong history generally 
holds a positive attitude to this version. Critics, however, argue that 
‘while it is true that the government practiced a tight fiscal policy, it is 
far too simplistic to explain this policy purely in terms of the ideological 
commitment of the various Financial Secretaries (of Hong Kong’s 
colonial administration) to fiscal conservatism.’ cccxxvii  From this 
perspective, we must avoid a presumed position according to which 
laissez-faire  and the related fiscal conservatism were unanimously 
benevolent governance options chosen intentionally to bring benefit 
to each and every one in the colony, even if the interventions and 
participation of the colonial administration were  in fact low compared 
to, say, the rest of the three ‘little dragons’. Rather, meaningful studies 
of the economic development in Hong Kong must focus on the 
dynamics and negotiations underlying the decision to adopt this policy 
direction.    
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For instance, studies of the provision of industrial land and the proposal 
of establishing an industrial bank by Stephen W. K. Chiu nicely depict 
this dynamic.cccxxviii The provision of concessionary industrial land and a 
publicly financed industrial bank were both pressing issues in the early 
1950s, when the Korean War opened up an enormous opportunity for 
the Hong Kong economy to go on and develop along the path of 
industrialization. That historical moment was considered as the very 
opportunity of formulating something resembling an industrial policy. 
However, in the case of industrial land, the commercial and financial 
sectors opposed the proposal because they wanted to avoid any 
possibility of raising taxes as a result of any prolonged assistance by the 
government in terms of the provision of cheap land. In the case of the 
industrial bank, the historical moment was the time when the industrial 
sector saw the potential for development, and at the same time the 
bank raised interest rates to compete for deposits. The proposal 
brought up by the industrialists, while not totally rejected by the 
government, was again rejected by the finance and banking sectors, 
for a 2-fold reason. They did not want to take the risk of a tax increase 
that a prolonged governmental input might bring; the reason was also 
that the industrial bank would be their direct competitor and 
effectively reduce their profit.  
 
Alex Choi’s discussion contributes one more dimension, the dimension 
of the relationship between the imperial home country and the colony, 
and hence uncovers a broader context in which the apparently 
fiscally healthy laissez-faire policy can be conceived and located. He 
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maintained that the time when Hong Kong saw the opportunity to go 
for industrialization roughly coincided with the time when Sterling crises 
were threatening British imperialism. As a result, the formerly restrictive 
attitude of the British to the industrialization of Hong Kong was more or 
less relaxed. However, the reason for this relaxation was not that the 
previously protected British industrial production no longer needed 
protection, but that during that the waves of Sterling crises, Hong Kong 
had become a ‘money-earning powerhouse’, which was a valuable 
asset to the low currency reserve back in Britain.cccxxix That is to say, the 
experiment of the industrialization of Hong Kong was then allowed, yet 
definitely not with the input of government subsidy, but rather with a 
strict fiscal conservatism.  
 
In the light of these two arguments, it is almost obvious that laissez-faire  
is less an ideological commitment than a mere name to embody 
different responses of the government regarding the market and its 
exchange, and hence looks different according to different 
circumstances. But after all, those are still decisions or actions taken by 
the ‘government’, a rather empty notion embodying quite different, 
sometimes conflicting, directions, principles, or concre te techniques of 
governing. From this perspective, we are then very close to the notion 
of governmentality introduced by Foucault. According to Graham 
Burchell’s interpretation, civil society, understood in the sense that it 
constitutes a space in which ec onomic activities are conducted out of 
government’s reach, is historically an invention of the government.cccxxx 
That the invention of civil society is one of the techniques of the liberal 
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government is one of Foucault’s arguments in the whole project on the 
genealogy of governmentality, in his lectures in 1978-79.   
 
Foucault’s project of a genealogy of governmentality analyzes -- from 
pastoral power dating back to Hebraic thought to the ‘reason of state’ 
in the classical period -- the notion of police in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, liberalisms since the seventeenth century, and 
the contemporary, neo-liberal counterpart.cccxxxi In general terms, this 
analysis is ‘an attempt to pose the question of the epistemological and 
technical conditions of existence of the political, to analyse the 
historical a priori  by which we construct politics as a domain of thought 
and action, and to analyse the instrumentation, vocabulary and forms 
of reason by which this is done.’ cccxxxii  Whereas every form of 
governmentality has its own epistemology and problematic in regard 
to the notion of politics, in general it is a ‘permanent instrument of 
critique’cccxxxiii to other and previous forms of governmentality.  
  
The genealogy of governmentality in the lectures of Foucault is too rich 
in content to be discussed in full here, but insofar as it pertains to this 
discussion, it is instructive to draw on the comparison between notions 
of economy in different historical periods. The concept of government 
before the 18th century, in a sense, referred to the governing of the 
family (or household) in economic termscccxxxiv. The emergence of the 
modern state, however, is characterized by the crystallization of this 
notion of the government of the household economy as a 
quasi-naturalistic, autonomous level of reality, which started to acquire 
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the name of political economycccxxxv. In other words, at the moment 
when modern government was founded, the idea of the government 
of the economy is more or less the successor to that of the government 
of the household. The sphere where individuals can freely conduct 
economic activities not only has a trace that can be found in the 
previous economic government of the household, it is also actively 
and intentionally organized, and placed out of reach, by the state. 
What is relevant about this analysis for our discussion here is that, as 
Dean Mitchell precisely summarizes, ‘liberalism is an art of government 
not only because it recognizes that there are limits to the role of the 
state but because what it determines as falling outside the political 
sphere is itself necessary to the ends of government’cccxxxvi.  
 
The invention and protection of civil society, in which the individual is 
allowed to conduct rational economic activities, does not therefore 
refer to a retreat of government, but ju st to a different form of 
practicing its governmental techniques. Even in the shift to 
neo-liberalism, the government does not disappear altogether; 
especially in the version of neo-liberalism of the German Ordoliberalen 
specifically analysed by Foucault, the state is required to organize a 
competitive market institutionally and juridically. For these German 
liberals, market competition no longer takes on a natural character, it is 
institutional and artificial instead. cccxxxvii  Or, in a more general 
formulation, the role of the state just changes to ‘actively creat[ing] 
the condition within which entrepreneurial and competitive conduct is 
possible.’cccxxxviii (original emphasis).  
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It is precisely in civil society that we can see how the economy can be 
mobilized by the state itself as a principle of philosophical critique of 
‘too much government’, and at the same time, as the very 
manifestation of governmental practicecccxxxix. Should this argument 
lead one to confuse whether the state is indeed omnipotent or 
debilitated, Foucault would probably have answered that this very 
fundamental ambivalence is what should be retained. If we adhere to 
the way in which Foucault poses the question of governmentality, this 
ambivalence just once again re-affirms that governmentality is not 
simply about being for or against something according to some 
arbitrary principles, but rather about a manner of formulating a 
domain of knowledge and practice that we call the political.  
 
Therefore, going back to the argument of Chiu and Choi, their studies 
not only successfully call into question, indeed by relativizing, the stagist 
approach to economic development, their studies even direct our 
attention to ‘the intellectual and practical techniques and inventions 
via which civil society is brought into being as both distinct from 
political intervention and yet potentially alignable with political 
aspiration’. cccxl This approach is meaningful to avoid the mistake of 
criticizing historiography while retaining its basic historical periodization; 
it also prevents us from discussing terms like civil society or government 
intervention in any a priori, a-historical sense.  
 
Therefore, the picture that emerges from the history of the economic 
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development of Hong Kong is far from the clear-cut narrative in which 
industrialization is a distinct step-by-step process; instead, the vitality 
and significance of different types of industrial activities are invisible 
only when Hong Kong’s history is narrated according to conventional 
literature. Moreover, the notion of laissez-faire should also be the 
subject of suspicion: it is just far removed from any ideological 
commitment. Historically it looks like an umbrella notion spanning 
decisions and policies of huge heterogeneity. It is ironically the 
outcome of the negotiation of interests between the colonial 
administration, the imperial authority, finance, trade and banking 
interests, and the industrialists, which, at different stages in Hong Kong’s 
history, discourages as well as embraces the industrialization in Hong 
Kong.  
 
And it is here that we can draw out a performative dimension of the 
rhetoric of the laissez-faire policy. In the words of Ngo, it is through the 
selective interpretation that laissez-faire  is rationalized, post hoc, as a 
‘good policy’ that contributed to the prosperity of Hong Kong, and it is 
through this post hoc rationalization that the popular legend of the 
barren-rock-turned- capitalist-paradise is sanctionedcccxli , that the 
identity of Hong Kong can be established. The performative dimension 
here refers, by definition, precisely not to whether this understanding of 
the history of Hong Kong is accurate or correct, it is by and large 
irrelevant in many cases.  The performative dimension resembles 
almost something like giving a simple and encompassing name to a 
historical space in which we, upon closer inspection, will find 
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incoherence, contradictions and inconsistence, evoking and obliging 
an inevitable precondition for the future path of Hong Kong, as 
informed by this very version of the Hong Kong experience.  
 
Teleology complicated: the beginning is the end is 
the beginning…  
Žižek tells a joke about a conversation between a Pole and a Jew, and 
the joke goes like this: in a train compartment where a Jew and a Pole 
sit opposite each other, the Pole is shifting nervously and watches the 
Jew all the time. Finally, he cannot restrain himself any longer and asks 
how Jews succeed in extracting even the last small coin from other 
people and accumulate all their wealth. The Jew agrees to tell him the 
secret, but the Pole has to  pay some money to the Jew first. As the 
secret is being revealed by the Jew, he stops, and when the Pole asks 
greedily if he can become rich simply by following what the Jew said, 
the Jew demands more money from the Pole, then he would tell him 
the answer. The Pole pays, and the Jew goes on to tell the rest of the 
secret. He stops again and asks the Pole to pay even more before he 
continues. Finally, the Pole loses his temper and shouts at the Jew, ‘You 
dirty rascal, do you really think I did not notice what you were aiming at? 
There is no secret at all, you simply want to extract the last small coin 
from me!’ The Jew replies with resignation, ‘this is how we do it… ’cccxlii 
 
What Žižek tries to exemplify through this joke is that the Other (the 
Jew’s secret) indeed does not exclude the Pole; that the Pole is NOT 
external to the Jew’s secret. The joke of the Jew is successful only by 
 166 
taking the desire of the Pole into consideration, that is to say, how to 
manipulate the ‘secret’, so that it causes our desire and at the same 
time is posed retroactively by this desire. As a result, at the end of the 
story, the Jew did deceive the Pole; he gets the money, and at the 
same time keeps hiswords. In other words, for the secret to be effective, 
the desire of the audience has to be taken into consideration. The 
audience, necessarily, has to fail to know the truth in the process of the 
unfolding of the secret. Therefore, it is wrong to situate the Jew’s 
narrative of the secret as a path to the final revelation of the ‘secret’, 
which is assumed to be external to the narrative itself; instead, the 
narrative structure designates the Pole’s impossible relation to the 
secretcccxliii, and that is where the secret lies, and that may be what the 
Pole has to acknowledge if he is to traverse the secret, know the 
secret. 
 
From this perspective, the lesson is that it is not particularly helpful, if not 
misleading, to consider any story as a path to the final revelation of a 
secret, to consider the story from the final point the story reaches, as 
the final arbitrator, the final reference -- which sometimes leads us to a 
void. It would help to recall a story often told to people in their 
childhood. Once upon a time, a King went out of his luxury palace to 
come to the countryside to breathe some fresh air. When he 
approached the foot of a hill, he stopped and wanted to have some 
fun. He then told his followers confidently that if anyone could make 
him reach the peak of the hill, that person would be awarded anything 
the person would like to have. A guy nearby came up and said to the 
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King: I do not know how to make you reach the peak, but I do know 
how to make you go down once you have reached the top. The King 
did not believe him and went up with the guy. When they all arrived at 
the peak, the guy said to the King, with little regret: welcome to the 
peak, my honourable King. 
 
If Žižek’s joke functions to complicate the straightforward teleology that 
every story seems to imply, this childhood story calls into question the 
relevance of the power of the people with respect to the teleological 
structure, it even broadens the possible referent of ‘secret’ itself. In the 
Pole and Jew joke, it is still the nervous and defensive Pole who triggers 
the story by asking of a supposedly deceitful and omniscient Jew (in 
the view of the Pole, who is curious about the Jew) their way to make 
money. And the question the Pole asks is ‘what the secret is’. The Jew, 
who knows it, dominates the unfolding of the narrative structure from 
this point. And in the case of the childhood story, it is the self-confident 
King who triggers the story, by asking a question that he thinks no one is 
able to answer, a question to which he thinks there is no ultimate 
answer yet. However, it is the follower who dominates the unfolding of 
the narrative. For the King, the question he asks is ‘whether there is an 
answer’. So in this case, while in both cases the one who knows 
dominates the unfolding of the narrative structure, using the 
terminology of Žižek, even the King, who asks the question in the first 
place, can assume himself in a position excluded by the secret and 
external to the Other, not to mention the people who are the only 
possible candidates to answer the question, when indeed all of them 
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are from the very beginning part of and included in the same game. 
One can also see that the desire to know can accommodate both a 
conscious sense to seek the secret and a more primary and 
open-ended question that does not necessarily have an answer, even 
though both are ultimately unattainable. The trick here is that the sense 
of both having and, paradoxically, lacking an ultimate and exclusive 
answer can work equally well to trigger an inter-subjective network 
that we retroactively and straightforwardly name as teleology.    
 
The above discussion is crucial to supplement the story of Richard Li in 
chapter 4. The openness of the working of desire works well with both 
Richard Li, who is the one manipulating the proceeding of the story, 
and other people, who are trying to make sense of the story, even if 
they do not consciously know if there is an answer at all. As long as we 
keep seeing the final revelation as the answer, rather than attend to 
how our desire to know the unattainable secret (which is whether 
Richard Li and the discourse of technology is the saviour of Hong Kong) 
guides us along the ‘wrong way’, (when the desire is the answer itself) 
we may still be far from approaching the contingent nature of this 
particular discourse, and we will fail to see for this particular discourse 
how our failure and desire are taken into consideration in 
advancecccxliv. In this case, we will simply see the story and judge the 
story as a one-way teleological unfolding of the secret. 
 
One question is justified to be brought up regarding Richard Li’s story: 
his empire of PCCW and he himself both eventually failed -- his 
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company has shrunk back to what it is supposed to be worth, maybe 
even less; he himself has now become no more than the object of a 
jokecccxlv. Moreover, time and again, even during his heyday, he was 
being criticized on account of his secret deals with the government, 
intentions of creating a monopoly and so on. While all of those are true 
and valid, they miss the point of the exercise in this thesis. In fact, those 
questions seem to mix up two aspects of inquiries, which are largely 
inseparable, but definitely not identical. To raise the question to what 
extent the discourse of technology successfully constructs its subjects is 
different from seeking to unravel the ways in which this discourse 
functions to construct its subjects. The analysis undertaken in this thesis, 
at the level of textual analysis, is clearly more of the latter kind. For the 
first kind of inquiry, a different methodology has to be employed, and is 
out of scope of the exercise in which we engaged here.  
 
Regarding the way the discourse functions, as we have discussed 
above, the teleological relation inherent in any story should not be 
simply seen as a case in which the secret lies only in the final revelation, 
after a whole narrative process external to the secret is gone through. 
The secret as merely the point of final revelation should not be taken as 
the absolute arbitrator, and is indeed far from being the most revealing. 
By the same token, the audience is also never neutral, listening 
indifferently to a story that reveals the answer in the last minute. 
Therefore, while it is true that Richard Li and his empire have fallen now, 
this alone is not adequately meaningful to be taken as the final answer 
of the whole problem, assigning meanings to all elements in the 
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discourse. On the contrary, all those questions justifiably raised could 
actually function as attempts to put up seemingly external scapegoats 
to mask the very fundamental contradictory quality and impossibility of 
the discourse, even at its peak moment, or from the opposite direction, 
against which ‘a pathos or nostalgia for a lost wholeness’cccxlvi can be 
constructed. In this light, judging him from the perspective of the final 
situation in which he turns out to be in, only defers, if not suspends, the 
exposure of the mask covering the impossible unity of the discourse of 
technology, and hence fails to see the impossibility of any primary 
narrative or discursively constructed social space in which all these 
discrepant elements and moments, in the sense defined by Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in Hegemony and socialist strategycccxlvii, 
can be coherently articulated. Therefore, although those questions are 
fully valid and could point to different directions of research, this 
validity stands only insofar as they do not presuppose a primary 
narrative or discursively constructed social space in which the 
discourse of technology and other elements and overflows can be 
properly and coherently accommodated. 
 
Why does the government always come up with 
solutions? 
Referring to the discussion of the previous section, early industrialization 
and the story of Richard Li, it might be interesting to postulate both the 
laissez-faire  and the high-technology function as the unattainable 
secret in Žižek’s joke about the Pole and the Jew. Or in other words, it is 
the objet a, which is ‘nothing but the rendering positive of a negative, 
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of making an object out of what does not exist’. cccxlviii  It is the 
object-cause of our desire, when the objet a itself is the very 
embodiment of the lack, and hence retroactively the desire. cccxlix 
Through this perspective, the issue with the discourse of technology is 
not whether it is ‘for real’, in terms of bringing economic success to 
Hong Kong, or whether it has unanimously been internalized in the 
minds of the people. We must, instead, pay attention to how this desire 
of laissez-faire and hi-tech as the ‘(unattainable) secret’ to the 
economies since the early 1950s, and at the end of 20 th century 
respectively, retroactively, or borrowing the words of Ngo, post hoc, 
constitute fantasy spaces, where the spaces themselves must by 
definition be deemed failures. Elements constituting the fantasy space 
can be various and include such as the post-handover Southeast Asia 
economic crisis, the lack of technological sophistication and 
diversification for long periods of time, too much indulgence in 
futureless labour -intensive and cutthroat industrial activities, threats of 
globalization, etc. It is precisely against these fantasy spaces that 
laissez-faire  and hi-tech can be constructed effectively as the object 
of desire, the magic and inevitable pills for economic development or 
the revival of Hong Kong. 
 
In order to further exemplify this mechanism, it might be instructive to 
recall Žižek’s rejection of Stalinism in his postface to Lukacs’s A defense 
of history and class consciousness. According to Žižek, for Stalinism, it is 
impossible to have any act proper. Stalin asserts that the revolutionary 
potential is written into the very ‘inner nature’ of the working class, yet it 
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does not arise spontaneously, and needs ‘neutral intellectuals’ to force 
the potential out of the workers. This very compulsion is ‘the Party’s 
exertion of dictatorial pressure over the “empirical”, actually existing 
workers and their confused, opportunistic self-awareness, in the name 
of (the Party’s correct insight into) what their true inner potentials 
and/or their “true long-term interests” in fact are’. cccl  
 
Here we have the same structure in the case of Žižek’s analysis of 
Stalinism and the case of the narration of Hong Kong history. In the 
case of the analysis of Stalinism, the moment of fantasy occurs when 
the nature of the working class is determined as revolutionary, but only 
in the form of ‘potential’, and along with this potential, they have their 
own interest, conflicts, etc., among themselves. And it is against this 
fantasy that (with their exclusive insight into the development of history) 
the Party’s  coercion becomes justifiable and even inevitable. In the 
case of the early account of the industrialization of Hong Kong by 
finance and trade capitalists, hongs, Hong Kong as a fantasy space 
was posed in which trade is ‘objectively’ and ‘empirically’ more 
profitable, the geographical conditions and raw materials and so on 
were all supposed to be unsuitable for developing industries. It is 
against this scenario that the desire to create the colony exclusively as 
an entrepot is posed, in the name of the ‘stability and prosperity’ of 
Hong Kong. The more Hong Kong is considered unsuitable for the 
development of industries, the more the development of the entrepot 
business is apposite and urgent. The moment of retroactivity here is 
that, by steering Hong Kong in the direction of entrepot trade, even 
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the ‘objective environment’ according to which we judge the validity 
of the fantasy changes in a direction favourable to the business of 
trade and finance, and hence makes the desire of the 
trade-benefiting laissez-faire naturally more palatable. 
 
The discourse o f technology is the contemporary counterpart that can 
be juxtaposed to those we have just looked into. Stanley Aronowitz 
provides one formulation in his book, Jobless future : ‘American’s 
weakened competitive position had to be improved through 
efficiency programmes such as technological change that reduced 
the size of the factory labour force; mergers and acquisitions that 
eliminated redundancy…  and applying hatchet to “overhead” costs 
such as clerical workers and middle management’. cccli The economic 
recovery brought about in these ways is called ‘jobless recovery’, and 
in such a situation, ‘everything, including jobs, had to be sacrificed to 
make workers more productive’.ccclii Is this not the basic model of what 
we have seen in the case of Richard Li’s PCCW? The basic elements 
are still employees, whose characteristics are: inefficient and 
redundant, whose status is again posed as the fantasy against which 
trimming and restructuring are conceived as ‘authentic’ solutions to 
the indeed unanswerable problem framed in terms of employees. This 
play of the 2 categories is significant, since fantasy and desire are in a 
relation in which fantasy creates desire which retroactively creates 
fantasy. They are therefore not two independent variables for us to 
measure the innocent distance between them. Our perception of any 
one end of the tension necessarily involves, or indeed is constituted by, 
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our change in perception from the other end. Yet, in the example of 
Richard Li, this game of restructuring is played out without much 
technological content, not to mention technological improvement, 
even if this discussion is situated precisely in the rhetoric of the ‘new 
economy’, which is highly associated with technological innovation. 
Yet the closed circuit that draws us in is still that the more Hong Kong’s 
industries are under-developed in terms of technologies, the more 
hi-tech Hong Kong is obliged to become. 
 
In effect, echoing Žižek’s assertion that a letter will always arrive at its 
destination, we can have a glimpse at why the government always 
comes up with solutions in different economic situations. The letter 
always arrives at its destination because once the letter enters into the 
symbolic circuit, the sender is subsequently disburdened of his 
responsibility for the letter.cccliii The sense of teleology here is not the 
ultimately unshakable, and objectively existing direct channel through 
which a letter arrives at its destination, quite the contrary, teleology 
here is merely presented as a post hoc rendering positive of the 
inter-subjective network that the letter passes through. So the fact that 
the government always comes up with a solution -- no matter whether 
it is entrepot trade in the pre-war period, industries in the post-war, or 
hi-tech by the end of the 20th century, with the laissez-faire policy a 
constant – has less to do with the government’s ability to identify and 
make sense of the problem at the very beginning, and its subsequent 
ability to formulate strictly corresponding solutions. Quite on the 
contrary, the teleological and causal relations involved have more to 
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do with retroactive creations of ‘problems’ to be solved and the 
retroactive fixing of dissimilar elements (i.e. the problems created and 
the solutions taken post hoc) into meaningful sequences in the field of 
discourse. As far as our desire is concerned, teleology is not a path out 
there in an a priori form, the government always comes up with 
solutions because we want ‘to know’, the solutions are only 
articulations that occupy our lack of the answer, and the problem as 
well, which is produced out of our desire ‘to know’, and are meant for 
us only. 
 
What exactly is ‘hi-tech’, then? 
We have now reached a position very close to the one of Laclau and 
Mouffe. In their Hegemony and socialist strategy, they revisit the 
interpretation of the history of the Russian Revolution and provide an 
alternative reading of the significance of that history. In orthodox 
Marxist doctrine, class is an abstract category defined in terms of its 
position in the process of production, and the historical development 
proceeds sequentially from the revolution of the bourgeois over the 
feudal lord to the revolution of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. But 
the situation of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century is peculiar, 
there was ‘weakness of the bourgeoisie, and urban civilization; 
disproportionate growth of the State as a military-bureaucratic 
apparatus becoming autonomous from classes; insertion of advanced 
form of capitalism resulting from “privilege of backwardness”; freshness 
of the Russian proletariat, due to the absence of tradition tying it to a 
complex civil society’cccliv. Due to the immaturity of the bourgeoisie, 
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they argue, the question of hegemony regarding the historical 
development is designated by a space ‘dominated by the tension 
between two very different relations: a) that of the hegemonized task 
and its “natural” class agent; and b) that of the hegemonized task and 
the class hegemonizing it’.ccclv  
 
In other words, the question of the Russian Revolution is: how can we 
grasp, as Žižek asks in a similar tone, ‘the tremendous emancipatory 
potential of the Event of October’ccclvi, without falling back to strictly 
observing some ambiguous law of general historical development. In 
effect, this is the question of how we are to understand the Russian 
proletariat’s bypassing the bourgeoisie to overthrow the Tsar: are we to 
still cling to the ‘narrative of exceptionalities’ or to open up the 
‘conceptualization of specificities’? ccclvii  Despite their complex 
argument, their answer is simple: what is important is the contingent, 
historical and hegemonic articulation of dissimilar elements, and our 
analysis of them, instead of their fixation back into the chain of 
abstract historical necessity. That is why they assert that, ‘(h)istory, 
therefore, is regarded not as an ascendant continuum of democratic 
reforms, but as a discontinuous series of hegemonic articulation or 
historical blocs’.ccclviii 
 
According to this assertion, it is meaningful to borrow this insight of 
Laclau and Mouffe from the reconsideration of the problem of history 
to the analysis of the discourse of technology in Hong Kong, and this 
has been attempted in this thesis: For both the government and the 
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business sector, the issue of hi-tech is posed as a ‘logically necessary’ 
or at least transparent implication against an ‘objectively pressing’ 
situation in the post-handover year. In the first chapter, an attempt was 
made to draw a rough picture in which different ways of approaching 
the problems of technology are sketched out. The discussions and 
debates vary hugely according to the times when they emerge, the 
theoretical frameworks to which they refer, the meanings of the very 
term ‘technology’ they evoke, etc., but all of them amount to drawing 
the picture of a dispersion or proliferation of the discourse of 
technology, in the sense of Foucault, as we can actually see there is 
hardly anything unifying in the term ‘technology’ itself: notions (except 
the very one of ‘technology’) such as author, style, period of time, idea, 
etc. all fail to unite this huge diversity of discussions and debates 
 
The chapter on the governance of Hong Kong further destabilizes the 
idea that Hong Kong is ‘a black box of rational progress’. Through the 
ways in which the vicious circle consisting of epidemics, bird flu and 
SARS, and public hygiene is articulated, the strength of changing our 
perspective regarding the analysis of social and political events should 
have become adequately clear. In the chapter, the concept of the 
performative is repeatedly discussed, and the reason should be 
obvious enough now. The idea that no matter when we speak or 
perform, we necessarily have objectively, externally existing referents 
from which we can judge the truth or falsity of what we said, is called 
into question. Instead, when we speak or perform, we constantly 
re-articulate, modify, or reinvent the referents concerned. Is this not 
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precisely the philosophical assumption of the theoretical discussion 
above? Concepts like historical development, field of discourse should 
not be assumed to have any essential, a priori core, such that other 
unarticulated elements are deemed as essentially external elements, 
and denied any fundamental potential for change. Thus we can see, 
from a greater distance, as shown in chapter 1, the degree of 
inconsistency or even conflict and chaos regarding the meaning of 
the ‘master signifier’ (and the meaning assigned from it to others). And 
it is in chapter 2 that we can see how every particular discourse in the 
field tries to set in place and fix, albeit temporarily, a certain network of 
meaning around the impossible master signifier; or in other words, how 
meaning is only possible when it is fixed temporarily in a particular 
discourse.  
 
Upon the groundwork laid down in chapter 1 and 2, the 2 subsequent 
chapters go on to depict the discourse (regarding both the 
government and business sector -- Richard Li and his PCCW in 
particular) constructed around the notion of hi-tech, as the ultimate 
and constitutive inadequacy. The chapters seek to show the 
mechanism of the hegemonic attempts of the SAR Government and 
Richard Li’s PCCW to articulate dissimilar elements and temporarily fix 
their meanings, so as to render possible a harmonious, unified discourse 
of hi-tech, namely a natural teleological path for Hong Kong. At the 
same time, by providing a broader global association and uncovering 
the unarticulated and subversive elements which penetrate the 
government and business discourse, the chapter argues for, instead of 
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a straightforward value judgment, the necessary impossibility of such 
attempts.  
 
The argument described above may better be explained with an 
imaginary example. For a very fatal disease, a whole range of 
treatments, medicines, and arrangements are inspired to combat it, 
but the mere presence of all of them will just give the disease a 
deadlier quality: if a certain simple treatment is able to cure it, that 
whole range of responses is unconceivable and unnecessary. 
Therefore, all of those responses, instead of successfully recognizing or 
capturing the disease, only paradoxically determine the quality of the 
disease as fatal. And if this example, though imaginary in nature, 
sounds easily understandable, it may be due to our recent association 
of something similar to it: SARS. SARS is not eliminated because medical 
professions invented an accurate and proper treatment, all 
arrangements regarding public hygiene look more like political 
gestures than direct responses to the disease, its gradual 
disappearance is also out of our grasp. All of them indeed confer the 
utter unattainability of the disease, yet the drive derived from this 
unattainability simply articulates dissimilar elements together, which 
further makes the disease mysterious. In the light of the discussion in 
chapter 2, rather than just proving the necessity of an analysis in terms 
of articulation, what the case of SARS shows us in this present context is 
obviously the complexity of causal relations in terms of the working of 
desire. 
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Referring back to our present discussion, suffice it to juxtapose the 
notion of ‘hi-tech’ with the notion of ‘society’ in Laclau and Mouffe. 
According to their famous discussion of the ‘impossibility of society’ as 
a ‘sutured and self-defined totality’, the assertion precisely points out 
that ‘there is no single underlying principle fixing – and hence 
constituting – the whole field of [social] difference’.ccclix Our sense of 
society as ‘a valid object of discourse’ is only an ideological nodal 
point, which ‘consists precisely in those discursive forms that seek to 
construct society and social agency as decidable discursive forms 
within a totalizing horizon that projects on to a particular discursive 
form an impossible fullness and transparency.’ccclx  Or from another 
angle, Laclau’s nodal point is also Žižek’s ‘quilt’, both society and 
‘hi-tech’ can be conceived of as words ‘to which “things” themselves 
refer to recognize themselves in their unity’. ccclxi  What this 
understanding implies is that, although the words are the points to 
which all moments within the discourse refer, the words do not 
consequently contain the richest meaning, or are not the master 
signifier assigning meaning to everything within the unity. Rather, the 
very words have to be utterly empty to embody the possible relations, 
and hence the meanings, that the words retroactively establish with 
the ‘things’, the dissimilar elements, waiting to be articulated. So if 
society exists only as a perpetual effort to construct its impossible self, 
‘hi-tech’ as the nodal point, or quilt, works in a similar way. Whereas by 
definition a discourse embodies the attempt to fix, at least temporarily, 
the meaning of the moments within, all the references within the same 
discourse will definitely make the meaning of the nodal point 
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self-conflicting and senseless, hence rendering it impossible for the 
nodal point to have any stable, self-defining meaning.  
 
Conclusion 
By now it should be clear that we do not criticize ideology because we 
consciously have a very defined and clear-cut picture of how a 
certain ideology misleads people, how ideology distorts the reality and 
so on.  Any reality is not to be grasped in its fullness, but is constantly in 
the remaking discursively, whose master-signifier, or the nodal point, is 
the ultimate inadequacy or unreachable, or in another formulation, 
the real goal of any ideology ‘is (just) the consistency, is the ideological 
attitude itself’.ccclxii Therefore, it is rather fruitless or incomplete simply to 
point out all the cracks between actions and thoughts, between the 
revealed intentions and the implicit intentions, between the reality 
formulated in any specific discourse and the reality ‘as it is’; in short, the 
symptoms. However, to say that it is fruitless obviously does not imply 
that there is no crack or there is nothing to blame: it is only the first step, 
rather than a complete process. The joke of the local stand-up 
comedian already shows us that the emptiness of any crack can 
paradoxically act as the ultimate support of people’s justification of 
their actions or decisions. Instead, the notion of fruitlessness implies that 
valid and effective criticisms do not stop where symptoms are pointed 
out, or, as Žižek said, ‘the unmasking of the secret is not sufficient’ccclxiii.    
 
What we have to attend to, therefore, is the form of ideology that 
drags people in – replacing the content without traversing the form 
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can not take us too far; the history of Hong Kong’s economic 
development narrated by a liberal or a socialist necessarily have 
differences, but not necessarily in terms of being ideological or not. If 
critics would like to wake people up from the neo-liberal fantasy (unless 
they in fact want to convert people to become total nihilists), what 
they have to do will be to conceive of a hegemonic articulation that 
does not presume any a priori master-signifier, such as laissez-faire or a 
new economy based on I.T., which fixes historical meanings once and 
for all. Recognizing the opening of any articulation; not trying to cover 
up points where incoherence can be found; keeping openness a topic 
of dialogue and debate; allowing change of articulation as the result 
of the dialogue or debate – all these may be possible ways to live with 
the necessity of fixing temporal meaning discursively.ccclxiv 
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